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I
CHAPT"^-; I
1 . 9 -^tata^ent of the p^"oolcv. .
It is the purpose of this stv.dy to investigate the
influerice of Hegel on l..ar:' . . ' 'aon in the philosophy
of the state. Only one other philosopher of th-; nineteenth
century has had as wide an effect upon the political thinkinj
ci ..i^i v.ui-ld as has Hegel, an^' ' -ras Larx. Hogol
gave rise to schools of political ideology as different as
the Fascists and the Corr unists. His follov;ers have produced
both individualistic and socialistic sy3t^r:3. His dialectical
Eiethod has achieved ^vorld-'vido fan.e and has v/on i.iany signifi-
caj-t follo-'ers.
Although E:any voIul.93 hav? -tun .v.'itten on the philosophy
of the state of these three ..or, no searching study of the
influence of Hegel on the la Veer t-^o in this field has been
L^ade. The special significance of the preson'. work is tiiat it
considers the influence of Hegel on Larx and Green in the philo-
sophy of the stat^.
2, The Significance of the P.-oblor:.
The widespread influence of Hegel on the political
thinking of the nineteenth and t-ventieth centuries has been

wqII attested, ^ Few philosophers have aroused such a
variation of response. Ken 7/ho lollov/ad hij:: or v/ere in-
fluenced by hii:: d'^velopea theories as different as Larxisn,
on' the one hand, and as ^'ascisn on the other,
1 ' 2
l.arx las bean caled Hagel s greatest scholar, Hecker
K
I
has assorted that L.ar:: acceptia I-3gel s thesis that the con-
sciousness of necessity is the beginning of freedom, but that
hile the theory suggested resignation to the status quo,
*.arx interpreted it dynai-dcally as a challenge, ^ Braraeld
speaks of the "Hegelian synpathies of ii-arx, Sngels, and Lenin."
He points out that l-'arx s PhD, dissertation, led him to syi^-
pathize •vith Hegel. ° i.arx v/as "caught by the tide of popu-
n
larity accorded HegelianisE:,
"
Eober speaks of Hegel as '"•^7' s ^r.'^ "^ngols* "^.a2ter," ^
He calls attention to the herita^^u "bequeathed by xiegel," -
ar.d concludes that Larx "was also a Hegelian, and he was mver
quite successful in divoi'cing hir.self f:L"on- his naster."
1. See I. arcuse, RAR, pas sir...
2. Vogel, HG, 211.
3. Hocker, CTi.", 105,
4. Ef-ar;.eld, PAC, 11. See also Lenin, m;, IC.
5. Differenz der den-okritscher. und epiku.re ischen Ilatur-
philosophie . In this study i.arx interprets Stoicisr and Dpi
• cureanisE. as doctrines of self-consciousness,
6. Eranield, PAC, 55f55.
7. Ibid., 49.
8. Sober, LIH, 115.
9. Ibid., 119.
10. Ibid., 343,

Veblsn r.,entio" ^ debt -''--i^^- '. ".-^'^ owed to Hegel.
Engel? refers to rlegel's ^apocii , akinf; sorvice" in showing
things to be in a process of growth, Larx luentioned his
dependence on Hogel for the dialectic ^'^ but stated that he
turned Hegel right side up, ''^ As we shall note later, however,
aside from the dialectic, larx s relation to Hegel was i.iore a
reaction against his theorias ':hr.r it "'as an acceptance of
them.
In the eyes of his biographers cind followers Greor, also,
was a student of riegel, L.arcu^e refers to Hegel's influence
on Green, Sabine calls attention to the fact that C-reen
was influenced by Hegel, but that he reacted sharply to cer-
tain Hegelian principles of the state. -^"^ Barker speaks of the
profound influence of i'^egel on Green. Catlin says,
however, that of the right wing British Hegelians, Gi'een was
the least influenced by Hegel.
Green refers to the truth in Hegel's idea of the state
as a Leans to the realization of freedon;, •'^ and agrees with
11. Yeblen, SLC, 420,
12. 3ngels, AD, 45, 65; LP, 21, 46, 96,
13. Lerx to Dietzgen, 1S76; OAF, I, 25, 338.
14. Larx, GI, 199; CHPa in S-iH, 25; CGL, 349; CAP, I, 25.
15. La reuse, RAR.
16. Sabine, HPT, 674.
17. Barker, P^ST, 11, 25, 29-30, 46, 61, 66-69, 72.
18. Catlin, SPP.
19. iJettlGship, "iOG, II, 312.

hit. that uoQGrn states do contx'ibute to the roalization of
frojdor>', But Green feels at Kegel 'i:''. ::ot adeqvrt
stress the faci that freedom, cannot even be oonsiderad apart
froK. individuals. Green agreed with Hegel that the state had
a significant part to play ir :: developtient of freedor., but
he believed that Hegel slighte-i she individual and over-empha-
sized the state.
3, The Background of the Philo':oph7 of the State.
The essential problen of the philosophy of the stato
has revolved around the relation of the individual to the
stute. T' jarly Hebrews beliovod that their great lawgiver,
"0S3S, received the la-.vs frou God. It v-as Loses' task to bind
"together into a single political unity the various tribes."
In those aarly T.-ildorness days 'the general principle -^as that
the unity of the tribe was n.ora ir..portant than the wishes of
individuals. In fact, v/hoevar croke a tribal latv cerited
20. Kettloship, ',70G, II, 312.
21. See article by T.H. ?Lobinson, "History of the Hebrew
and Jewish ^'eople," in Ab. JotJ..., 62a.
i
divine punishment. The Pythagoreans taught that the individual
should subordinate hinself to the whole. Respect for civil autho-
rity was primary. The welfare of everyone depended upon the state,
Democritus maintained that a well-ordered state was the greatest
safeguard to a healthy and prosperous people. An essentially blind
obedience to the state was expected of everyone.
This early Greek idea of absolute subservience to the state
began to change about the time of the Sophists, They emphasized
the individual,
Xenephon in his Memorabilia relates that Socrates never tired
of asking eveiryone he met, "What is a state?" His answer to his
question is well expressed by his attitude in prison. He indicated
both the worth of the indi-^idual conscience and the significance of
the laws of the state,
Plato's idea of the state was basically aristocratic. Only
the best minds should rule, Th^ purpose of this was first to make
a better state and secondly to make better citizens. But under-
neath Plato's idea of the state we see an assumption of the natural-
ness of slave labor, Aristotle followed Plato essentially in this.
Both of them failed to sense the internationalism which we find
so pertinently in Kant.
Through the centuries Lien have revised and re-emphasized
different aspects of the philosophy of the state, ^en like
II
I
I
Spinoza and Hobbes amphasizsd the supremacy of the state as the
institution that saved man from a barbarous state of naturo. Others
like Locke, K9usseaU| Adam Sii.ith, and Ricardo emphasized the indi-
vidual whose welfare it was the state's business to insure. In
general, they believed that this could be ac :;oniplished by a lais saz -
f aire attitude on the part of the state.
There is a growing sentiment today that the great productive
resources of the world ought to be made to serve the needs of the
masses of people, T/liether this will be done through the charity
of the owners in an individualistic order, or whether it will be
done through the charity of the government (either aristocratic
or democratic), the fact remains that it should be accomplished,
Hegel, Marx and Green endeavored to make it possible for everyone
to have an abundant life. Their methods of securing this life
raise once again for consideration the question as to the amount
of state authority that is compatible with self-realization.
3, The kethod.
We shall consider each man in his chronological order. Since
ethics and politics are so clearly associated, we shall investigate
briefly the ethical theor-y of each before we consider his philosophy
of the state. In their ethics we shall find their expectations for
and confidence in man, what they wanted man to become, the ethical
goal of human endeavor, and the criterion or criteria of a valid

ethics. We shall relate each ran to the one or ones who precede
him. In our concluding chapter we shall sumaarize our conclusions
on tho influence of Hegal on l.arx and T.H.Green in the philosophy
of the state.

A REVIEW 0? -ii^ UTSRATUIIE
Cartain of the most relevant studies on tha philosophy
01 .the state of He[;el, L.ar::, ...^ . '^- .l.-- .ill je considered.
There is a paucity of works on the influence of Hegel on
Larx and Groan in the field of the philosophy of the st::ite,
and in the few works which ara pointed out, there is no
searching study of the correlations.
1. i-iterature. Relat ing to -e^el's Philosophy of the State .
Btilow in his volur.;e on Die 5nt;7icklung der Ilagelschen
Sozialphilosophie er.phasizns several features of Hegel's
social philosophy, -"-s r.ot^s: 1) t'^3 significance ^iven.to
private property, 2) the ei.-phaois on factors othor than the
aconotic in the davelopnent of r.An, 3) Hegel s statecieTrts
c-gainst force, 4) lais - r ':, :u e of capitalist, 5) the Gr.phasis
On the need for one "Selbstoowusstseiii" for others if full
developr..ent is to take plac .. concludes that in Kegel's
svstsj.., "Jrcih^iit ist darn nioht i.ehr 3ie rasenda lillkttr,
sondez'n die Gebundenheit an das Sittengesatz,"
Vogel's book deals not only 'ith Kegel's ideas of tho state
but -vith the influence of -legol on I.arr. TI.g author conoludus ch
I.Qgel s greatest student is I'arl L.arx. Vogel endaavors to shov;
that tha ideas of l^arx and SngelP follou necessarily fron those
1. Biilo-j, 3KS, 143
2. Vogel, HG, 211.

riegel,
Reyburn has given us a splendid study of Hegel's philosophy
of the state. The author deals with the corr.iiionly accepted empha-
ses of Hegel and in addition points out the place that Hegel gaire
to econor.:ics, ^ Napoleon taught Hegel that the basis of the state
is the nation, Reyburn points out what he considers the major
weakness of Hegel's treatr.;ent of the state. He underestimated the
reason of the masses and overest iiriated the ability of disinterested
officials or the Prince to recognize the real needs of the nation.
Gray's voliime on Hjgel's Hellenic Ideal observes that: 1) Hegel's
idea of history is founded on the principle that reason rules the
world, 2) freedom is learned under the aegis of a state, 3) Hegel ror-
ked more frora the viewpoint of civilizations than of individuals,
4) Hegel was attracted to the power of unifying the state which
religion had, 5) the indi 'idual '-as determined social institutions,
6)the Christian religion erred in placing supreme value on the indi-
vidual person and his claims torithe detriment of the culture as a
whole,
Stirling ^ finds the secret of Hegel to be that he "made explicit
the concrete universal that was implicit in Kant,"
Stace ^ observes that for Hegel 1) a person is an absolute
end and should not be used as a means, 2) the person finds his
significance in the state, "the state is the true self of the
3. Reyburn, ETH, 218.
4. Stirling, TSH,zxii.
5. Stace, PH.

individual." ^ 3) the state is the suprema embodiment of freedom,
4) mo:; have no authority over i'^atss,
Sterrett ^ concludes t. at Hegel 1) puts more stress on the
whole than on the individual, 2) assarts that a man cannot be a
person without a state, 3) and yet maintains that individuals merit
real concern.
Fischer in his monum.ental work says that Hegel maintained
that, "Der Staat dient nicht, sondern er herrscht; er ist nicht
Mittel, sondern Zweck, und zwar Zweck an sich, der httchste aller
Zwecke, Selbst = und Endzweck," ^ The state is "ein sittlicher
Organismus," ^ Religion ought to help to unify the state. War
helps to unite the state, and is needed to preserve the state since
there is no arbiter save the ''Jorld Spirit between states,
Hoenigswald has conLiented briefly on Hagel's philosophy of
the state in an article in Runes, Twentieth Centurjr Philosophy ,
He mentions the influence of Hegel on l.arz in the political sphere
but he does not ,give any detailed explanation of it. He criticizes
Hegel for what he sees as ."the permanance and absoluteness of the
Spirit in the midst of the vicissitudes of its development," '^^
Flewelling, in the above Runes volxime, says that Hegel "was
primarily an absolutist who could not in spite of hin-;self get
6. Stace, PH, 406,
7. Sterrett, EH.
8i Fischer, HLWL, II, 727,
9, Loc, cit,
10. Runes, TCP, 284,
II 1 \
entirely away from personalistic assumptions,"
Sabine points out that "the revolutionary quality of Hegeli-
anism is most apparent in its criticisn of religion. The dialectic
shows the relativism of all supposed absolute truths."
Rosenzweig calls Hegelc's political philosophy "harte
und beschrSnkte . " He indicates the influence of liapoleon on
Hegel's idea of the nation-state and the consequent emphasis
on patriotism toward the state. Rosenzweig portrays Hegel's
system as statism and yet statism for the purpose of developing
free men, H9 points out that Hegel's followers have embraced
both ultra-conservative and radical movements,
Giese considers the educational task of the state in the
light of the pre-eminence of the state. He points out that the
nation idea is basic to the state. The function of religion is
to lend support to the idea that the state is "gOttlicher Wille."
"Nur durch die Kirchenspaltung hat der Staat werden ktJnnen, was
seine Bestircmung ist, die selbstbewmsste Vernttnf tigkeit und
Sittlichkeit."
Busse -^^ shows the origins of Hegel's ideas of the state to
be in his PhSinomenologie des G eistes . Hegel had concluded in his
PhMnoEienologie that the contemporary development of the World Spirit
11. Runes, TCP, 333.
12. Sabine, HPT, 687.
13. Rosenzweig, HS.
14. Giese, HS.
15. Ibid,, 118.
16. Busse, HPGS.
\
is through the vehicle of the consciousness of a particular
nation, Hegel traced in this book the outline of ri.ght as
1) iirxodiate or naturaO. mind: the family, 2) the relation of
individuals to one another in a formal universality: Civil Society,
3) mind developed to an organia actuality: Political Constitution,
Aside from the iren Lientioned above the following have written
favorably or unfavorably on Hegel's ideas: Michelet, Gflschel,
Erdmann, A. Ruge, Rosenkranz, D, Strauss, the Bauers, Feuerbach,
Marx, Engels, T.H.Green, Bradley, Bosanquet, Hobhouse, Gentile,
Croce, Hastie, E.S.Haldane, W, Wallace, ^, Haym, K. Kdstlin,
J. Klaiber, E, Caird, A. Seth, G, S. Morris , W.T.HarriflB. Followers
of Hegel in America include philosophers with as widely different
theories as Royce and Calkins, who are absolutists, Brightm^an
and Flewelling who are parsonalists, 2rA Sydney Kook, a naturalist,
2, Literature Relating to Marx's Ph ilosophy of the State ,
Venable's book, while not on I'arx's philosophy of the state,
is valuable as a contribution to the understanding of llarx's ethics.
Venable notes Marx's emphasis on the class struggle and yet the
classless nature of his goal, 2) idea of man as "a function in a
field," 3) confidence that h\iman nature can be changed.
Parkes has written a critical attack on Marxist theory.
17. Venable, HInIM,. 5,
18, Parkes, MAa.

He points out that the goal of freodom, security, justice and
peace toward which the ^'arxians strive is not compatible with the
means of class warfare, r3volution, and dictatorship. Parkes
surveys history for evidence to support his conclusions that I'arx
erred in the following ways: 1) Revolutions occu.:' not in industri-
alized nations, but in peasant nations, Parkos overlooks, however,
Larx's recognition that such nations as the United States of America,
Great Britain, and France might not need a revolution; 2) The pro-
letariat is not and never v/as a revolutionary class, -^he proletariat
is reformist. It is the group of middle class students who supply
the revolutionary impetus. But Parkes overlooks liarx's recognition
that while the proletariat ii.ay not be aware of its function as a
revolutionary agent, it is the logical group since it has the
greatest need and suffers most because of the evils of the system;
3) Russia has achieved none of L:arx's ideals. Parkes affirms that
L'arx's kingdom of freedom is really a slave order since freedom
must mean liberty to do what one chooses, a matter concerning which
Hegel, Ivlarx and Green have a word to say. The socialized economy
of Larx limits personal choices, frustrates democracy, and functions
inefficiently. In another field Parkes criticizes Marxism for failing
to emphasize the interaction between economic and ideological factors
and for assuming that everything has an economic cause, We shall answer
these comments when we consider Ivlarx' s philosophy of the state.

One of the most complets books on Larx's philosophy of the
state is that of S.H. Chang. •'^ It deals searchingly, sympathe-
tically, and critically with the Marxian principles of the state.
Chamberlin in an article entitled "Karl Llarx: False Prophet"
deals devastatingly with most of the Marxian principles. He con-
cludes: 1) tnat Marx erred in emphasizing the labor theory of value,
2) that the dictatorship of the proletariat was a "conception of
preferred rights for the class of manual wage-workers,"
3) that his analysis of the need for revolution was unsound and
unhistorical
,
4) that he overlooked the virtues of capitalism,
and 5) that Larx's materialism was a one-sided interpretation of
history,
22
Steklof f calls attention to the exceptions which Marx made
to the necessity for violent revolution.
In Lenin's State and Revolution the clear statement of the
principle that under the Communist society the state would be
unnecessary is i\ade. Its classic expression is, "The state will
be able to wither away completely when society has realized the
rule, 'Fromi each according to his ability; to eaca according to
his needs,'"
19. Chang, MTS.
20, Am. Merc
,
Jan., 1939,
.21, Ibid., 64.
22, Steklof f, HFI, 240.
2 3. Lenin, SAR, 97.

J. i.iuw.louOii 1 uri'y . o:....:^ out that i ar:c l*aC cr.v.ght
Hegal's vision of the devslopu3nt of hui:.an history arj a por-
trayal of the slo77 ar.-ival of c alf -consciousness in ran.
.-9 i-aintaii s that it is a defo:;t of the popular versior. of
I. arzisK that it assuiacs that Kar:t dir^ not care what happenod
"to thn individual.
Ealz ^'-^ in a study of '^q.i-a^z value doctrino says that
tha Aristotloian Eianner of thinking pervades the Marxian
r,r i^ of valvn, "^.is i" no-- ':trr'.nge since i.;ost philosophers
Qi tiiat day r/ero influenoad by Aristotle, '.'sTiile Kegel's or-
-anicisr. v/es Aristotelian, his lo^-ic v/as an atl^lc against
Aristotle
.
Barker rondnds vis that Larx did make provision for
a gradual social trans f on-;£t ion 'Without a violent revolution.
-^astci,
. , .-..t .
-
.ri.-ic; anu spiri . ar^- not anti-
thetical, and that 1. arx vras suprex aly concerned with the ividi-
vidual.
24, "l^arsis}.. and the i:...:.viaual, " iu . .-u.,
25, Balz, VDI.,v.
26, Barker, PTSP, 209.
27, "Larzist. and Spiritiuality, " The Protcsta:.t , vol, IV, no.

3, Literature Relating to T. H. Green's Philosophy of the State.
Ritchie deils searchingly with Green's attitude toward the
relation of the individual to the state. State action for Green
is expedient only in so far as it "tends to proriote freedoiT: in the
sense of self -dotertained acticn directed to the objects of reason,
inexpedient in so far as it tends to interfere with this,"
Ke points out the Kantianism; of Green in his emphasis on the in-
dividual will, Ritchie indicates the combination of the theoretical
and practical in Green.
He went straight from the declaration of the poll,
when he was elected a to'vn councillor, to lecture on
the Critique of Pure Reason . He was robbed of his
sleep by thinking about the Eastern question and
dreading lest the country should be driven by ii;otives
*of which perhaps a diffused desire for excitetient has
been the most innocent,' into what he regarded as an
indefensible and unrighteous war. His strong opinions
on the liquor traffic ^'/ere in his own mind directly
connected with his conception of the ethical end and
the nature of rights.
Barker ^ points out the interest of Green in social reform,
particularly education, tenperance, and property. He stresses
Green's eaaiphasis on the negative function of the state as a rer.over
of obstacles. ^Jiberty for Green is highly personal. But he recog-
nizes that the state must interfere at times to insure liberty for
28. Ritchie, PSI, 14-7
29. Ibid,, 131-132.
30. Barker, PTST.

the individual. Green believed that war was unnecessary and
evil. Like Kant he believed in the possibility of brotherhood
between nations,
Sabine shows how Green's belief in government interference
for the removal of obstaxilos is not incompatible with his interest
in personal freedon;. He concludes that Green's idea of self-reali-
zation "whose conditions a conxiunity ought to secure for its men-
bers was in the main Aristotle's idealization of Greek citizenship
but with its aristocratic implications omitted,"
Lluirhead suggests tnat Green's emphasis was humanistic
in the sense that his philosophy intended to establish a '.working
basis for human endeavor, Grnen* conceived that the true good is
both personal and social, and that the purpose of the state is to
provide for the freedom that individuals need to pursue the good.
Green points out that property is right only if it helps the indi-
vidual to self-realization,
LacCunn sees Green's interest in political activity as
arising from, two sources: 1) §i sense of public duty, and 2) an
application of his philosophy of idealism.. Green's purpose was to
show the basis in reason for the principles of democratic citizenship.
31. Sabine, HPT.
32, Ibid., 674.
33, Luirhead, TS3.
34. LacCunn, SRT.

Ha believed with Hegel that political affairs need a religious
evaluation and reference if they are to be fully intellij^ible,
llacCunn points out the Ka-otianisni of Green in his concept of duty
as nore fundamental than right.
Dr, Georgia Harkness calls attention to several najor
elements in Green's political theory. Society ought to develop
or to allow for the developnent of hxirnan capabilities to their most
complete realization. In this task the state is a remover of
abstacles. She indicates Green's interest in social reform and
calls him "a sober-miraed visionary," She concludes that Green
saw the problem of the times as that of reconciling the "conflicting
claims of the modern spirit."
Bosanquet's theory of the "hindering of hindrances" ^® is
comiparable to Green's plea for the removal of obstables to personal
d^-^velopment . He agrees with Green that rights are "that vshich is
really necessary to the maintenance of material conditions essential
to the existence and perfection of human personality,"
Leland says that Green lays down principles not rules.
In his dealing with education Green insists that the purpose of
education is to develop personality in harmony with the principle
35, Harkness, POG.
36. Ibid,, 121,
37, Ibid,, 128.
38, Bosanquet, PTS.
39. Ibid., 137.
40. Leland, ETPfJ.
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of self-realization. The sole purpose of ohe state is to contri-
bute to the good of individuals, and yet he agreed \n.±h Hegel
that individuals found perspective only in society.
Other than the above mentioned the folloT/ing have written
on Green's philosophy: Fairbrother, R.B.C, Johnson, Sidgwick,
Pringle-Pattison, and Dewey,
4, Literature Relating to the Influence of Hegel on I.arx and Green,
Llarcuse has written a n:ost significant book on Hegel's
influence on both I,;arx and Green, It deals suggestively with Hagel's
dialectical philosophy, but only slightly with i;arx's theories of
the state. The influence of the dialectical principle on Larx is the
E.ajor fact considered. Several aspects of Green's philosophy of
the state are noted, but no searching stud^^; of the influence of
Hegel or Karx on Green in this field is made,
Sidney Hook's voluxie '^^ deals with the development of political
thought from Hegel to Larx, Hook ciaintains that Hegel was a poli-
tical reactionary and that he stood for "political accomodation,"
The author says that Larx is "not interested in what the individual
n'.an makes or does not make. He is primarily interested in the behavior
of groups or classes and in the individual only in so far as he is
44
a member of a group or class," For Hegel the state is the con-
dition of social life. For ! arx the state is the product of social life.
41, Larcuse, RAR.
42, Hook, HTJ.:.
43, Ibid., 19.
44, Ibid., 39.

Rebecca Cooper has written on the Logical Influence of Hegel
on Larx. She considers a nurr.ber of the aspects of l.arx's philosophy
of the state which have a supposed relation to that of Hegel. She
deals with property, contract, crime, classes, and the state. But
her conclusion is that the connection between Hegelianism and i;arxisr..
is "purely external and verbal rather than an integral one,"
Sabine points out the influence of Hegel's dialectic on
I'arx's thinking. He points ov\t that Larx recognized the dialectic
as revolutionary in its implications in spite of the fact that
conservative Hegelians had used it in a reactionary fashion.
47Larck considers ceiiiain Hegelian and Marxian ideas of the
state in their relation to each other. On the basic question as
to the relation of i'.arx to Hegel, L!arck says: "Diese Frage ent-
scheidet sich an der Jlolle der dialektischen Kiethode Hegels fUr
den Iiarxisrr.us ,
"
Lenin's Teaching of Karl larx deals with the role which liarx
played as the iLan who "continued and completed the three chief ide-
logical currents of the nineteenth century," ^'^ These three currents
were: 1) classical Gernan phi 1 os ophy( primarily Hegel and Kant),
2) classical English political economy (Smith, Ricardo, and I'althus)
,
and 3) French SocialismC Sistiondi and Fourier), Lenin remarks that
the dialectic, which L:arx borrowed from Hegel, was the greatest
^tchievement of classical German philosophy.
45. Cooper, LIHI.;, 178,
46. Sabine, HPT.
47. Liarck, HI'.
48. Ibid., 3.
49. Lenin, TKli, 10.

This dependence of Larx on the Hegelian dialectic is empha-
sized further in Lenin's Cahiers sur la Dialectique de Hegel,
21

CHAPTER III
THE ETHICAL THEORY OF HEGEL
1, Abstract or Fornal Right .
The dialectic of the ethical theory moves from abstract
right, to MoralitSt , and finally to Sittlichkoit , Although the
last stage is the most real because it is the most universal,
the first stage is essential in recognizing that right may be
determined or derived from pure logic. The logic in turn derives
from tho very nature of being. The abstract state of right is one
of particularity, in that the universal is only potential. ^
Selfhood is not yet recognized at this abstract level of ethical
theory. This is the stagG of pure formal categories of right.
But no sooner are these forr.ial principles established than contra-
dictions arise, '^hese contradictions push the dialectical move-
ment of right to tho stage of m.orality where right becomes personal
right. But in its genesis, right is formal and essentially a pro-
duct of thought. ^
We cannot remain on the level of formal right, because here
our acts have only a negative reference to the will of others.
In loralitHt, however, our acts have a positive reference to the
wills of others, L'oralitSt involves the subjective or personal
1. Hegel, POR, 44.
2. Ibid., 11.

element, and, whereas the abstract right is derived from pure
logic, E^orality includas the subjective relations of i/.dividuals
and is thus a higher explication of freedom.
The ought which is the distinguishing 'element of
morality, does not however attain to actual exis-
tence, except in concrete social relations of men, ^
The essential field of right is the will, and this is basically
free. In i^his manner freedom "constitutes the substance and essen-
tial character of the will, and the system, of right is the kingdom
of actualized freedom." ^ The systematization of right leads
irresistibly to relations, "'hat begins as pure formal right
m.ust be developed in its relations. This brings formal right
to LaralitSt,
2. The Relation of Will and Thought ,
Hegel recognizBS, as all ethicists must, the fact of freedom
of choice, ^ The development of ethical theory becomes the develop-
ment of the freed Qm> of man as it relates to others as well as to the
formal right, Will is basic to Lora litSt. The impulse of spirit
is the will to freedom, Freedomi is not meant to be the license
to do whatever one wants to do. Freedom cannot remain a formal
matter. Here again the dialectic is at work,
A v/ill which resolves nothing is not an actual
will; that which is devoid of definite character
never reaches a volition, ^
3, Hegel, POrl, 168, See also Sterrett, EH, 106,
4, Ibid,, 10.
5, Ibid,, 13.
6, Ibid,, 23.

The impetus of the dialectic recessitates the Eiovement from
formal will to subjective will, and fror. subjective will to ob-
jective will. The progress is in the direction of the more in-
clusive. Formal right considers only the bare fact of right.
Subjective right considers the additional datxun of self. It is
not just bare right, it is my right. Objective right considers
the additional datura of absoluteness or universality. This leads
Hegel to the philftophy of the state.
Will and thought are not separated by Hegel other than as
formal principles. The free 'vill is also a thinking will. Will
is essentially free or self-determining, and to fulfill its highest
meaning it needs the con.plement of thought, "Spirit is ,,, intelli
gence," ^
Man is pure thought of himself, and only in
thinking has he the power to give himself
universality and to extinguish in himself all
that is particular and definite, ^
As Hegel pointed out in another regard:
Reason cancels the indef initeness that agreeable
feeling has in relation to objects, rids the content
of the impulses of subjectivity and contingency, and
teaches in respect to the content, the knov/ladge of
the universal and essential in what is desireworthy
,
and in respect to the forrri, or the disposition, the
object or action for the sake of the fact itself. -^^
Will must be treated by reasonableness, which is essentially
7. Hegel, POR, 106,
8. Ibid,, 13,
9. Ibid,, 15.
10, Hegel, RDR, 50.

coherence. If a nan is to amount to anything, he r.ust know
hov7 to lir.it his will by his reason. "The laurels of mere
willing are dry leaves, which have never been freen,"
Will is the unity of two Glerrents, "indef initeness or genera-
lity and def initeness o particularity." In order to be
complete will cust be reasonable. This, however, is still on the
level of forTr.al right and formal willing,
3, The Theory of Right and Duty .
In the abstract sense right is "freedom as idea." ^'^
And "every step in the development of the idea of freedora has its
peculiar right, because it is the er/ibodiment of a phase of free-
dom." •'•^ Right is a term belonging to free persons.
In so far as everyone is recognized as a free
being he is a person. The principle of the
right is therefore expressed as follc/s: Each
one shall be treated by every other person
as a person,
This right of persons to be recognized and respected as
free is likewise a duty, -lights and duties are comUiensurate and
inseparable. In so far as a person is worthy of rights, ho is
likewise possessive of duties. Persons have duties to themselves
to the fandly, to the state, and to other m^en in general,
11, Hegel, POR, 120,
12, Ibid,, 17.
13, Ibid,, 36,
14, Log, cit,
15, Hegel, RDR, 26-29.
16, Ibid., 3,

For example, "an action that lir/.its the freedon of another, or does
not acknowledge and treat him as a free will is contrary to the
right," ^"^ As a person worthy of being respected by others as a
free being a man has the duty to respect every other person as
IS
a free being also.
Since Hegel aimed to get r:ien free, he condemned slavery.
He recognized that it depends on a person's will whether he will
be a slave or not. Slavery, then, is not only an abrogation of
duty and right for the one who oppresses but for the one who is
1 Q
oppressed as well. There are socie things that cannot be relin-
quished, such as, reason, morality, and religion. We are the
rightful masters of these things, and even the slave must consider
it not only his right but his duty to see that he is the captain
of his invincible and unassailable freedom, In this realm also
the dialectic drives ethical theory from formal right, to personal
right, and to objective right, "The notion of the right.,, has
reality only in political society." ^-^
4, The Constituents of a Loral Act ,
The individual right ray be siTiirued up as the coivmand to
"be a person and respect others as persons." I'oralit&t
is the area in which individual personality arises and develops.
17. Hegel, KDR, 29.
18. Ibid., 3,
19. Hegel, POR, 63.
20. Ibid,, 71, 105,
21. Hegel, RDR, 40.
22. Hegel, POR, 45.

There are three factors in a irioral act. First, there is the
factor of piarpose. We must ask, does this act accord with r.:j pur-
pose? It is understood that v;e are aware of our acts. It is this
avy.areness that makes us rr.oi'al y responsible for r!l\a± we do.
Oedipus, who killed his father and married his mother unknowingly,
wa^ not morally guilty although his act was formally wrong, '•he
purpose of action is a factor involving morality of action. On
the level of MoralitSt purpose is subjective and individual,
while on the level of Sjttliohkeit purpose becomos objective and
universal,
A second factor involved in a moral act Ol, ncerns whether the
act has valvie for the door. 'A'hGreas the first factor was toleolo-
gical, the second is axiological. As the dialectic of ethical
theory progresses, the question becomes more one of value for the
individual. It involves value for other individuals and social
groups and finally value for the state.
The third factor is the most universal and involves the fact
of universal value. This is the Good. "The good is in general
the essefacG of the v/ill in its substantive and universal character,
the will in its truth," The highest morality, then, is to desire
what is universally good, Priv-'te intentions are not suf:^ieient to
23. Hegel, POR, 125,

atone for wrong behavior, 1-y inspiration and my feeling cannot
justify a wrong act, I.'y intsnticn must bo tested by its results
on the good of the state. This sets the stage for the organic
theory of the state which Hogel holds, where "When one moLiber of
a conx.unity suffers, all others suf -er with him," " Thus the
test of rriorai action moves fron. formal purpose to personal value,
and finally to the universal good.
5, The Transition from LoralitHt to Sittlichkeit ,
The person is meant to be infinite and universal. To confine
the person to mera subjective I. oral it St is to "Stultify its very
nature. The absolutely free r;ill begins with abstract or formal
right, moves to the sphere of morality where individuals contrast
with other individuals and groups, and finally is lod to tho idea
of the good as realzed both in the will and in the world,
Hegel pointed out tho function of property in the development
of selfhood, Lan's dealing with private property leads him to
more wide-reaching morality. Contract is the next stage beyond
property. In property the individual faces only himsoDLf, while
in contract there are at least t'.7o -ill involved. The individual
cannot act arbitrarily in contract. In marriage, for example, two
persons give up their priv::.te rights in order to share in social
24. Hegel, POR, 216,

rights-. This Kaj seem at first like a lirdt at ion, but it is in
roality the liberation of both, Through the luutual dapendence
and co-operation involved, self-seeking is converted into other-
seeking,
A further step is needed. This is the state. "The character-
istic of ir.an as rational is to live in a state; if there is no
state, reason claims that one should bo founded." The state is
no mere organ to protect property or even life. It is the realm
in which the freedom of the person becomes concrete and universal.
Thus /the dialectic forces the transition from abstract right to
Loralityt and now to Sittlichkeit.
25, Hegel, POR, 166-1G7
26. Ibid., 79.

CHAPTSR IV
HEG3L'S PHILOSOPHY OF TrlE STATE
1. The Stata As The ^^aalization Of the ]j>thical Idea
.
1) The basis of tha state in reason .
The ethical idea which was considered by Hegel first in its
particularity or aostraction, then in its coirx'Unity of contract
where the individual iiiust consider the ^ill of others fijids its
fulfillment in the organization of the state. The state is no mere
contract of convenience in the Todinian or Rouoseauean sense,
Jean Bodin had said that the state '.vas founded on a contract which
the people ir.ake with the ruler. Once this contract is made it
cannot be .rokon, riegel asserted that the contractual relation
v/as a Liore societal agreenent and that this was not adequate upon
which to found a state. The state is the necessaiy culmination of
the absolutely free -nill in its progressive developront , Hobbes
and tiagel concurred in the principle that a state of nature would
be a state of savagery. Hegel Tras no Thoreau, The isolation of
a Walden represented joth personal and political regression, Lan
was made for conipanionship and in his ethical outreach demanded a
state.
As the "realized etnical idea or ethical spirit"^ th3 state
1, Hegel, POL, 502., POli, 240.

has as its founMation a basic reasonableness. It is impossible
to understand the implications of tiegel's theory of tha state
unless we recognize that he coTiSidered the state to be the hi!rb-
est expression of reason. T is fact is seen more clearly when
we note his appreciation of the Germanic State as the superior
state- of his tin.e. It '.vas because he saw the Germanic countries
as possessing the n.ost rational basis of any existing state. His
implication that the pr9S3-nt r.onarchic state was the i, ost adequate
to date rested on his con^-iction that it i'epresentod reason at
its present best and that it cost adequately provided for freedom.
The coLr..only proG.ulgated theory that Hegel was simply another
Genuan nationalist overlooks the unceasingly advancing nature
of the dialectic, a fact that Hegel himself illustrated when he
pointed out that Ar;.erica ray well be the great state of the
future,^
By establishing the state in reason Hegel justly dese:'ves
the comiiendation of history. Yet, the tendency has been to
overlook this element of reason and to accuse Hegel of a type of
r 3glorified I^azidom, The Hobbesian exaltation of force is an
alien policy to Hegsl, He criticizes von Hall^r^ for his con-
tention that "it is the eternal unchangeable decree of God that
2, Hegel, POH, 129.
3, Hobbes, L3V, 95,
4, Hegel, POR, 244, Quoted from von Haller Restauration der
Staatswissenschaft , 342, v.l.

the more powerful rulers, must rule, and will ever rule," After
developing this attacK at scire length Hegel summarizes, "often it
is imagined that force hoi s the state together, but the binding
cord is nothing else than the deep seated feeling of order, which
is poosessed by all,"^ The ground of the state "is the pover of
reason realizing itself as v;ill." Thus "the state as a completad
reality is the ethical whole and the actualization of freedot.. It
is the absolute purpose of reason that freedom should be actualized.
The state is the spirit 7/hich aoides in the vrorld and there realized
itself consciously,"'^
2 . Religion in the state ,
Hegel recognized the need for a reconciliation between the
Church and the State, The state church seeraed the best solution.
It avoided the hazard of anarchical and nonco-operative sects,
Hegel saw the church essentially as priestly and not as proph'^tic.
Nothing niust be considered higher and r.ore sacred
than good will to'-ard the State; or, if religion
be looked upon as higher and nore sacred, it must
involve nothing really alien or opposed to the
Constitution,
5, Hegel, FOR, 258,
6, Ibid., 247.
7, Ibid., 244-245.
8, Hegel, ?ut<, 559-560
tI
He recognizGd, however, thu.t religion is -'cna beginning of the
state inasmuch as relision is the abstract truth of which the
- 9
state is the concrcjte expression. Th^re were qualifications
in Hegel's use of the term religion as the foundation of the
state. It "/as religion as illustrating the highest freedom
that is the foundation of the state, What this, rnoant "'as that
"insofar as religion is o' a true sort, not displaying a nega-
tive and hostile spirit toT/ards the st?te, but, rather recog-
nizing and supporting it, it h?s its own special Tiiace and
station. "'^ The church '-'as, then, a pacifying influence over
the revolutionary and anti-social elements in society. The church
served its function when it corroborated the authority of the
state. It v/as rightly pointed out that the ^church coin'9S under the
jurisdiction of the state inasmuch as it owns property and hires
laoor, and for this reason, depends upon the state for protection.
When Hegel said that the state rested on religion, we rust
recognize that religion represented rationality so that the state-
ment was equivalent to sayirg that the state L:ust rest on .'eason.''"
Since religion at its ' est was I'easonable, Hegel recogrized
that it could be advocat-^d th-^t corpulsory -hir-ch relationship
9. Hegel, PO:l, 260-261.
10. Ibid., 262.
11. Itid., 263.
12. lidd., 272.

would be the logical pol"'o -. Fov7?ver, lieggl did not concijir in
this conclusion and he said with regard to religion, "of oou.'se,
with its special character, depending on inn ?r . imaginative
13thinking, the state cani.ot interfere," He ev^n admitted that
in a s .rong state there nay le room for sects "'.I'hose croeds
111 4present then: f ron. recognizing any direct duties to it. This
thesis is held 77ith the reservation that the state as objective
and concrete rationality has the jurisdiction ,over religious
15
organizations which are subjective and abstract.
Hegel concludes by saying, "thus, the doctrine that the
state ^hould be founded on religion is pei^verted, when it is
interpreted to irean that individuals n.ust have religion in
order that their spirit, enchained by it may bo the no re read-
16ily oppressed by the state," Religion is intended to be free
and rational in its abstract representation, and as such is
desirable, but the state as illustrating concrete freedoiii and
rationality is the nora adequate and complete fulfillment of
the search for coupleteness, Hegel had seen religion when it
was "teaching what despotisni wished, — conterpt of the human
race, its incapacity for anything good,"
13, Hegel, FOR, 262.
14, Loc, cit.
15, Ibid., 267
16, Ibid., 272
17, Hegel, Kriefo, i, 15,

3) Certain prinpiplas of the gro7/th of" the state,
tKofi "t*
The farr.ous diccui..^ "histci'y of the world is the world's
18
court of judgment" la/s the groundwork for Hegel's idea of
the norriiative principle in the detemii nation of the ideal state
at any pa reticular period of history. In every period of history
certain nations lead the -'^.y for the rest of the world. This
vast panorai:.a is seen in "ol:3 philosophy of History . In order
that we might see the full significance of the state in the
Hegelian system \ve shall consider certain principles of the
growth of the spirit as it reaches toward state participation.
(1) the nioanirg of "Spirit."
19
Tho vory Tsserce of coirit is freedom. Without freedom
th ;re can oe no fr jedom. as wo interpret it. The bonds of slavery
annihilate the possibility of spirit, for spirit's sole truth
is f reodor , J-'ot crly is tho essence of spirit frGedor^, but it
is "self-conscious consciousness* of one's own oeing," Unless
persons are aware of their c".ti possibilities, th^-re can be no
spirit drjvelopod. Spirit arises when mankind aspires "to make
21
itself actually that which it is potentially." It is the
study of this growth and progress of m.ankind toward its potential
greatness that is called "universal history," Thus the essence
le. Hegel, PGR, 341,
19. Hegel, POH, 44.
20. Ibid., 44,
21. Ibid., 45.

of spirit in mankind is to .3 found in its freodora, and th3 be-
ginning of freedoii: is the s9lf-corscio\;isneGS of ore's ultimate
possibilities, \7ith V'^--^'^.-^ prefatory statenients let us consider
what principles energize latent humanity to becone spirit,
(2) i^oason rules the •.•.'orld«
Undergirding the whole development of spirit is a funda-
22
liiental conviction that "roason is the Sovereign of the '.'jorld."
This is an a priori that gives hope and courage to man as he senses
the first vague stirrings of spirit within hini, iVithout a con-
fidence that this \7orld in which we live is a rational world and
that events occur, not accoi-ding to blind chance, but according
to law and order, the r.'hcle picture of life will appea" to be a
aoel of confusion, a meaningless chaos. "To him who looks iipon
the world rationally, the "/crld in its turn, presents a rational
23
aspect," But if, on "jihe other hand, one looks at the world as
without sense or direction, then all of one's relations to the
world will be soen in the sa:_e light. One 7/ould not hope to
better a world lacking all reasonable significance; no 3i:ore v/ould
one.ezpect to better an idiot who lacked all the foundations of
rational possibility. The first aspirations of ran toward spirit
find support fror. the confidence that "reason governs the world, "^^^
22. Hegel, POH, 34-.
23. hegel, PuH, 37,
24. Log cit.

(3) The function of geography.
A second principle influencing the growth of spirit is that
of the geographical envi-'onn-ent, Thare is truth in the statement
that n^an is a creature of the soil — an expression of the
geographical and cliraatic feces that inipinge upon hiii. Granted
that "nature should not ^e rated too high nor too lo^," still
the fact remains that the environment plays a great part. It is
in a natural environment that consciousness takes shape. "]!ature
is the first standpoint fror.. which man can gain freedom T/ithin
himself, and this liberation must not be rendered difficult by
26
natural o ostruct ions,"
It is- possible under certain conditions for the influence of
nature to be disproportionate so that spiritual growth is hindered.
Such a situation arises in countries of extreme temiperatures.
"in the extre:-:e zones man cannot coi.:e to free movement; cold and
heat are here too powerful to allow Spirit to build up a world for
27
itself," '/"here man has to spend his m.ajor efforts protecting
himself fromi the assaults of nature, he has no time for the
development of spirit within him. In such a predicament are the
Ssquim^aux of the North and the jungle savages of the South,
25, Hegel, POH , 121.
26, Loc. cit,
27, Loc. cit.

Neither can ever quite escape fron; the fact of climate. Also
there is recurrent fear of attack by wild oeasts,
must r9meEiber that we are not to rate nature too high.
As v;e shall see later it is more what cian does with nature than
what nature does with man, Lan can rise aoove the exigencies
of nature oj the factor of an organized political life,
(4) An organized politicr.l life.
The third principle guidir.g the growth of spirit is the
presence of an organized political life. Life prior to poli-
28
tical life is "beyond s 9lf -cognizant life," "efore political
life r-.an is not even aware of himself. He is a wild creature
comparable to the birds of the air or the beasts of the woods.
Because he lives by hiir.self like a hermit, he is not conscious of
his kinship with humanity, nor is he aware that he ought to will
to do what is for the conjuon good. Then toe, in his primitive
state, man must spend all his tine taking care of his bodily
wants. Not until the division of labor of an organized society
freed man from having to do everything for himself was he able
to find time for the cultivation of the spirit. Only under
^
organized life does man have time for the spirit.
28. Hegel, POH, 121.

It is oecause of this that we can call the state "the actually
29
existing, idealized moral life," Only mar living in the unity
of a state has the chance to develop spirit. The hermit laay have
a semblance of self -consciousness, but he does not have an other-
consciousness, nor does he have the freedon: to grow spiritually.
The state is the realization of freedom and only those people '"ho
have fomed states can be considered to have the freedom necessary
for the growth of spirit.
This is therefore, a denial of the coi!iii;On philosophy that a
state of nature can je a state of freedom, I^an would be a bar-
barian in a state of nature, for he would be subject only to per-
sonal whims and would be bound by the harshness of nature. Only
under the sheltering am of the state can the brute in man oe
tamed, and can morality grow fror.; n.ere personal fancy to an obedience
to a lai'ger whole. The social life is the only worthy life, and
30
only in a state does man possess "spiritual reality,"
(5) A free political life,
A fourth principle governing the growth of snirit is that the
political life be free, "A State is a realization of Spirit, such
that in it the self-conscious being of Spirit — the freedom of the
will — is realized as La'?,"^-'- In considering the life of the
29. Hegel, POH, 70
30. Ibid., 71.
31. Ibid., 218.

Oriental v/orld this is ons of the principle observations, namely,
that it is not a free political arrangement, "VJhat should be inter
nal subjective sentiment is made a matter of external arrangement."
L.an under a determinad political life becomes spiritually stunted.
Under the patriarchal rule of the Orient the individual is denied
the freedom to think and act. All th '.t he does is conr/anded by
the emperor. Only a chosen few take part in political or social
matters. The mass is in slavery to the few.
Therefore, without freedom, in political life n\&n cannot
attain his place of spirit. He asoumes a certain "fixedness of
33
character," that stunts and thv/arts his variant possibilities.
The individual does not even think of himself as such nor does he
consider himself as free in his life, "In China the Universal
OA
Will iniL-.Gdiately commands what the Individual is to do,"
There is no thought of personal feelings, needs, or d'osires.
The will of the state is all. The individual is nothing. This
is the principle to which the ^^azi state reverted. The individual
35
under such a state cannot gain "independent and civil freedom,"
Thus it is that "since equality prevails in China, but without any
36freedom, despotism is necessarily the mode of government,"
32, Hegel, POH, 159,
33, Ibid,, 163,
34, Ibid., 169,
35, Ibid., 172.
36, Ibid., 174,

Under such a despotic rule the anibitions of ix.an are dulled
and vitiatad. There is no point in acting or thinking from pur-
pose unless one is the eraparor. Thus the citizens rer.ain forever
in a state of "nonage^^"^ It was the Gernianic^^ nations, spurred
on by the Protestant concept of man that "Tore the first to attain
"39
the consciousness, that man, as man, is free.
(6) The worth of the individual,
A fifth principle underlying the growth of spirit is that
each person be recognized as of worth. In China v/e see the lack
of this idea. Individuals "in the State have as little indepen-
dent personality" as they do in the Chinese family. The indivi-
dual is as nothing in the Orient, I'i?.- life is a fom of slavery,
"Everyone has the power of selling himself and his children, "^"^
Personal integrity cannot oxist under such i-ule. "If a son comi-
plains of injustice done to him by his father, or a younger brother
by an elder, he receives a hundred blows '.vith a bamboo, and is
banished for three years, if ha is in the right; if not, he is
42
strangled," In the Chinese state all the citizens have an
equality of degraiation. This has engendered within all a cocxon
43
disrespect for all, " Although the caste system was not an original
37. Ibid., 178,
38, It should be noted that no one nation is reant, Hegel,
in POH, speaks in the plural (45) when ha conii..ends them for their
progress. In general he includes the northern European countries
(124, 125, 127, 567).
39. Ibid., 45.
40. Ibid., 170,
41. Ibid., 178,
42. Ibid., 179.
43. Ibid., 191,

part of Kinduisrii, tha sai e degrading concapt of porsor.ality
was so:n in India whors "the Chandalas are obligf^d to n-ovo out
of the way for their sup"/iors, and a Prahr.in r.ay knock do'vn
any that neglect to do so. Infanticide is thus cordon,
"Lothers throw their children into the Ganges, or let them
pin3 away under the rays o'' sun," "Hmnanity on the part
of a higher caate to'vards an inferior one is entirely forbidden,
and a Brahn.in uould ne-''3r think of assisting a r.ercber of another
46
caste, oven vhon in danger," This lack of respect for the
worth of persons is a fundamental eleiT'ent in the maintenance of
a despotic society. Elaborate institutions were built for the
care of aniii^als, cut throujhcut the land "no single institution
can be fo-und for huir.an beings viho are diseased or infinr; fror.
age."
Early Judaism 'vcs s^in as a stop for'.7ard although avoi. ^; _ .^o
48
the individual was not r-jspo'Cted. It ^'/as Christianity that
first put the stamp of worth upon persons as such, although
nothing was done upon a -political scale until the Gerrcanic nations
under the in.petus of Prot astant ism incorporated the Christian
evaluation of persons i -no a nnliticc.l and social doctrine,
(7) l.oral Account '-ijil ity,
A sixth element in the groMrth of spirit is a recognition
44. Hegel, POH, 200.
45. Ib'id., 205.
46. Ibid., 209.
47. Ibid., 216.
48. -Ibid., 262.

of the r. oral accountability of each person. This roral accounta-
bility arises out of the concopt of tho freedom of persons. It
is frot. the fro^don to choose evil as well as good th it n.an's
accountability j..-isjs. "i s djstiny is in i^is '3rj a.dlity to
49
will either rjood or ovil,"
TVs sse the negation of this in India whare morality does
not ^xist in ri^-.rt or wrong conduct consciously choson, 'jut
consists rather in being corn in a particular caste, A Brahoiin
need rot "ans"/-!r for cr:r-^ any kind."^^ Tnis lack of a
sense of noral accountaoilioy results in iira- orality and license.
On the part of the submerged iiasses it results in a fatalism
and an indifference to"M;"ds i ^-t i "s of value o- ^ v-it, 'Tlie
whole Hindu religion is diffused '/ith a vast in.lif f orence to
eith:!r vice or virtue. The true Mi's to which the Htndu aspires
has no quality. It is a state of nothingn'iss. In Ohina the
status of moral accountabil j.ty is much the sa^.e. The individual
is not expected to fe^l morally culpable for his doeds. All
that is expected is that he comply with the external comii:ands of
the state. The punishment v/hich the dividual receives for
49, Hegel, POH, 65,
50. Ibid., 208,

failing to conply with the axtsrnal conT:ands of the stnte is
only a niatter of disciplino, Tnis discipline is only a factor
to frighten the citizors ito a state of obedience. In Persia,
on the contrary, it is expected that man should be vi.^tuous,
and in support of this "subjective freedon; is presupposed,"'^-^
Lack of a sense of freedoni results in a belief in the
absence of noral accountability. Safth presupposes the other, and
without either, moral dovelopr ent or spirit is inpossible. Only
'7hen n.en recognize th^t they r re to blame for their OTrn decisions
v;dll spirit rise in them to a place of power,
(6) Independence of thought,
A seventh principle i]:)v?ded to pron.o'te the development of
spirit is a subjective independence of thought. Each p-jrson
must be a thinker in his ov/n right. This is assumed if freedom
is present, for freedom, is the expres'^.ion of self thir.king. It
5 2
is part of what Hegel means by "Pas-^ion." Passion is that
state of m.ind v7here the whole will is actively directed tow^-rd
one single goal. In the Chinese state only the emperor had this
whole-hearted interest or passion, all the rost of the people
obeyed unthinkingly. In the Irdian state a fev? thought and the
51. Hegel, POK, 242.
52. Ibid., 52-53.

rest of the people f ollo'.vjd. In the Persian state there V7as a
great social and cultural fr-iedon: of expression, 3lthou,"h the
political side r-as still determined by the few, I\!ot ur.til the
Geruaiiic nations, spu.-red on by Prot estantisK, avoTrad th"t
_
every
man is a king in his own right was there freedon in the true
. ense of the term. Of course, this V7as freedom under the aegis
of the state. It 77as a fr.T^dom narkod by concern for the needs
of all.
The it^norance and sup ai'St itior s of the Oriental peoples
go hand in hand. The very superstitions tnat ourden'the Chiv.ese
5 3
"arise froLo a want of subjective independence," In all circum-
sta ces of life mor do not corsult their o\7n intelli:*ence , but
consort with witch dctors and soothsayers. It is precisely
because of this lack of personal initiative in thinking that
Chinese science has never p:-ogressed beyond the state of r..Tre
observance of the obvious. So too in the field of ethics Chiiia
has lack-;d the personal quality, i\?ther than arise from an inner
Corpulsion or persuasion, the ethics appears as an external code
applied by the enperor to all alike. So the Hindu "is incapable
of holding fast to an o ject in his m.ind by means of r-tional
54predicates assigned to it, for this requires refl^ccion,"
53. H-gel,pOH, 180.
54. Ijid., 215.

The possibility of history as the story of spiritual
growth "requires Understanding — the po'.ver of looking at an
object in an independent o-jective light, and comprehending
it in its rational connections -vith other objects. Those
peoples therefore -re alone capa le of History, and of prose
generally, who have ar^'ivad *t that period of development,
at wh'ich individuals corr.prehend their own existence as independ-
55
ent, i.e., as possessing self -consciousness, " "God '-.'ishos
56
no narrow-hearted souls or er/ipty heads for his children,"
(9) Thought r-.ust find concrete expression.
The eighth principle is the natural conipleraent of the previous
one. It consists in the principle that free and independent
thought n.ust find GXT?res3ion iv concrete fact, Th?.t which i -^kes
certain luan stand out as -.vorld heroes is that they both "v/illod
and accor..plished something great; not a nere fancy, not a -"re
intention, but that which n;e b the case and foil in with the needs
of the age,"^*^
In contrast to this the dreaming spirit of the Hindu is
an oxaiiiple of thought th-.t seeks no expression in concrete fnct.
The dreariis of these people have no necessary cornection with 'lito.
55. Hegel, POH, 220.
56. Ibid,, 41,
57. Ibid., 61,

They are lost in a haza of reverie. "These drears are not more
fables -- a play of the imagination, in v/hich the sou.l only reveled
in fantastic gat.bols; it is lost in them; hurried to and fro by
these reveries, £.s ':^-r co- t': --irg th^.t 3xists really and seriously
5§for it," The Hj.ndu uiiid Las lacked concern for concrete expres-
sion. "It '^as not given xo the Asiatics to unite self-dependence,
freedom and substantial cur of mind, 'lith culture, i. e., an
interest for diverse pursuits and an acquaintance 'A'ith the con-
59
veniences of life."
In order for spirit to Lecome actual, the passions and the
ideas of mien must ui-ite in a concrete expression. In such fashion
is the state formed, Lan begins with the idea of freedom; v7ith
this idea he links a passionate interest in corr unity expression,
and the result is a synthesis of spirit under the conditions of
the state,
(10) Perpetual Soi'u^^ie i.nd ^ro^rth,
A hintli elem^ent that m.anifests itself is that the progress
of spirit is a perpetual struggle and gro'jrbh in which there is no
end. An itj..ortality is den.L\nded in order that the r.ighty stirrings
of spirit may emerge to reality, "The Idea advances to an infin-
ite antithesis,""*^
-
^
58. Hegel, POH, 194.
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IJow thare are those like the Hindus who suppose that bliss
and poace are the end of riian. Such a principle is held jy many
psychologists of today, ospocially those who contend that their
major task is to resolve all of L.an's f i'ustrations and tensions
in the easiest way irrespective of r.oral factors. For Kegel
"the History of the World is not a theatre of happiness. Periods
of .^appiness are blank ^.'^-^js in it, for thoy are p<;^riods of
51
harniony, — periods when the antithesis is in abeyance," The
history of the world presents an eternal struggle between what is
and what ought to be. Out of the give and take of this rraelstrom
spirit emerges. It is for this reason that the lot of tho -e who
set out to lead the world is not a happy one,° They re the
very vortices of whirlpools of discordant conflict. Out of
their agony is born a n?w and nobler spirit. Thus it is that
"Spirit is at war with itself, "^^ And out o" this r;ar arises a
transfigured spirit. The very nature of spirit demands this anti-
thetical striving. "Only oy o'^erconn-ng this antithesis is
Spirit twice-born-- regener-.ted,
'
A similarity with this idea is seen in the Phoenician worship
of tiercules who "inste'^-.d of passing his life in idleness, snends
it in hardship and toil,"'^5 go too, the Egyptian s.-^irit sho\7s
61, Hegel., 56.
62, Ibid., 61,
63, Ibid., 90
64, Ibid., 240.
65, Ibid., 258,

its likeness by its su.';;;ing "frse fi'oir; natural forms," The
essence of the Bgyptian spirit is to be scin in its antithesis
of nature and spirit. "Spirit sunk in Nature, and the ir:pulse
to li.erate it — are held together inharcioniously as contend-
ing elen'.ents,"^'^
Still in this roar nnd crash of events there o rises a
question, "Aegarding Hio jory as ".he slaughter- en :;h "t •n;hich
the happiners of peoples, the wisdon: of States, and the vii'tue
of individuals have be^n victir.ized — the question irr'olu- -
tarily arises — to \7hat principle, to v/hat final aiiii these enor-
t-ous sacrifices have been offered." There cones to the rescue
t^ j fi:-"t -^rirciple 'o fo /th, namely that Reason rul :s t^.e
world, , ut cur thoU(3aL.s -. e lifted to wider horizons and the
Universal extends itself un';il it includes God,
(11) God -the hur..an spirit.
Thus spirit is led to affirm its universality in something
beyond itself. T'r.is sor.ething is still of the nature of spirit.
The development of m-an enrolciS and includes the 'vays of God.
Thj.s expansion of vision is needed especially as one vie'7S the
harshness and incompleteness of the "'orld. Only through the com-
prehension of God can the "thinking spirit"^^ be reconciled
67. Hegel, 289,
68. Ibid., 4-9.
69. Hegel, POH, 42,

vio-i Ci.j fact of the 'Bzist. on re of ovil. Thou too ino i.iid sees
its relationship to the v/hole through the "focus... of Heligion
Thus it can be said that "the conception of Ood, thjrofore, con
stitutos the general basis of a people's character, "'^'
I'-ore than this, "the forci of Religion decides that of the
State ai)d its corst itutior. The latter actually orgin^ited in
the particular iLeligion a-^opted jy the nation,"''^ A secular
life that took cognizance orly of the temporal and particular
would le "relative and unauthorized,""^^ The State rests upon.
Religion, What this means '.ve have already considered.
For these tan pr i - ciplos to f orci an o}:act picture of the
as
dGvelopn-Oiit is not so iirpoi't ?; t^to recognize that soi..ething of
this sweep of 32perience ii^ust be covered if spirit is to be
seen to eEerge in its fulness, Aether the consciousness of
God is the beginning qr the end of. spirit, it is still evident
that "freedom can exist only \''here Individuality is recognized
74having its positive and real existence in the Divine Feing,
2
. The Ivelation of the Ii'oividual to the State ,
1 ) Individuals find their meaning in the state ,
H'^gel's recognition of the significance of the individual
70. Kegel, POH, 84,
71. loid., eS,
72. Ibid.^, 26.
73. II. id, , o5.

is illustrated by the s rvct^-r-^l l::r +^0 Philosophy of Rirht,
lie '03t,ins with the parson and '.vith p.-ivcte norality. The indi-
vidual, howover, is t.'iuc : ?d and dwarfed unless he associates
.nth o"/n::.-s. As^o V. take place in the faiidly and in
other societal ^roups, but the full expression of the person is
found in tho state relationship. Since ti-uth is universal, true
pc -snrs n-ust be \x-i-^---sal also. This 'su-gests that there i..ust
ultiu.c.tely be a '-orld statj. In any case pe.'sons possess "truth,
real existence, and ethic-l status only in bging a meraber" of
75
the state.
i-ot only individuals but far.ilies and civic groups also find
their full expression in the strte. "Tb?
' state is tiie err.bodax.ont
of concrete fre doi.. In this concjce fre.ido,
,
personal indi^-i-
duality and its pai^ticul, r interests, as found in the far.ily
76
and civic cor/raunity, h'.v.^ their coir.pl -te develo-ir.^ nt. " It
is then the duty of inui'o.duals
,
fai^ilios, and social -roups
to accomodate their interests with those of the st-te. The degree
to v/hich this accorodatinn tahes -^lacc r.o.y vary considerably fron
a ruthless regimentation to a willir;; Ouoaience to la^^s prototing
the coni.ion good, Hegel has in ir.ind an obedience to the state
75. Hegel, POr., 2^10-241,
76, Ibid., 246.

that is in harnony -.vith the rational ends of individuals.
The state has this dual aspect in that it is the oxtoi'nal power
guarding the : 5'-idual, - -y it is li'ke'vise th*^ ir.-^.ogral nal-
ization of the individual, ihe distinction of i-ill betvi-e^n self-
regarding and other-regarding actions is artificial in the
Hegelian politics, Tlie t-.?o ".re coi.plenientary and inseparable,
2) The state is hijh;;r than the individual .
Any theory of the st.;.te rust account foi- the rij^-bt of
the state to demand s-.crificos of its n.enbers. This philosophic
question is jroui;ht to a head when recalcitrant individuals or
groups are involved. Certainly for any civilized group the
state is regarded as of i ore significance than isolated individuals
or groups. If states had not l:9en so recognized, society '^ould
long since have slip-o-^d into anarchy, "The preservation of the
whole tak^^s preceaenca of that of the individual;-- and all should
77in disposition acknov/ledge this," '.7hen Hegel sur.;i. arizes
,
"It is thus a higher authority, in regard to which the lav/s and
78interests of the farily and cor.ji.unity .ire su^^ject and dependent,"
no reasonable argun-^nt can be raised. However, it n^ust be kept
in nind that it does take a difforence -i.s to the kind of rotate
,that is involved, Hegel could easily have felt that cei'tain
77, Hegel, dJ.i, ''^5, CO
78. Hegel, POR,

conditions inevitably cr-11 for revolution and still ha r/ould be
asserting no Kore than -vhat I'.ewx call?d the t^^ching of the
"bourgeois democrats."
Bakunin, who was steeped in the study of Hegel, was called
the "Father of Terrorisr-i, " He considered the two eternal enendes
of man to be governiuent and the church, and no weapon wt^s un-
worthy of use which promised to expedite their complete obliteration,
"The desire for destruction," said Pakunin, "is at the san.e
7°
tiE:e a creative desire," " This, hcvever, did r:.ot exeniplify
the Hegelian ideal.
On the other hand wo find Larx saying that "the history of
g
all hitherto existing society," is "the histbry of class struggles,"
Hegel recognized that s-,rugjle was inherent in progress, but it
v^as not a stru[;<^j.j Jtj . . !3n classes or jetweon people and f;ovorn-
ir:ent but between spirit and r aterial oostacles. The struggle
was one of individuals as they r^ere seeking to find s--ii'jtual
f ulf iln.ent , "The civic cor.iiiunity is,.,, the arena for tne
81
contest of the private interests of all arjainst all," while
th3 st-te is the r'.eans of unifying the h.any into one, and of
protecting the nany fron each other.
79. Hunter, VLI. , 27.
80. I. arx, CI. , 321.
81. Hogel, POK, 299,

Yet it must ba reco^^-.i.zod that Hegel did justify rovolution
on several occasions. He tolorated the violence of the French
masses because he felt that thoy "'oul'1 directly oenefit by
success. Hegel of course qu'lified .0.0 sup.ox't of r ivolution,
i-
're force did not constitute a legitimate struggle, "Laterial
superiority in power cj.n achieve no enduring results: iTapoleon
could not coerce Spain into freedom any Eiore than Phillip II
could force Holland into slavery,' There nust be an ' enian-
o o
cipation of conscience' for there can be no revolution without
a reformation,
Hegel noted that the feudal lords had such an "indomitable
84
contempt for principle, and an utter depravity of morals,"
that there was no other -.'ay for Lachiavelli to deal with the
situation than with the most reckless violence, '.Ve do '.'^ell to
note 7/hat i'-achiavelli said in The Prince and Tae Discourses .
For where the very safety of the country depends
upon the resolution to be taken, no consideration
of justice or injustice, humanity or cruelty, nor
of glory or of shame, should be allowed to prevail.
But putting all other considerations aside, the only
question should oe, TJhat course will save the life
and lijerty of the country?
82. Hegel, POH, 564,
83, Loc. cit,
84, Ibid., 510,
85. Lachiavelli, DIS, 528.

Again we read,
You i.ust knov/, -therii that there are two ir.3thods of
fighting, the one by law the other by force: the first
rfiethod is that of iien, the second of beasts; but as
the first n:ethod is often insufficient, one r.ust have
recourse to the s icond,
Hegel felt that the French Revolution was an instance justi-
fying the Lachiavolliar policy for he believed that a i.ore
reasonable governcient woxild be the outconie. Lachiavelli felt
that the situation of his day ^as so corrupt that a strong st^te
could be established only by an absolute despot. Although this
political structure would destroy freodoc^, ^-achiavelli thought
of this as a necessary st:.ge beyond which nan could grow as
he becate loss corrupt. Like Hegel Lachiavelli envisioned a
fro:;, independent nation in which civic rights would be respected,
Hegel says of the French involution, "The change nas necessarily
violent, because the '.voi-k of transformation was not undertaken
87
by the governjtent," In speaking of the Paris Coritiune Iviarx
said, "If the ao+s of tho P-ris workingnien were vandalisni, it
op
was the i^andalisiii oi -.cspair,^^
Hie Hegelian position tecoii.es clearor when we recall that
reason v/as to rule, Hegel rade room for the porsi'jility of
86. Lachiavelli, PRI, 54,
87. Hegel, POH, 557,
88. Larx ard Ihgels,
,
425.

revolution becausa hs felt that France v/as a country 'vlrjre
the leaders wore utterly unscrupulous and whsre the :govern-
Lient would not reform itself. But this necessity is a rare
exception and not the coi j on I'ule, In Disposition Hegel found
the cohesive factor in solving the problem between the nonarch
and the people. Disposition is the "cordi;^l recognition of laws
and the Constitution as in p.-i. ciple fixed and irxiutable, and
of the suprene obligation of individuals to subject their parti-
89
cular will to them," "Nothing must be considerad higher and
„90
liiore sacred than good will tcvards the State, Hegel criticized
England in this regard as overemphasizing the particular freedom
and underec-.phasiz ing the general freedom. The enlightenrent
and the reforciation with their concept of the worth of the indi-
vidual posed the problem et7/?en the individual and the state,
a problem which Hegel solves in general by der.anding obedience
of the citizen to the state. The individual is to be viewed
only in relation to the v/hole. "The abstract actuality or siib-
stantiality of the st .te consists in this, that tae end pursued
by the state is the general interest, which, being the 'substance
of all particular interests, includes the preservation of them also,"
69. Hegel, POH, 559.
90, Loc. cit,
91. Hegel, POK, 259,
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3) The rslation of ri-jhts to dutios,
"It holds fundamentally good that he 77ho has no rights has
no duties and vice, versa, " llo separati. n of rights from duti'^s
is theoretically x-aasonaole. In so far as the citizen has and
perfonus duties he has rijLts, "Kence slaves have no dutios,
oecauss they h''ve no rights,"'' In the abstract, right and
duty apply equally to 2Vjry person. In the concrete, hov/ever,
the rights and duties of all citizens are not the sar.e. As v7e
shall see in the following section a class division on the basis
of ability is devslopad. It is the sar.e division that is t.ade
between parent and child. Their rights and duties are not
conxiensurate. But all the ciiizons irrespGctive of their status
find for themselves a harrjory between their rights and their
duties, "The individual, ':7hc from the point of viow of his duties
is a subj-'ct, finds in fulfilling his civic duties, p-otection
of person and property, satisfaction of his real self, and the
consciousness and self -respect iirx)lied in his being a weciber
of the whole, It is not an either-or r_attor between the
individual and the st-.te. As 1-lewelling pointed out, "Hegel
was prir-arily an a-solutist who could not in spite of him-
self get entirely a'vay from personalis c ic assu; ptions,"^^
93. Hegel, PGR, 250,
94. Ibid., 251
95. Runes, TCP, 333,

3, Hegel's criticism of der:.ocraoy .
The root of ^^egel's distrust of deaiocracy lies in his
96
already estaulished prir.ciple that the true is the whole.
Democracy is atomistic in that it puts a premium on the
opinions of individuals many of whom are unaole to se^i in ten s
of universality. As Heg^al sav/ it ,ohe masses do not knou the
97
absolute will. To allow every person to have an expression
in the formation or executinn of policy is as unwise in the
state as it is in the hone. Even on thj.s score, however,
Hegel's comparison with the European patriarchal family standard
no longer holds as valid. Th?re are, said Heg3l, inm.ature m.inds
incapable of directing the destiny of themselves or others.
Democracy with such people was for Hegel what it v."is for Plato,
98
namely mob rule. Like Pli^to Hegel felt th-'t "only wh ire tuere
exist sii. pie, incorrupted - orals and a sm.all territory can a
/ 99demon cracy exist and maintain itself,"
People are members of class^^s, i.e., artisans, pnysicians,
governors. Every person could not participate wisely in go^-em-
ment any more than in medicine. Each person is to partake of
tu3 ousiness for which he is prepared. Govemm.ent is not
96. Hegel, POM, 16, (Lojwenberg selections).
97. Hegel, POK, 310,
98. Plato, HEP, 816; Hegel, POR, 317,
99. Hegel, RDR, 43.

everybody's uusiri'-jso, r'or this reason voting, which is co'.sidered
to be one of the basic der.iocratic rights, is analyzed by Hegel
to ue unsound as a n.sans of arriving at truth in the political
sphere. Even in the ast of derL^ocracies vooing by the n.any is
seldom if ever done. Special pressure groups do the voting and
the electing. Since this is ttj'e v7ay that der.iocracy works in
elections it seemed ir.ore reasonable to Kegel to have a specially
trained group of civic loaders elect ti^e proper state o/ficials.
Since snail groups would detemip-'ie policy in any case, it v/ould
seem more reasonable to have a trained stall group that '.vas not
interested in a particular class ends, but was interested in the
welfare of all, Hegel suggested that assenbly r^^etin,^s shouid
be open to the'puolic as the uest means of educating them into
the affairs of rational stite policy.
The freedoT of expression of opinion was likewise seen as
needing definite qualifications. Free speech must jiot oe inter-
preted to mean that one can advocate or develop any theory.
The reason why care needs to be taken is that all readers of the
press are not judges of the material. They do not know fact from
fantasy and are thus easily misled by false inf o 'Triation, In

science, on the other hand, an expression of falsity v/ould be
met with conteript, because tiie readers of scientific joui'n?, Is
can discriminate. In the press, however, jingoism and philo-
sophic reasoning are not always distinguishable to the average
reader. Still freedom of expression is a good safety valve
and "of any reasonable ard 'e may ^e sure that public opinion will
ultimately be pleased \7ith it, recognize it, and constitute it
one of its prepossossions,""^^^ Since the bad is the unique and
particular, and the good is the a solutely universal, then it
follows that that government will be oad which s :resS'3S the multi-
plicity and separateness of the citizens, and that government
would be iocd which stresses the universal oneness of the state,
4 . The citizen and war .
An issue of ti'f.ely concern is the relation of the indi-
vidual to the state in the wars which the state enters. In
understanding Hegel at this point we must keep in mind several
facts. First, the state is the most significant organization
into which human beings nay enter. It is in the state that the
person finds his true place, "^t is a very distorted account
of the matter when the st-te in dem.anding sacrifices from the
citizens is taken to be sinply the civic community, whose object
100. Heeel, POR, 325.

is i-^erely the socurity of lifa and px-oporty
.
"
"^^"^
I-^ife ar.d pro-
per oy can.-ot b3 preservad by sacrificing them in v.-ar. Although
it is perfectly true that for 2o:_cj peopl3 life and propurcy are
secured in var, still the security of these things is rore at
stake in war than ?.t ?.ny other title, '•hat v/hich the state pi'a-
3iir-J3S is far i_L..i than life o.' property, ^t is the full ethical
life that is involved if the dissolution of the state takes place,
On the other hand there i;; a difference in the ethical
ur.lity 0^ ctate;, "here tno jo'^fliot is ,j3t'.7ajn tvo states
that are at different levels of the historic development of
;-pirit, the solution in He^el'? devolf^p:- ?r>t is unclear, "Sacx^ificj
^or the Si-ka of trie i:;.;ivi duality G/.e stcte iiJ the substantive
relation of all the citizens, and is, thus, a universal duty,"
_ut -"-?1 '-i-^.p T.o clerr a'-.s'./er to the question as to ^io\7 an indi-
vidual can daciuG .vhetlier his state is worth saving or ^rhether
it is the lesser of tr/o states. Hitler in the Balkans and l^usso-
lini in ithiopia '-of- ju3tifi3-'= ^ r. r'-.ion^ ..n t'- ^ ha-^is that
they represented civilized statos, v/i.ile the count-'ios tusy
attacked were barbarians.
In spite of tho "c.z'; " " •.: ."' in desolation r.rri
confusion -^^^ Hegel still maintains uhat "war is not to be re-
garded as an absolute ex'il.. so by war people escape the
101. Hegel, POA, 330.
102. Ibid,, 323,
103. Kegel, PGR, 544.
I
::^orruption which would be accasiored by a continuous or etornal
peace." Vlax' upsets the stability of the terapoi-al ?.r • finite
cocupations but adds directior. ar.d purpose to thi . j atenial
ethical drives. It is recocjnized also that wars t.ay 'lolp to
provert civil disturbances by denandin^; a unity in ord3r to face
j^. ui. - , ?.3ace, then, if it lasts too Ion--, loads
to the stagnation of li.ankinc!. legel affirtis thrit,
Die Gesundheit eines Staats offenbart sich iii.
allger-einen nicht 30'.vohl in der Ruhe des Friedens
a Is in der Bevvaguno ies Kriogs. 10*7
TiOgel s slight recognition in his FOR and his PQH of the
fallacy and dostructiveness of •.7ar do9S not change the fact that
'.-3 believed tl.at war was, by zr.'l large, the only honorablo and
practical recourse. Although hi3 recognition of war's need, is,
in some aspects, no tiore erronacxr.c than the vier/s cf :.any Toliti-
cal leaders of today, we ii:ust ad:..it that he glorified war in a
ost exaggerated way. Hegel s statei.ont that "die Deutschen
sird ::ic-''t eine ir-.lcr-^ ?~-^'"i^^he ration," '^as a cliroct ^Ao^i
at ohe i'^oalis)- u:' i.a::t at this point. Further investigation
I
of Hegel s position in this regard ;7ill be considered under
his international vio'.7s.
104. Hegel, FOd, 330-331.
105. Loc. cit,
106. Ibid., 332.
107. Hegel, VD, 4.
IOC. Ibid., 1-^3.

The decision to go to 'var should not be made by the citizens
for they are too easily roused to passion in this regard. The
docision should be t.ade by the leaders who car. decide i.iore
impartially. The people are poor judges of universal norality,
Sittlichkeit . The masses err, hc^ever, not in being too forward,
as Hogel suggested, taut far iT:ore in being too apathotic, What
is needed is a more adeqi; ate check on the ruling groups in order
that cartels and pressure groups do not prove the deciding factors,
Iiiji-anuel Kant said on this score that "a republican constitution
is oest; for the citizens as a whole wi 1 not hastily enter into
109
war which they will have ":o fijht,"
Thus ne are orougat again to the view that since the state
is the organization in whiah the individual develops himself to
be his .vest, tnct there is no gre-ter virtue than to [jive one's
life in the service of the state. For this reason "the ir.ilitary
class is the class of universality, " '""'"^ It doo» the u.niversal
business of protecting the state, "True bravery in ci-/ilized
peoples consists in a readiness to offer up oneself in the ser-
vice of the state,, so that the individual counts only as one
ar.ong many.,., not p^rjsonal f earl'^ssnos s, but the tkking of one's
109. Kant, PP, 11.
110. Hegel, PO.l, 334«

place in a universal cause, is the valuaule feature of it,"
5, The Constitution .
The underlying confidence in the Philosophy of Ri^'ht is
that the Constitution of any particul ."'.r state is in its ossentials
deducible from the nature of being by means of reason. The Con-
stitution represents t><3 coiicrotization of the principles by -.vhich
states are managed, Hegel is not speaking of a supor Constitution
that applies to all states alike. There is no such document.
Constitutions are the peculiar possession of the coiintries in
which they developed, "In a Constitution a people ntust eni-ody
their sense of right and reproduce their conditions," It is
not a matter of abs ".ractly creating a Constitution for a state.
Such a creation would be a misfit because it would not be indi-
genous to the culture in which it would function. Constitutions
grow through the centurias in the atmosphere of particular sit-
uations so that the Constitutions of different lands could not be
expected to be at the s.me level of Sittlichkeit , The real exis-
tence of a Constitution as opposed to its fo'i£'.al existence as a
written docxoiuont, is in tlie consciousness of the people to whom
it belongs. The Constitution must express the spirit of uhe nation.
112, Heeel, FOR, 282.

Henel notes that a coi r^on error in thinking with regard to
Constitutions is that they v/ore instituted to con.bat the general
hatred and ill will of ii'an toward man. This governing po^er is
conceived as e>-il though necessary. To counteract this necessary
evil another institution is established to check ixs pov/er, and
so on ad infiniturr., Government thus becomes a systerr. of checks
and balances, Hegel considered this to ^^e a false evaluation
of the meaning and purpose of the state and of the Constitution,
There are three factors in the setting up of a Coistitution,
First there is the legislative power which defines the universal
in terir.s of law. This is the abstract state of law. Second
there is the executive power which applies these universal laws
in specific particular instances. Third there is the Prince 7/ho
makes the ultimate decisions and by his position unifies the whole
law system of a st -te.
Considering these three functions of the governmental
agencies we recognize two characteristics of the law. The first
characteristic of law is in its O-jective and initial sta^e when
it is posited as a corpus juris
. This step is ^ade by r.eans of
logic or the speculative reason. This establishes the' general

principles. These geno/al prirciples are the most universal
truths. This, in general, is what the Constitution is for
particular states. The Constitution represents the jasic
principles on which the ordor of the state is founded. The
second characteristic of law is in its suojactive and secondary
stage when specific application is made. While the firr^t stage
is the task of the ph?.losopher exclusively, the second stage ir.ay
be consunated by the student of history, since the specific
application involves the background of the country and the pre-
paration of the p?ople to receive the law. The Constitution is,
then, a olending of abstract reason with specific application.
The goal of the Constitution is the freedorr. of the citizens.
It is Hegel's conviction th:.t "every genuine law is a liberty:
113
it contains a reasonable principle of oojective nind,"
The Constitution, the;
,
"deternines as the internal law of
the State, the relation of the particular powe -s of the govern-
ment both to the Governir.iint as their supren.e centre and to one
another, and the relation of the citizens thereto or their share
114therein," And f urthorKiore,
113, Hegel, POI/!, 5^9, Lontasquieu gives a significant position
to the- Velff.tion .0 f -la'.ys to the people. "It is necessary Poopla^a
Linds should be prepared for- the Reception of the best Laws," 3L,I,314.
"It is the busines;^ of the legislature to follow the spirit of the
•ration, when it is not contrary to the principles of government,"
SL,I,316, Solon, when asked if the laws he had given the Athenians
were the b3st, replied, "I have given thet. the best they were able
to bear," Plutarch, Life of Solon
,
9, in SL,I, 328.
114. Hc^el, RDR, 45.

The guarantae of a constitution,, lies in the
collective spii'it of the nation,,. The question--
To whom (to what authority and how organized)
belongs the power to make a constitution? is the
sar.e as the question, Who has to r.ake the spirit of
a nation?.... What is tnus called 'naking a con-
stitutionC^ is-- just because of this inseparability
—
a thing that has xi^var happened in history, just as
little as the n^aking of a code of laws, A constitution
only dsvelops fror. the national spirit identically
with that spirit's ov:n development, and runs through
at the sane tic'.e with it the grades of formation and
the alternations required by its concept. It is the
indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and
be it added, the history is only that spirit's history)
by which cons bitutions have been and are mde.
There is never a time when the task of building a Constitution is
completed, "The constitution is an endless progressive growth,
6. The Prince.
' 1) Individuality in particularity makes absolute decision
possible.
There is necessary in the universality of the state a parti-
cularity in order to provide for unity in decisions. Unity is
a value to be desired regardless of the nature of the particular
state. The various political philosophies follow different paths
to gain -this unity. All stat^, ho'.'^ever, reduce the executive
office to the snallest possible nur.ber in order that a unified
decision will be more prcable. Again, most, states agree in having
115. Hegel, POM, 540.
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the formal exocutive po^er in the hands of one person, Hegel
believed that the republican monarchy provided for this unity in
the soundest way, ho iv.ajcrity decision either of the people or
of the leaders could take the place of the decision of one author-
ized person, "The element which implies aosolute decision is
not individuality in general but one individual monarch," This
is what Keyburn considers the weakness of Hegel's whole treatment
of sover;^aignty
;
namely that the real unity of the state cm st be
1 18
a single particular r.an.
It is thus that by a monarch "the personality of the state
119
is actualized," One of the most difficult political concepts
for the layman to grasp is that which puts final authority in the
state, No\7 the state is impersonal until it has some individual
whose personal act of will can actualize the self-detorm.ining and
sovereign will of the str.te. This does not mean that the monarch
can be "wilful in his acts," The monarch is "bound to the concrete
content of the advice of his counsellors, and when the constit-
ution is established, he r.as often nothing to do but sign iiis name,"
As Hegel pointed out in his Aesthetic,
117. Hegel, FOR, 28o,
118. Re y burn, ETH, 252.
119. Hegel, FOR, 287.
120. Ibid., 290,

Th3 : onaLCzhz of ov..- ^i:. e ai'e no longa-" like the
heroas of the HiVthical ages, persons in whor« an entire
social order is concretely sur.r.ed up, but rather r.iore
or less abstract foci'-vithin 'lere of an order
already developed ano f irr. ly . "} ic.r md
corstitution. 121
Since, "Dass oine I.:enge einen Staat bilrlo, dazv : st ^•ot-'endig,
class sie sine ger.einsane Wehrs und Staatsgewalt bilde," ^^^ it
seer.od logical to Hegel that the real unity of this State demanded
an ir dividual who could be tho concr?ti2ation of th-^.t u-ity. It
ii> understood that the state is aL aady in a sense a ooj^pletei
organization where decisions are answered by the constitution and
codss of la'.7. The v.onarch, thor;, ic . '-.'^e -'.-;r<^o'i. -'ho oi.-^rs
his iiar.:Q on belialf ofi the state. ''i'Dr this office is neeaed only
a iu:an who says 'yes,' and so puts the dot upon the 'i'." -^^3
"The priroiole cf the st-'':o ; ust be "^'^.z^ thnt the r^'i"''" '; ^ :':^-"'.-^-':nr
of its 0 -cucant shall be of no signif iciaico . " "^^^ lliis prince is
neither the "Herr" of Kietszche nor the "Ftthrer" of Hitler. The
prince does have considerat ] i: zc: on 'ith V'l ^^osition of t''-
king of England as a titular head, negdl s prince does not have
Biuch work to do because of the rigid curtailr.:ent of his t)ersonal
liberty. "I.- " -all-ordered ;.ionai-G>y only the' subjective. .-o,...j
of la?/ coi.es to aand, and to this the r.ona^g^h subjoins Kerely the
subjective 'I v^-ill.'"
121. Hegel, Aesthgtic
,
I, 248, See also l.orris, HPS, 92.
122. Kegel, Schrif ben , ir
.
123. Hegel, POR, 292.
12<L, Loc, cit.
125. Ibid., 293.

H'gel was opposed to the i!»r;erican systor of checks and
nor
-l-:r:cos boconsT '"^-3 '"as co de"terF.ir.3d that unity bo achieved,
Tha trouble -.vitn tao A. 3-'ican schen.e was th?.t it sacrificed
unity in the interest of atoriic individuals. Instead of giving
one person or o)";e group the avi.thority, the A: -^ican s-'-t-^r
divided the ponor anong se^'oral groups, eaca of which n'ould
act as a check or a spur to the other. The theoi'y "'as thvt
corruption and ori'or ':';ov.la l^ss likely ""i t -3 'ts a
certain co; petition for ac uracy. The difficulty -.vas that pressure
^roups usurped po"7er and r.^de decisions, and '^'hat '7as meant bo
be a deii;ocracy actually fun-^.tioned as an aucocracy, Hegel felt
that "the idea that the functions* of governt.;ent should oe iridependent
contains the fundan:ental error that they should check one another,
iut this independence is apt to usurp the unity' of the state,
127
and unity is a.'Ove all things to be desired," That Hegel
leans to'7?.rd totalit^-'.^irrisr: in this matter not to be overlooked,
but it r.ust bo ?.di..i:tJu :nat he s ureases the r est cornnendaole
and least obnoxious aspects of a jsolutisn. in politics. Thus
Kegel co: eludes that "in its ; ost loriritive aanif ^3-in' ti: n s , the
126, Hegel, FOR, 292
127, Ibid., 309,

state has at its head an individual, whether he be patriarch,
128
c'.ief, or "-hat not," This individual , ivns to oth9r7ise
abstrtict r/ill of the stats a personal .vill which executes a
unified decision,. Hegel did not fe-ol that an idoal could be this
unity, as it is in the UiTited States of Ar ?r'ica for ^x"'* t^!* e
.
The unity raust be a po -son.
This thought of Hegel grew out of the political times in
v;hich he lived to a large degree. Ke saw thg* failure of the
old feudal nobility of ".^iir o^iuburg to free theriselves frorfi the
past, and on the other hand he saw the strength of the Prussian
st:?.te. Hr? sa-.7 the chaos of the French Revolution, even under
the Directory, until Napoleon appeared. Hegel had \7itnossed the
v;eakne:"s of a Holy lloman 'Hlr.pire where the enperor did not ruie,
and he contrast3d this '.vith Prussia which had an autocratic king,
TOO
.It W2S not that he took P:Lnissia for perfect i n, ' but only
that he s?'" what Prussian v::i+,j hrA done for Gemany, For this
rei son ^ne individuality" oi' o l3 prince r..a^:e possible absolute
decisions which were essential for a unified state,
2) How the prince was elected.
128. Hegel, POR, 329,
129, Hegel, POH, 536,
I
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Popular olections for the prince ^vore corsidGrod both
irpractical and unv/isG, for the ri'ethod of pxjpular eloction pro-
iiiotss this disunity of fa-,ticr.s, 'Jitnoss the presidential
elections in the United St.".tes of America as an illustratirn of
the chaos caused by lett:r.j the rasses decide who shall be the
rulsr, In ord'5r to solve tiiis proolon:, H'3gel felt that an
hereditary tionarchy '-/as necessary, "Right of birth and right of
inheritance constitute the basis of legit ir.acr, not as regards
positive right r arelyi but likewise i"; the id'ja. Through the self-
dsternined or natural succession to the vacant throne all factious
130
disput^^; ;re avoided," Ore has only to recall, hc^^-"^:", the
Wars o: .toses m order to see tm inadequacy of iiegal's defense,A
iSherB the citizenry car.e to hold intense fe-^ling of loyalty to
an hereditary l?ader even gre~;ter chaos ray ..e caused -'' rr^ doubt
is raised as to uho the legitiirate successor should e, Uhere
the citizens consider elections Kiore in a sporting light, no
profound fears are engendered regardles? of the i-.an elected.
This ^jilling acceptance of the results of popular election is
130, Hegel, POii, 293.
131. See Ploetz, SM, 272. The "^ars of the Roses of Lancaster
and York lasted for the thirty years oetween 145 5 and
1485, During this chaotic period^ when two families
tried to assur.e the right of succo-sion !i3ngland Tras not unified,
.1
due partly to tne cor.fia3:.CG of the populace in the systen: of
checks and balances which holps to prevent r.isrule by any one per-
son or party.
Hegel's contention that "the raonarch has his rights vested
in the very necessity of the state; not by contract, nor by the
132(doD.ocratic) will of the people," rpissas the brunt of the
distinction between his ideas and popular democratic id'ias.
1. onarchists and republicans agree jn considering that the rif^lits
of the leader :^re vested in the necessity of the state. They
differ in their beliefs on ho-.v the monarch is to be chosen,
3) The poorer of the nonarch,
133
It has already been pointed out that the r.onarch does not
have free reign. In fact, whTre the constitution is vrell estab-
lished, the will of the ronr.rch is expressed only in the affixing
of his signature to docui.:3nts. In the aecision of certain cases
in an established stite the ronarch is not only supplied 'with
the rules by which ca3 9S -'ill be tried but he is sup"li'?d -.-'ith
the cases as well. It is the task of other offi-^.e^'s to decide
132. Her^l, POR, 249
133. Ibid., 290.

13^
which cases r.erit or dar.and the ai;tention of the prince,
135
"One of the highest recognitions of the uajosty of spirit,"
o; tne rKonarch is his ric;ht to pardon, "Out of ti:e 3ov3rei£;rt7
of the E-.onarch f Iot/s the right of pardoning criminals, 0 ly to
soveroignty belongs th?.t rsalizaticn of the po'-'or of the srt^rit,
which consists in regarding what has happened as not having happened,
136
ard cancels criire by forgiving and forgetting,"
Actually the niajor authority rests in other hands, and as in the
English governrent, Hegel's pri ce is core of a figurehead
providing unity than an executive leading the I'lation,
7 . The Executive 7u ction,
1) ^^ualif i nations o' the officers.
Like Plato Hegel believed in an aris ':ocrat ic governnent.
The best people should n tb.e rulers, Thus^ in the cons j.deration
of v7ho would be the ex9cu:i^-e leaders of the state, Hegel ir.ain-
tained that those who covld s>^e the universal problems and needs
of the state v/are the ..-'3 t fitted to assur.e leadership, ""^""hoi'e
is required in then-, the objective elonont, nanely, knowledge and
:^34. Ijegel,- POS, 298-299,
1313, loia,, 295,
136, Loc. cit.
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proof of fitness," Hag^l recognized that it \7?.s r.ore impor-
tant that the exscutive ar.d lo^islative lo'ders bo L.en of univer-
sal outlook than that the prince be such, for the spade '."O-i^k is
done the forr.or nn. T^oj sot the moral pace for the state.
As iiey'cur'n has point yd out
Hegel tended at tir;os to underest ir.ate the solid
rationality of t'.:e populace and to ove :'est irat j the
ability of disinterested officials to racorrnize the
real tendencies and neods of the nation, "^^^
2) The class elonent ir the choice of officers.
Again, in unaniiiity -.vith Plato, Hegel introduced a p^opTrty
139
qualification for those '.vho v/ould be political leaders.
It -vas his idea that the r'iddle class represented the pillars of
140
the state in regard to "rectitude and 3.ntellig3- ce," " Thus he
r-^intained that property ownership was essertial to the political
leaders and I'uling classes. The orfnership ^as essential to the
political or ruling classes. The ownership of property gave then
a nore tangible stake in the welfare of the state, and it gave
then a sense of independence fror, want since r any of the pol-
itical lead3rs received nc salaries or salaries inadnquate to
support theLi. For the sanie reason that senators and rspresenta-
137, Hegel, POR, 302,
138. ReyLurn, ETK, 247,
139. Hegel, POR, 315.
140, Ibid., 305.

tives are socura from th? attacks of tr'-ivata interests on the
floor of tiie iiouse or Sjn:.oe in tuu vJi itod States of Ar.Trica
^^Ggal defendod the protection of all agents of the state from
the attacks of individuals "-.vhose business is harn^-id by the
furtherance of the uni "e^'sal good,
8. The ilelstion of St-.tiS to .jlach Other .
1) The iruplications of the dialoctic.
The implication of the djalectical prij:ciple that the trvie
142
is the whole , that adeqtiacy involves completeness, is that
progress cannot stop "'ith a v;orld of rations existing like
v/indowless r..onads, Heg^l recognized that this is the logical
iuiplj cation froni the dialectic when he said that "just as the
individual person itj not roal unless related to others, so the
state is not really individual unless related to other state
In spite of this r ?cognition, V I'^el strangely did r ot sense the
p-'o..a ility of a v/orld natici. or c world sovorei^,.;, indi'^iduals
could be u;.ited under one head in a st:'.te, but the pos^sibility
of un^TVl^ 'rtate. under o o head seoi.-od fa^-t- stic at tlie nresent
jj.gj ..u-ld history. recognizoo tiict no authority
existed to decide disputes letwaan nations. Contingency ruled
in international relations. In spite of Fegol's fr/.nk r-?cog-
141. Hegel, POi^, 303.
14-2. Segel, POi.
,
16.
14-3. Kegel, POR, 337.

/.ition of this fact a; 'i ' '^rrto of his adverse c'-^'i-isi: of
I'-T.t's confidence in an international go\'ernK,ent, tiie impli-
cations of Hotel's dialectic are clearly in favor of the possi-
1 ^-4
oility of a u::ifijd 'vo-'ld,
2) The recognition of international anarchy and the
2ccepta'",ce of r^ar .?. s a solution,
Hegel stated that "w^en the particular wills of stat&s
can cor-3 to no a^-rear.ent, the controversy can be seti-.led o:ily
by war," ' This was a frunk recOt,nition that thore -^as no
superior pov/er to rule betv/sen nations, '.Vhat international
law there was rested "on social usage, "^^^ There -.vas a contrac
tual relation between str.tes.
States stand n.ore in a natural than a legal i* elation
to one another. There is on account of thc^t, a con-
tinual s-':rifG ":oi" r-r c.roy\^; t •-i^r..,l^'7
In such a situation tae only Lasis for Sitt Ij.chkoit r.v.?'t be the
individual states with their particular wil?_s. In a universal
cense whsre the rel?.ti :^ -': rtates are constantly charging
and there is no judge .v.io c.w. reconcile the differences, the
only true picture can oe seen from the vantage point of history
sVorld hj story can po:'t -hi oh nation the L.ore adequate
expres3ion of the a.soluoe spirjt.
1C4. Sae art., Phil. Foim., 23-25, 1944.
14-5, Kegel, PGR, 339.
146, Hegel, POll, 547,
147. Kegel, RDR, 4-5.

It ^as not strange, ther .^f oi'e , that given s^ch an anarchic
international, situation Hegel should feel that ^var was the only
logical recourse, -ilhere aivili^eu :"?.tions -ivera endangered by
barbarian nations, it was the duty of the i.Ox^e civilized to
preserve thet'Selves, even if they bad to destroy the others,
Tiiis is the clear l eaning behind Hegel's statejaent that "civilized
nations r_ay treat as barbarians th^^ peoples who are behind thajK in
the essential elements of the st te." "^^^ The strange part is,
hov/ever, that Hegel did not see as did Kant the probability of a
"federation of free states."
Although it is true that He;, el believed that war was "not
to be -vvaged against internal institutions, or the peaceable fai-ily
and private life, or private persor.s," ^^^ He had no coi .punctions
about waging it against other states, ^^ar ^vas the instrxii^ent
,
ho'vever horrible it seer;ad, through -vLich reason ''.'orked out the
advance of spirit. .7ars were Lore blessed thab peace, Lan was
fi'.ore rational -.t war than at peace. Here is an area '.vhere Hegel
failed to follow the iiv.plicaticns of his own th9oi*y. Logically
he should have favored internationalisri.. Actually he took a
firr.' nationalist position and .lorif j.ed in the prospect of '.-'ars which
.Tould pi'eserve national sovdr^i^-nby and develop •,.:an*3 spii'it.
148. Hegel, POR, 345.
149. Kant, PP, 14.
150. Hegel, POR, 340.

OLAPTER V
THE ETHICAL THSQAY OF VALU.
1. The Class Nature of Lorality .
Whereas Hegel considered ethics to be es entially logical
and empirical, the developDcnt of reason, Larx considered ethics
to be the outgrowth of econociic conditions, Larx did not origi-
nate the thesis that econorr.ic forces aided in moulding life, bvit
he did give economic factors a proi:.ineno3 that they had not pre-
viously had. ^ It was Larx's firm conviction that the history
of mankind had been mainly directed by the abb and flo"?: of econoiaic
conditions, so it was only logical that he should consider othical
theories to be the by-products of the economic factors of his time,
i;arx accepted the Oroek and medieval Christian theory that
economic factors were miaterialistic, but \';'hereas his religious
predecessors had concluded that material things were non-essential,
larx declared that they wore basic. Indeed, Larx reacted not so
much to the dichotomy as to the thesis that material forces were
morally insignificant. Since religion had neglected so many of
the bodily needs of man, Larx was intent upon putting man's physi-
cal needs in their right perspective. In doing this, he certainly
swung to the other extreme. Yet, it must be seen that the materi-
1, Plato gave considerable recognition to the significant
part which econom.ic conditions exerted in affecting hum.an relations.

alisn of I. arx went beyond that of Feuerbach in the prominpnce
that u:an received, liarx criticized Feuerbach for his crude
material ism, hiaterialisn for li/'arx v/as not merely a ceans for
explaining man, but chiefly for changing him.
We shall consider the class nature of society in a later
section( VI, 4, 5 ), but it rcay be said that in a class society
morality will be a class affair, I'arx pointed out that the
various moral systems which Europe had endured had followed
the changing economic organization of the various nations.
Whereas morality had been bom'geois, there was corrdng a "prole-
tarische Zukunf tsmoral, " ^ As rngards the relative value of the
two kinds of system, bourg'sois and proletarian, Engels said:
Wslche ist nun die wahre? Keine einzige, im Sinne
absoluter Endgtiltigkeit ; aber sicher wird diejenige
Moral die meisten, Dauer versprechonden, Elemente
besitzen, die in der Gegenwart die Dmwfllzung der
Gegen'vart, die Zukunft, vertritt, also die prole-
tarische,
Thus, recognizing that morality is a class product, Sngels
went on tosay that that morality which aids more in the redemptive
revolution ifl the better, Larx likened class consciousness to
Francis Bacon's "Idol of the Tribe," ^ Larx and Engels noted
2. See Karx, TF in GI, 199,
3, Bngels, AD in R0D7, 31.
4, Loc, cit,
5. Venable, HI^^i:, 21,

that there were other factors than the econonic which deteruined
social life, ^'or exanple, they thought of art as a means for the
moulding of the attitudes of people. But they were most od ncemed
that the economic factor should not be omitted.
The economic situation is the basism but the various
elements of the superstructure— political f orais of
the class struggle and its consequences, constitutions
established by^the victorious class after a successful
battle, forms of law, and then even the reflexes of all
these in the minds of the combatgints: political, legal,
philosophical theories, religious ideas and their fuller
developnient into systems of dogma-- also exercise their
influence upon the historical struggles and in many cases
preponderate in determining their form, '^here is an
interaction of all these elements, in which amid all
the endless hosts of accidents ... the economic movement
finally asserts itself as necessary,,. There are numereus
intersecting forces which give rise to one resultant
—
the historical event., , Larx and I are ourselves partly
to blame for the fact that younger writers sometiraes
lay more stress on the economic side than is due it.
We had to emphasize this main principle in opposition
to our adversaries, who denied it, and we had not always
the time, the place or the opportunity to allow the
other elements involved in the interaction to come into
their rights, ^
Be this as it m.ay, the fact remains that economic forces
determine these other so-called factors so that we are back essen-
tially to a temporary economic determinism. Temporary because the
revolution assumed that there was a force other than economic at
work, and because the disappearance of classes jtssumed a freedom
from economic controls.
6, Engels to Bloch, SC, 475-477,

Hegel had prosented the state as being a resultant of
x-eason. Larx presented the st-te as being the result of exploita-
tivo econo; ies, -^hus, ^vhile He^el s noral theoi'y haraionizod with
and aided a state, K'arx's theory was ti;at riioraiity oither aided
a state founded on exploitation or provided for the dissolution of
I
the state. Hegel s moral theory niado the state essential to the
full dovelopL-snt of man. l.arx's Lioral theo.-y n.ade the state a
barrier to the full development of can. According to L'arx ethics
either was a tool aiding in the maintenance of a reactionary state,
or else it was a revolutionary tool in the hands of the proletariat
aiding in the overthrow of the state, lu either case, it was a
cla^s means to a class ends.
In connection with this Larx condemned the morality of his
day as being the legislative product of the bourgeoisie. "It is
impossible," said Larx, "to create a Moral po'ver by paragraphs
of law," Lorality is not mores. Just v/hat morality was leads
Larx i.ore toward Kant than Hegel, more toward atomism than toward
organicism,
2. Ethics Is Dehurianizing,
Following his conslusion that ethical systems have been pro-
ducts of classes, and basically the ruling classes, larx went on to
7. larx, EBE, 28. Kegel's position in this matter was the
same, ^'^e too believed that the moral development of man was prior
to the concretization of tha dovclopi/'nt in law, '^ho constitution,
for example, represented the level which a culture had attained,
and did not represent a moralizing force for the changing of a
culture, ^^ontesquieu (SL) presents a similar thesis.

point out the dehumanizing tendencies in bourgeois othics.
Bourgeois ethical systems have been abstract, committing the
fallacy of the universal in tbeir neglect of the basic needs
of man. Ethics has served as a ueans' of preserving the status
quo, ^ and that to the degradation of nan,
l.arx offers as an illustration of this, the policy of the
division of labor as exercised under bourgeois economy, -^he
division of labor separated the interests of the ir. dividual from
the coBTtUuity as a whole, by breaking down the social iiitercourse.
The particular organs of a compact whole grow loose,
and break off, principally owing to the exchange of
comEiodities ?/ith foreign com.^;unities , and then isolate
themselves so far, that the sole bond, still connecting
the various kinds of work, is the exchange of the pro-
ducts of the coi:u..:odities , . , The foundation of every
division of labour that is well developed, and brought
about by the exchange of c ot moditie s , is t^^e separation
between town and country,
In similar fashion the division of labor separated the intel-
lectual from the manual and n.aterial and took the enjoyment out
of work. Workers became mere com.modities , means to the end of
capital production. I an becam.e enslaved by his labor.
8. Larx and Angels, GI, 114-115.
9. Larx, CAP, I, 502-504; Larx and Engels, GI, 22-23; Larx,
CAP, I, chapter 14, sec. 4-5, chapter 15, sec, 3,4,5,8,9.
10, Larx, GAP, I, 385-389.

The uour^eoisia, -'hcrevcr it has ^-ot the upper hand,
has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic
. relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley
feudal ties that bound Lan to his 'natural superiors,'
and has left no oth^r nexus betweon ran and uian, than
callous 'cash payir.ent,' It has drowned the most heavenly
ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm,
of Philistine sentiir.entalisin, in the icy ^vater of ego-
tistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into
exchange value... The bourgeoisie has stripped of its
halo every occupation hitherto honored and looked up to
with reverent a've. It has converted the physician, the
lawyer, the priest-, the poet, the Kan of science, int"o
its paid wage laborers.
The bourgeoisie has torn a:7ay from the family its
sentimental veil, and has re.iuced the family relation
to a mere money relation,
Larx has been accused -^"^ of slurring over the significance
of individuals in his criticism of the capitalist state. Certainly
in his positive program he does have pore to say about the prole-
tariat than about the individual proletarian, '^^is was dv-.o not so
much to a lack of concern for the individual as to the belief that
the individual v/as the product of society. In his preface to the
first edition of Capital Larx mentions this fact.
But here individuals are dealt with only in so far as
they are the personifications of econom.ic categories,
embodiments of particular class-relations and class-
interests, Ly standpoint from which the evolution of
the economic formation of society is viewed as a process
of natura. history, can less" than any other make the indi-
vidual responsible for relations whose creature he socially.
rem.ains, howevei?-much he may subjectively raise himself
above them, ~\
11, Larx and Engels, GGL, 32 3-324,
12, See Ghamberlin, "K!TP," Parkes, WAA, Hook, HM.
13, Larx, CAP, 15,

still one nust not disregard the fact that Liarx rras supremely
concerned v/ith what capitalisrc did to individuals. Although l.arx'
s
positive program of revolution does not present in any cloar
fashion what the new order will n.aan for persons as nuch as for
classes, but Llarx's criticisri of the present order certainly
recognizes the degrading effects that it has on individuals
and not liierely on the proletarian class, taken by itself, abstract-
ly.
Engels pointed out the devasting effects of the manufacturing
system of England upon individuals.
These Ijondoners have been forcod to sacrifice the test
qualities of their h\ii.:an nature,,, a hundred po^rers uhich
slunbered 'vithin them have r.jir.aiaed inactive, have b ;en
suppressed,,, Tha vary turmoil of the streets has sore-
thing repulsive, sorjothing agair.st which huri.an nature
rebels. The hundreds and thousands of all classes and
ranks crowding past each other, are they not all huiuan
beings with the sar.^e qualities and powers, and with the
san.e interest in being happpy? And still they crowd by
one another as though they had nothing in common, nothing
to do with one a:iother, and their only agreement is the
tacit one, that each keep to his own side of the pavement...
while it occurs to no man to honour another with so much
as a glance,,. This isolation of the individual, this
narrow self-seeking is the f \indam:ental principle of our
society everywhere,.. The dissolution of mankind into
miOnelds, of which each one has a separate principle, the
world of aton.s, is here carried out to its ut: ost extreme. '^
This was Hegel's criticism too, not only of capitalism., but of
Kantian ethics as well.
14. angels, 2 3-25.

Ivot only in its division of rr.an fron nan, but in its false
avaluation, the capitalist system has degraded nankind oconorci-
cally and ethically, Jnjals pointed out with Biblical obsenra-
tion,
Das Geld ist der Gott dieser Welt. Der Bourgeois nir.i.;t
den: Proletarier sein Gold und i:;acht ihn dadnrch zuk
praktischen Atheisten, Kein ''Junder also, wenn der
Prolatarier sainen Atheisnus betjHhrt und die Heiligkeit
und die Lacht des irdischen Gottos nicht L^ehr respek-
tiert.
3. The Rights of Lan Are Supren.e.
Whatever Larxian critics uay believe with regard to the effi-
cacy of his syster., they can scarcely fail to see that he was
iiiOtivated by a desire to improve trie conditions of r:en. If i arx
did lose the individual in the econoniic order as Hegel lost him
in the absolute, still it "/as r..ore through an eivphasis in his
positive prograni upon the class nature of the revolution, I arx
thought in teres of classes. lurry points out, "one of the
chief of the many defects of the ordinary popular version of I'arKisr
is the absence of any emphasis on its consequences for the indi-
vidual." He goes on to show that the Jiarxian program was fun-
damentally concerned -/ith what hap;^iened to persons. One of l.srx's
chief critic isr.s of ^euerbach was that his materialism, failed to
15. Sngels, LAKS, in HODY, 97
15. Liurry, L'.I, in LAil, 79.

include ran. larx's frequant condenmation of thg capitalist
systen: nas based on his l-.Vliof that the systeu. harii.ed persons,
vVa shall note later, it is true, that I. arx felt that r..an does not
becor^e affective in society until he acts as a cl':ss Liember, but
this does not cancel the concern v/hich Larx had for huiuan needs.
Liarx said that in the final stage of the new order the econo-
r.;ic principle would be, "Froni each according to his abilities,
to each according to his needs," -^"^ while in the first phase of
the cori-TjUnist society, ir.an 7/ould still be paid on the basis of
the amount of work that he could do. Larx felt that the method
01 payment on the basis of -'ork done did not take into consideration
the differing abilities of n.en and their relatively comon and in-
compatible needs. The payrrent on the basis of need is a develop-
ii.ent of Benthaii.'s "grsatest good for the greatest nu;-;ber," coupled
with Kant's concern that persons be treated as ends and not as
liieans. Certainly l arx is ethical in spite of the fact that he
did not develop an ethical theory and in fact condetned traditional
ethical syster.s.
17, Larx, GGP, 10. This stater:ent occurs in the 9th edition
of Louis Elanc's Orga.:izat ion of Labor
,
72, Blanc revises a pre-
vious conclusion that images ought to be equal, by thi"; statenient,
"Equality is therefore only proportionality, and it will not truly
exist unless each person-- in accordance with the law in sone sort
written into his constitution by God hMiself-- produces according
to his abilities and consm.es according to his needs," See Tifagner,
SR, 248.

"To be radical," said larx, "is to grasp the ratter by its
root, .iow the root for rankir.d is r.an hirself." Ke oonti:;ues,
The criticisn: of religion ends with the doctrine that
man is the suprema being for L.a:;kind, and therefore with
the categorical it^perativa to overthrow all co:.ditions
in which man is a degraded, servile, neglected, contemp-
tible being, conditions which cannot better be described
than by the exclai;.ation of a FrenchL:an on the occasion
of a projected dog tax: 'Poor dogs; they vant to treat
you like rrien,
'
4, Das OpiuL: des Volkes .
One of the unfortunate eLiphases of I arx was his attack upon
religion due pric.arily to his confusing tho iiistitutionalist'. of
his day with the Christian religion as the Gospels present it.
Thus L;arx declared, "Gora.iunism abolishes eternal truths, it aboli-
shes all religion and all. r.orality. . , " Although !. arx substi-
tuted coimunist truths and conaiiunist F.orality, it t-ust be adL.itted
that these were not eternal but purely temporal and relative to the
social situation. His attack vjas rightly ag-iinst the ita.oral aspects
of the church of his day. Ke erred, hov/ever, in outlawing religion
because of those defects.
In critioizin- ..u x-JG:.u^y of his day in a latter to ^x-.
Kugeln^ann, Larx averred that it was "reeking of the barracks, the
18. i.arx, CHP-., i.. o:., 26-27,
19. Larx "and Sngals, CCU, 341.
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Church, cabbage- junkerdon and above all, of the philistine,"
Two aspects of the church nettled Larx— its other-worldliness
and its intensely v/orldly ccnservatisrii, I.arx asserted,
Die Religion ist der Seufzen der bedrfingten
Kreatur, das Ger.;tit einer herzlosen Vifelt. wie
sie der Geisi; (;eistloser ZustHnde ist,
While the theology of the priests v/as transcendent, in actual
practice, they were worldly prelates of the nost reactionary sort,
"Der Pfaffe erscheint dann nur noch als der gesalbte Sp^lrhund der
irdischen Polizei." Tlie clergy had conspired v/ith the gendarii'.es
to "derrioralize ir.iiature masses," Thus Larx concluded t, at if
r.an was to be freed from the bourgeoisie, he would have to discard
religion. Sngels called religion "ein Littel der liassenverdutrxing,
"
Since the religious leadors "erheben das Prinzip der Ausbeutung
selbst auf das Piedostal ues Heiligen und 3v/igen," "Religion
ist die grBsste konterrevolutionSire Kraft," 1- arx saw the church
as a threat to the proletariat. The church like the state r;as a
repress j.ve agency. It .vas "parsonpower, " "^^
21, Larx, CHPR, in AOD\'', 18.
22, Larx, Du Achtzehnte Brunaire des Louis Bonaparte, in R0DV,47,
See also l!arx» EBB, 115,
23, Larx, 3233, 56.
24, Sngels, Brief e an Sorge vom 29, November, 1^86, in RODV, 44.
25, Lukatschewski in RODV, 9,
26, Log, cit.
27, Larx, C'-7F, 57.

The first stap toward redeer.ing i.ian fror. the repression for
v7hich the chur-ch stood v/as to banish the idea of a state church,
quoting frou Bauer, Larx stated that "when there is no longer a
privileged religion, there r;ill no longer be a religion,"
The individual can enancipate hiniself politically fror: religion
"by banishing it froi.. public right into private ri ght." 29 This
step, hov7ever, is intended to be only a political enancipat ion,
'Shich thus neither abolishes nor seeks to abolish the real re-
ligiosity of the individual," This is a retiarkable concession
to genuine religion, llarx goes on to say,
The so-called Christian State needs the Christian religio
in order to complete itself as a state. The derocratic
State, the real State, does not need religion for its
political cor.pletion. It can rather do ?7ithout religion,
because it represents the realization of the hur.ian basis
of religion in a secular i.ianner, •'•^
I.arx thus wishes to eradicate established churches, but he does
not intend to abolish personal religion, "The privilege of faith
is a general right of i.an," But. religion ought to be earthy,
politically practical for the individual. Thus while L.arx approves
the "abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people,
28. Bauer, DJ, 66; Larx, JCJ in SS, 47,
29, Marx, JQ in S3, 5S.
30. Ibid,, 59,
31, Ibid., 62.
32. Ibid., 72.
33, Larx, CHPR in S3, 12.

he is liksv/ise pleading for a socially revolutionary relijion,
l&rx stressed the idea that popular religion was a construct of
r-:an's iirx;atur:> and abstract thinking. For this reason it was the
"opiui:; of the people," '^^ -Is hoped that D.an could r-.ak e a tran-
sition so that "the criticise, of heaven transfo.-ius itself into the
criticisni of the earth, the criticism of religion into the criti-
cisiLi of right, and the c^'iticisr. of theology into the criticisr.. of
politics."
The Jewish religion received its share of condenination.
jiiile Christianity -^as . asically too other-worldly, Judaisr. v/as
the basest of material isi... "Out of its entrails, bourgeois
society continually creates Jews." Judaism was the rconey-nad
religion, and whan, as it frequontly did, the Christian "Ihurch
becane nioney-ninded, it -vas becoming 'Jewish.' l.arx's essay on
"T^e Jewish Question" i3 b3avily loaded '^'ith anti-Senit isr:,
"Public credit," said a.-x, "rests or. ..he confidence that the state
will allow itself to be exploited by the Jews of finance." ^'^ I, arx
criticized the n.oveii^ent on foot to liberate the Je'vs. He saw no
reason why Jews should 2 sji-aiioipated when all the citizens v/ore in
the saB'.e chains. The need was not for Jewish enancipation, I.arx
34-. Larx, CEPR in Si, 12.
35. Ibid., 13.
36. Larx, J^ in 33, 92. Cf. also 88, S5.
37. Larx, GSF, 45.

contended, but for citizen er-.ancipation. The latter den:ands a
basic change in the structure of the state,, '.vhile the fonnor
would be L-sra patchwork,
5, ian's Capacity for Developtient
,
Althouj^ I. arx was skeptical about the ability of religion
to develop either sociaty or individuals to be noro free, ha
did believe that v.an had a definite capacity for freedou. !Yhen
Dar\7in's Origin of Specijs was published, Larx wrote,
This is the buck which contains the basis in natm^al
history for our view,,, Darwin's book is very impor-
tant and serves ne as a basis in natural science for
the class struggle in history,
l arx criticized, however, the unhistorical tabulation r ethod of
Darwin, Further, Larx suspected that the struggle for existence,
especially as applied by I.althus, was too easily a bourgeois tool.
The coDipetitive syster: of capitalisn 'vas likewise a struggle for
the survival of the fit. Thus Larx, recognizing the dialectical
truth in Darwin, criticized him for limiting. the evolution to
biological life and for failing to see that nian's stinggle is
econoriiic and must eventuate in the overthrow of the present syster..
Although Larx introduc:jd the econonic factor into his evolution,
he unfortunately eliciinated or ignored Liany of the equally important
38, Larx, SC, 125-125 (Letters to Sngels and to Lasallo)
.

biological factoi's which Darrin included in his,
I'arx found an assuranca that r_an had infinite capacities
for devalopL.ent in the inorganic sciences— astronorr.y, physics,
chendstry, themodynamics ard geology. Here he found iKplications
that hunan life also was a "natural devolopnient froi.. an inorganic
r.atrix," Larx found his first assurance, however, in his study
of the Hegelian dialectic. Before ha was a studont of Darwinian
science ha was a stuaoi.': o2 the Hegelian dialectic. Infinite
developn.ent was part and parcel of the dialectical system.
While Hegel had seen the prir.ary motivating factor in all
change to be the unquenchable search of the huir.an spirit for the
freedoin of the divine Spirit, Larx fiound the primary motivating
force to be aconoriiic, l.'an v/as affected by his bodily needs and
by the reactions of both hir.self and others to these basic bodily
demands. The history of man portrays the changing nature of n.pn
as he seeks to free hir-self iron economic pressures. In this sense
liagel and Larx have an. oleiv.ent in corj:on. The Philosophy of History
of Ha^el portrays the strviggla of men to becor^.a free froiu the
tranir..els of restrictive 'forces, ?iith Hegel tho forces are r-ulti-
fort-- culture, piiysical onvironr^-ent
,
custoi::s, uores, religion,
39. Venable, I.IIl!, 13, Sea also Sngels, DCii, 16,

personalities, the spiritual longings of L.er. for idaals. But
the n.ovsr.ent of the dialectic aix.s at freedor. or tho full exprassior.
of reason. With I/arx the forces arc epitonized in the econor.;ic,
although others are racogrized. These things are basic for 1. arx
—
production, distribution, the drive for economic po-.ver or security,
the inpact of oppressor on the oppressed. But here too the dia-
lectic aims at freedor.— the freedon; from econordc inequality
anu the freedom for economic security, As \va noted previously,
Engels adtiitted that the overer.phasis on econor.ics had led to
the assur-;ption by larxian students that no othar factors -.vero
recognized; yet he asserted that both he and l.'arx discerned
that there 'vere other factors. They believed that these other factor
were already stre-ssed sufficiently, '^hile the economic aspect had
been neglected.
While Hegel aided to show that man's slo^ rise to self-
consciousness would be oxor.plified in nan's awareness of his re-
lation to the absolute Spirit, i.arx aiued to sho'^r that man's rise
to self -consciousness would be exeiuplif ied f ir st in ran's awareness
of his relation to his anrl ultir?.tcl;"- ir. renL of freedor.
40, 176 '.vill consider this in the next ishaptor when Tie
coirjTient on Larx's statements in CAP, III,
41. Engels to Bloch in SC, 475-477.
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where classes did not exint, because exploitation did not exist.
H'0c;el called r..en to be Spirit conscious j llarx called r an to be
class conscious, yet only as a u.eans to a classless society.
In their coroion assertion that n.an needed society for full
development Hegel and i.arx agree, Lan is for havx as Tenable
states, "a function in a field," a "variable in an interactive
context." 1-arx stated,
The first prerdsa of all hur.an existence, and therefore
of all history is that uen nust be in a poisition to
live in order to be able to 'make history.' But life
involves before anything else eating and drinkin;^, a
habitation, clothing and Liany other things. The first
historical act is thus the production of the r..eans to
satisfy these needs, the production of r:aterial life
itself.
Larx carries this further.
All production is appropriation of nature by the in-
dividual T/ithin and through a definite fonri of society.
This gives rise to probler.s of distribution.
In society, hoivever, the relation of the producer to
his product, as soon as it is aompleted, is an outward
one, and the return of the product to the individual
depends on his relations to other individuals, ^^e does
not take inir odiate possession of it,
Hegel said that i an does not begin to jt;ake history until
a state is formed. Larx agreed that soi.:e social organization was
42. Venable, EiT., 5.
43. }.:arx, GI, 16,
44. Larx, Introduction to GPS, 273,
45. Ibid., 283. 1^
46. See chapter lY, 3), (4), chapter IV, 2, 1).

I'i.oiad, but that tho stata -vas only a n.eans f or a oarticular type
of econor ic systeE, Whereas Hegel's Philosophy of History shewed
the developciant of Spirit in the state, liarx's history showed the
developi-ont oi ^ooiiui-ic systens. In his introduction bo the
Critique of Political ICconouiy Larx points out five types of pro-
ductive systens. The Asiatic or priiaitive coirj-iunisni, the ancient
slave systot, the feudal syster., tho bourgeois capitalist syster.,
and the socialist systeci are tho five types nientioned. All of
these econoi.ic systems develop under soue forr. of social structure,
Larx criticized Adani Sr-.ith and i-'avid Ricardo for their* theory of
the individualistic origins of society.
The individual and isolated hunter or fisher who fon.:s
the starting point r'ith Smith and Ricardo, belongs to
the insipid illusions of the eighteenth century. They
are Robins onades, ^
". arx continues,
Production by isolated individuals outside of society
—
something #iich night happen as an exception to a civi-
lized nan who by accident got into the wilderness and
already dynamically possessed within himself the forces
of society-- is as great an absurdity as the idea of the
developnent of language without individuals living to-
gether and talking to one another,
47, l.iarx, CPS, peeface; Sngels, OF, pas sin,
4e. Iwarx, CPE, 265-2GG. The temi "Robinsonades" is not defined
by Larx, but it seens to suggest the 'lone wolf concept of Robinson
Crusoe,
49. Ibid., 26S.

In his ninth Thesis on Feuerbach Lari calls such a theory
a construct of bourgeois ideology, "I. ar is in the raost literal
sense of tb.e -.vord a zoon politikon, not only a social anii.al, but
an aniii.al •A.'Iiich ca:. develop into an individual only in society." "''^
I. arz's ethical position, if he had been \7illing to recognize
hi;:. self as holding to a philosophic theory, "/as that of social
hedonisn: or social behaviorisir. He emphasized ciore what the environ-
ment did to r.,an in his negative attack on capitalisn, although in
his positive program he indicated what iv.an could do to snvironuent
,
Like Eenthaia, l.ill, and Sidgwick^l arx air/.ed for the greatest good
of the greatest nui:iber. The \7eakness of llarx's theory'- at this point
was not that it lacked a sincere concern for u^n, but that it lacked
a clear criterion by which to test the definition of the greatest
good.
Impatient with what seemed to him to be the abstractness of
Hegel's stress on reason (coherence) Larx projected a practical
prograii: of action without concerning hirr.self sufficiently '.-.'ith the
theory lying back of it. Like Hegel, his emphasis on systet. tended
to slui- over the individual, Ii.arx lost individuals in his econor.ic
theories, and yet his confidence tha^t the r.eirbers of the proletariat
could E.end the unhealthy economic situation certainly L.ake hiD r.ore
50, Larx, CPE, 266

Kantian than Hegel-, who lost individuals in ths state, '^ho
tendency of both ! arx and K3^;q1 to or-iphasize systei.. iHore than
the menbers of the systori indicated tiore their sense of the.
relative value of systetis versus persons, and did not signify
that they wore conipletely indifferent to the fate of persons
,
These men had organicistic theories about society, and these
theories naturally put loss eniphasis on individuals than they
do on social wholes.

I..A:0C'-. ; ..__.uSOPHY OF 11-13 STATE
1, Larx's Svaluati- n of. thg Hegelian Syster; .
Thore ".9 so!..e quostion as to v/h'^bhor Vo ;- -1 ' ^ ?.f f i-'i..ation
that Hegel's "grBcstar Sch^Uir ist Knrl i-a -x, but there can beA
: n doubt but th.-'.t Marx cortairly owed a cor.siderabla debt to
neg'il for certain of tho .asic aler.onts of his systen. The dia-
lectic was the rxst sijr.if icart aspect of Hegel's system which
;
' r>: took ovnr, l-- "x a'^-) ''^' '-ols r co"' iz'?d the di?.l'i?.tic to be
2
the greatest acaiei'Hei.t o2 clas -ical Geru.an philosophy. In a
letter to Dietzgan I'arx str.tes that "the correct lav/s of the
?.l ': ic are already included in Hagel aloeit - . "stical forn:,"
"ogol did not exaggerate the case when he said
Dia Abh&ngigkeit der soziologischsn Anschauungen
von Larx und "Si.gols von donon Hegels folgt notwendig
aus dena tiefgehonden Einflus;?, den dieser auf jena
austlbte, Diaser Einfluss selbst ist eir.a unun-
strittene Tatsacho, Larx und Ungels haben hin-
reichend bez mgt, dass Kegel ihr Lehrer v/ar,^
Larx, ho7/ever, fait thr.t Hogel had been too abstract in bis
theory and had not ccr-.o do\7ii to practical progranvs. In the
1. Vogel, HG, 211,
2. Engels, LF, 70; Lonin, TH , 13-14.
3. larx to Dietzgen, 1S76, quote in Kook, HTl.', 61,
4. Vogol, HG, 212. Tbiis is substantiated by Larx i:^ C!PE and
by Engels in LF.

instarcys '7h?re Hegel had instigated specific policios, thny were
of a reactionary nature. Spo:''''' of ^^9fje!l, 'lis follo""'"S
I arx said, "The philosophnrs have only interpreted the world
vlif f erently, the point is, to charge it," ?/hen ^'-arx said this,
iie did not i:.oan that his ^ ;;. othod "'as not philosophical, ."'ut
that h:s was T..ore fully developed. His philosophy "/as i-ore
co: pl9t9ly conscious h•^Yin,'T roved on fro.v abstract theory to con-
crete pi'or;ra;.., Ir. cricicior of Geri^an philosophers 1-arx said,
"Gernans have thought ir. politics '^hat other people have done,
Gerr/.any ^"^s their trioor ^t? c^l conscience," In their wlani^esto
Larx anci ^n^ jls call thj t.r philosophizing on the French
devolution and espr^cially on socialise., "the robe of speculative
co"i-v?9bs, 3;-broiderGd ™ith flov7?'"s of rhetoi^ic, S'':e:ped ir. the
aew of sickly sentii.ent, xhis tra: scendental ro ;.e. '
In his criticise) of Feuer ach I,.arz condor.ns not only the
cra^s ^ aterialisi'. of F^-i ch but tre i^'"!.^") of "the r;S
"
particularly He^el who ";.ovg in the reali: of the 'pure spirit,'"
and "iv.ake religious illusion the driving force of history,"
Sngels consid-^red Hegel to b'^ theoretically a revolutionary but
practically a political reactionary. In support of this TSr.gels
5. Larx, GI, 199, (Jhesis 11.)
6. Larx, CHP:!, in S3, 2 5,
7. Liarz and 1]ngels, CCI., 349
»
8. Urx, GI, 30.

pointed out that Hagel's 3tatGii:ont "all that is real is oi-nal:
and all that is rational is real," had been interpreted by
narrow-EiindGd liberals as a "sayictif ication of thi:.^s that be,"
l.e^-ol i-.eant this to Hiean, "all that is r^al in zhe sphere of
hur..an history becor.es i -rational in the process of tine and is
therefore irrational alroafly by its destination, is tainted Ivofore-
hand "/ith irrationality, end everything which is rational in
the rdnds of zen is destined to becon.e real, hov/ever r.uch it i ay
9
contradict the apparent li-^y of existing conditions," The
theory of the dialectic vas certainly revolutionary and 3ngels
adtiitted this:
~ut precisely here lay the true s j.gnif icance and the
revolutionary character of the Hegelian philosophy,.,
that it once and for all dealt the death blow to the
finality of all products of hurjan thought and act ion,
Engels saw his and Larx's agreec;ent "/ith Hegel at this point,
Hegel had sho^n how stages of histiry are necessary and valid for
a ti: .J but that these st-:>ges j.iust dscay and perish in order to
give way to a new era.
Just as knowledge is una.le to reach a perfected terfina-
tion
-'.n a perfect, ideal condition of huK-.anity, so is
history unable to do so; a perfect society, a perfect
^
'state,' are thi'^gs vvliich can only exist in iriagination.
9. 3ngels, LF, 21
10. Log Cit,
11, Ibid., 22,

The difficulty as "^-^-^In r;-^.-' it •-'.-s that Hegel's revolution-
ai^y ir..plications had be.jn covj.^od oy xiis system, so that absolute
Spii'it becat.e the goal ovan though the systen: denied an absolute.
12
Sr.gels was troubled vitn the idea of any absolute firality.
The need -.yhich Hegol had of construct inij n syster niada it seem -to
Enjels as if a closed and static theory ^^ere the result, Engals
pointed out that
'-Whoever placed the chief ecphasis on the Hegelian syster;.
could be fairly conservative in both spheres, r3ligion
and politics ; -srhoever regarded the dialrjctical method
as the i'.ain thing could belong to the nost extrei e opposi-
tion, both in politics and religion.
The followers of .bogol illustrated this. The Social Dar.ocrats
such as Bernstein accu.'^od I a.'X of having becore ert^'-^^leA in the
"sniiros of Hegelian dialo::tiG," ' They contended that ..a.-xisr.. riust
be purged of idealistic il^^elian dialectics. The nao-Hegelians
,
among whoti are the Fascist philosoph'^rs, clair thr.t I.^arx and Hegol
have no relationship and that H'^gel supported the l-'asoist state-
theories, Carritt of Oxford said that dialectical r;.aterialisi..
•vas tbe 3;7nthesis of "Ht-tI's absolute i^l-^a ard the r-'\tter of the
Eaterialist,
"
In spi';e of the fact that sore critics r.ake Hegel a hopeless
12. Sngols, LF, 23.
13. Ibid., 26.
14. Preface to 3ngels, LF, 8.
15. Loc cit.

raacuionary, I arx recognizad that Hegel's dialectical theory
was revolut io nai'7 in its political iriiplicat ions , The dialectical
theory was not robbed of its revolutionary iiuplicat ions by the fact
that Gem-ian thinkers had r:.ade "practical life... as unintellectual
1 n
as intellectual life ij unpractical," Both nen began their
systems with abstract general definitions and moved tcvard con-
crete expressions of theso gsneral principles, '7ith Ilegel these
pr'inciplas v.qtq int^jrpracG^ arily in the light of Spii^it,
although he did give recognition to the effects of econouiics and
environn.ent . With I..arx thay vqtq interpreted primarily in the
light of economics, although iie adfdtted that there were other
factors, Larx like Hegel was opposed to social atondsn: and syttpa-
il'Gtic with social orga nicisr... ''ith bot ' of ther. the dialectical
process roi.;ained the central fact in spite of their differences
as to the i-otivating force behind tho dialectic.
^S. Sidney Hook assarts that Hegel stands foi" "political
accOi-oiation, " (HTl., 19), lax Eastj:.an says "It is the relic of
a religious attitude to attribute your plan f oi* changing the world
to th'3 world • itself , and .ndaavor to prove that the 'inner law'
of this -.Torld is engaged in rea[j.zing your ideals," (Intro, to CC!.
,
Sasti-an criticizes the dialectic as the "Garn.an-prof e ssorial"
fcethod which is unnatural to the uore "sceptical and positivistic
Anglo-Saxons," Gen an philosophers, says Easttian, have to start
with the beginning of the ".-orld in order t-o solve the sir:plest
probleii.sCGCL, viii).
17. Larx, CHPIl in Si, 36-37.
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2. larx's Dirlocticr?.l
I. I's ovci-'-. p'.-csj.s on irtjlloctual facto 's led hii_. to
develop a dialectical spiritualisi
,
l»iarx's overecphasis on ocono-
: ic CO d?ticns led h5j.: to JO"'olop a din Isot i:rJ. : at-H.p.lisr , If in
px'acticQ, though not in theoi'y, Hegel sli^-iitad cii.jr :lian intel^i-
t;onGe factors, Liarx in p.*-.-tice though not in theory, slighted
oth'^r thc.r g"'-o'':0: ic i'* " ""/''O-T! , ^ "'/ no, "'^""i :"''t? r ial**
ity, pa^'sonaiity, "18 - a.":: epitoi-.iz )a this -tcdeiicy vv en he and
Sngels avowed
What else does the history of ideas pi'ove than that
intellectual production (shanges in. character in propor-
tion as L.aterial production is changed, -^^
The r.ovet-ent froii* abstract to concrete in society is not,
as hegel said, the result of self-co-ordinating, self-absorbed,
and spontaneously operating thought," but is the result of
i.ultipl: econoriic forces ii-pinging on i..an and forcing bin to
discover the concrete. "The r.iode of production in r.aterial life
detert.ines the general character of the social, political and
spiritual processes of life." ^'^ Larx recognized that the philo-
18. Chatiberlin, "K!.??" in Ag.. Lerc
. ,
January, 1939, 64.
19. Larz and iSngels, CCl. , 341.
20. Larx, Intro, to CPE, 293-294.
21. Lar-x, Intro, to CFE, 11. See also Lenin, TD.:, 15. "If
uiaterialiSK explains consciousness as the- outcor.e of existence,
and not conversely, then applied to the social life of iv.ankind,
tiat eria lisK r-.ust explain social consciousness as the ovitcore of
social existence."
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Sophie oenaei'.oy ..Ji^.iuj.. ju o'j the Cartesian division bot'VGen
! ind and i.atter had'been to separata Eiaterial factors fror; spiritual
and thus fail to find an adequate ayrthesis, Li^o Kartjl.'j^rx
:ought lio solvG the "oil Ux-caticn, " Kani: liad based the sigi-.if ioanco
of the world of nature in the "pi-actical reason " of ethical
obli--ation. The enphasis ana the result v/ere certainly' practically
constructive. Larx did not face this pt^oblen, though he did sug^jeit
thatkan's "oughtness" should express itself , in tert-s of i-aterial
changes
,
Ho"' do general historical conditions affect production
and what part does it play at all in the course of his-
tory? It is evident that this question can be taken up
only in connection ';i'ith the discussion and analysis of
production.
In a letter to Bloch Engels recognized that the ocononic factor
v^'as not the only one,
liTenn nun jeiiiand das dahin verdreht, das likono)r.ische
LoEient 3oi das einzig bestii.ri-.ende, so verrjandelt er
jenen Satz in eine nichtssagende
,
abstrakte, sinnlose
Phrase. Die tJkonoi.ische iK'.ge ist die Basis.
but he does suggest that it is the li^ost fundajuental one.
22, Larx, Intro, to CPS, 287.
23. Engels, Brief an J. Bloch voi:: 21, Septeii.ber, 1890, in :iODV, 28.

In the light of this econor.dc or materialistic det err-dnisr:
l.arx intsrnr.^td history by the strug^^-les betT'/een classes over
econoi..ic i-atters, Hegel aau indicated that the fori.ation of a
state, as the eiibodiuent of a stage of reason, v/as basic 5f a
•u:.n were to L.ake history. I arx pointed out that "r.en i..ust be in
a position to live in o/der id be able to L.ako history. But life
involves before everything olse eating and drinking, a habitation,
clothing and n.any other things." Both j-.en agreed that ran had
to have a Eiininiuc. of freodor. to develop constructively, Hegel
believed that that freedor. depended upon the existence of a state,
l.arx believed that freedor- depended upon the existence of fair and
adequate distribution of the L.aterial necessities, Hegel said that
tian was influenced by the kind of state in which he lived, l.arx
said that nan ras influenced by the kind of econoLiic conditions
that prevailed. So, out of his analysis that hitherto existing
societies had been founded on econonic exploitation, i;ar:: con-
cluded that the social prodvio cj ox those eoonor..ic systoL.:-; v.ere
likewise exploitive. Social groups fro., the farriily to the state
were resultants of a slave economics. In speaking of the Paris
Cor-jaune Larx said,
•24. Larx, TF in GI, 16

IOC
It L C orTi.un v/anted to r.;ako indr-'idual property a truth
by trans fo:'i.inj the r.eans of production, land ani capital,
now chiefly the Lieansi of enslaving and exploiting labour,
into mere instruments of free and associated labour,
Larx's theory is a kind of social behaviorism, 1 an, as well as
his social relationships, is siniply the product of econotdc conditions.
As Bttlow has pointed out,
Der Biaterialistisch-utilitaristische Charakter, der
ja ici Grundo jeder i-ationalBkononde auhaftet, stiess
ihn ab, Sr '//ollto das nenschliche Leben nicht durch
Bkononische Kategorien bestirx^t wissen,
l.:arx's analysis, then, j.s of econoi..ic processes, ':7hile Hegel's
analysis was of Spirit processes, A fundamental aspect of the capi-
talist 9conor.y of his day vvas the theory of surplus value, Lenin
has said that "the doctrino of surplus value is the keystone of
the econoL.ic theory of I..arx." "^^ L.arx's attack upon the capitalis-
tic econoLiy vras li^ade at the point of surplus value. The relation
of surplus value to the capitalistic systoL. i arx illustrated by
the forfiuila L-C-(i.>L.), The lo':;er case "t:" is the surplus r.oney
realized o -ar the original "L" in the process of buying and selling
"C" ( coLx.odities ) , Under a barter syster. the process can bo illus-
trated by the formula C-l.-C, Here a man sells one coi:ir;odity which
he does not need for uonsy to purchase another which he does need.
25, Larx, CI7F, 61.
26, Efllow, EHS, 36.
27, Lenin, SPL, xxiv; CGL, Intro, by Lenin, xxiv.

In Eore primitive society tho formula i-iay bo C-C, In these two
fornulae C-i-C and C-C, both coLJ?.oditiG3 have the f^aro cor' v^ity
value although to the individuals- they have different use values.
Use value is the utility of a thing to the user, Gonxiodity value
is the arbitrary ruonetary price set on a coji^-iodity fcr the purposes
of bartering' or selling. Thus a ten-cent rattle and a ten-cant
stamp have an equal conxodity value to everyone, but tliey have
different use values to a fathor pacin-^ the floor 'vith a crying
infant. Larx' s critique cor..es at the source of "l.," or the in-
creased money over the original "L."
Trade should, said Larx, be based on the unlikeness of use
values and the likeness of conx.odity values. If this were carried
out, k-C-L' could not produce L-C-(l.>r.), Surplus value is produced
through a violation of coi.x.odity circulation. Instead of both
parties getting equal coirx.odity valte , one party usurps part of
the other i:.ar.'s share of the cornodity value. We nay illustrate
this by a picture of how surplus value or capital is created in
the selling of labor po'ver for wages. Let A equal the laborer.
Let X equal nanagenent i.O"J A has labor poorer ^orth ten dollars
per day in tenv-S of coi..i-odity value;-- but through the press of
28. Larx, GPS, 24; Lerin, TKl', 19; Larx, WP , 40

econor.dc conditions X is able to buy A's laboi' powei' for eight
dollars por day. The .value of the cor\r..ouities -vhich A oroduces
is still ten dollars par day so that there is an increase in value
that cones to X. In a fori.:ula this could appear as A(10)= X(8) / X(2).
Ther is no r.agic, say3 Larx, as to where the X(2) car a froLi, It
is a theft fron; the "worker. I. arx recognized the need for so-called
running expenses for i-:anager..8nt , but he does not see the noed for
the ad'3itional discrepancy that accruse to the etiployer. Strictly
speaking then it is not the r'hole "2" with which I arx is concerned,
but, rather, that portion '7hich is left over after running exparses
are deducted. This surplus xv, u:..sed upon thievery, a thiev^x"^ ..ich
the rorker I'ecognizes but I'.ust accept because of the pinch of
econor-ic ^^ant.
The discrepancy than, said l.arx, is a i.atter of '7?.gGS. Instead
of the Tvorker receiving the cow.odity value for his labor, realizing
that running expenses r^ust be deducted, he los es a portion of his
rightful valuB to the ez-ployer who pockets it as his duo. This
leaves the laborer with less than the coi-u..odity purchasing power needed
to livo decently, Larx and 5r:g -Is point?d out that:
The average price of wage labor is the niniiuun wage,
i.e., that quantur.: of the teans of subsistence which is
absolutely requisite to keep the laborer in bare existence
as a laborer,
29, Larx and Engels, ...
,

] arx continued along thi^ lice,
A general rise in the rate of wages would result of a
fall of the general rate of profit, ^^ut, broadly speaking,
not affost the pi'ices of cor.x.odities
,
Hov/ver, in an econor-.y ':'\ir,\\ ai:-:s at tho ac •wnl^t i'-'n of rurplus
value "the general tanuar.cy,,. is not to raise, '.^u-> to sink the
average standard of wages,"
Following David Kicardo and Adar.i Si/.ith I.:arx held to the labor
theory of value. This theory 3S an attempt to answer the question
"In what does the value of a coui.odity consist?" Use value, being
relative to the individual cannot be the detemdror of general
prices. Labor, said :.'arx, is an eler.ent that all corj-.odity values
contain. The aiiount of labor that has been exerted in f'aking a
product should deteriiine tho coLj-.iodity value, I.arx was nort thinking
of the tirue that each individual spent, but the tir:e spent by the
society of all workers, Th.u3, if a r a chine was invented •7hich could
do the work of tea *-en, the labor ti:..e spent would be the snr.e even
though the nui..ber of workers had changed, I^arx was endeavoring to
show that since workers gave value to corx:odities , not only because
workers , cua aoi-T-.odities uUu because they purchased coi-.r.odities,
then workers ought to bo able to benefit by these oo:.::-odities.
30. l.-arx, VPP, 62.
31, Log, cit. See also Bollary, LB, 127,

u-'^er a syster.: of surplus value rroat r;asses "/ant "dthout suffi-
cient purchasing power to gain a Jecent standard of liviii~ in
large r.easuro bocauso there was so jreat a discrepancy between
corrodity valuos and "vages.
Since aconotiic factoi'S, -vhicb said Larx, "7are necessarily
inherent in surplus value, had caused the present chaos, he con-
cluded that the econori.ic system, "/hich tolerated surplus value
had to be abolished if t.an and his society ^o^ere to ik.prove.
1. aterialistic factors were parai.ount, go Larx s attack carae at the
place 'There material factors were i.;ost inhur.ane. Lying behind
his critique of capita lisr.; "as his observation of '^hat capitalisr'.
did to persons. Although larx had no coherent criterion by -.vhich
to evaluate v/hether an ecoi'on.ic syster.; '.vera bad or t,ood, he did
YiHve a sincere concern for the "workers at hoart "/hidi Benthan and
1-ill his historic predsce'^sors had had. The iioi-e specific raasons
Thy he attacked capitalise: folio--' under the next -ection,
3, The J^ehi;ik.ani2int,- Tendencies of Capitalist 3conoi..y
.
l.arx's criticis!:. of capitalist econot:ics Tas based on his
observation of. '.vhat that systei". oid to persons, He 'wanted ..tv.
to be fre3, •'•he capitalist syster. r. ade i-.an a rage slatre. All
that 1 srx had to say concerning the evils of bourgaojs ethics
uz traced to his observation of the doaui-anising aspect of
bourgeois
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ooonoEiics. In the I ardf jsto , larx and JJngals contend t-^at the bour-
geoisie has given to evon the tiost sacred relationships a r^onetary
aspect. Everything depends upon r..oney. Even the fanily has be-
come a finaricial r.iatter. Thus l.arx insists that the syster. of capi-
talisK has nade ii^en like I.iarkhar:' s "llan With The Hoe," "stolid and
stunned, a brother to the ox,"
llarz continues to say that the bourgeoisie has "6gglor.erated
population, centralized i-ioans of production, and has concentrated
property in a few hands," The tendency of -capitalisr.. to con-
tralization is one that ultiL.atley destroys the sciall capitalist
and the system of capitalist: itself. "The stiall trades people...
all these sink gradually into the proletariat," The 'workers
are incapablo of Liatching the power of the larga-scalo producers.
1 arx expected capitalist to last longer than it did. In Russia
the revolution cat-e before capitalist: had becoL>e highly developed.
Ha, had wrongly assur.od that the revolution v/ould be i.o- j likely to
occur where capitalisr. was r.ost fully organized and where the evils
it produced were most flagrant. Present world affairs indicate
that coiij-unisiu is )..03t likaly to arise in those lands whore the people
32. Larx and Engels, CCI., 324, See section on "Ethics as De-
humanizing. "
33. larx and Engels, CCki, 326.
34. See Lenin, TKL., 28.
35. Larx and Engels, CCL, 329.
36. See Chaciberlin, "Kl.TP," in Ax.. I .ere., January, 1939, 63.

have becor.^a r:ost class conscious, the prelude to unified dis-
content,
Larx wanted the v/orker free frot: economic want, ^ie sa^
oo^ij ur isn as a v;ay to achieve this, "Cor: .ur.isL., " as distinct froi..
capitalist., "deprives no :;.an of the power to appropriate the
products of society; all that it does is deprive hir. of the power
O 17
to subju^"3te the labor of others by i-.eans of such appropriation,"
Capitalists is the kingdom of necessity because it lacks conscious
deliberate planning, Co. unisc; introduces planned econoiuy, and thias
supplants the plannless kingdom of necessity by thb planned systor.
of freedoEi,
«
4. The Class Struggle ,
Hegel said that clas:-es had been forr/ied on the "basis of the
natural division of labor and that this division 'vas still the
basis of class distinctions. The division was one of occupation
and product* Larx, on the other hand, agreed with Kegel that
classes had been f ortied originally on the basis of the division of
labor, but throughout L;ost of history the division had been on the
basis of ownership or non-ownership of the i-.eans of production.
37, Karx and Engels, CCL, 337,.
38. i:arx, CAP, III, 954; karx, CGP, 31; Engels, AD, in HL, 298;
Corres, of I. arx and Bngels, 477, 517; Parke s, liAA, 112.

In additio. to theso two charactoriscally capitalist produced
classes, owners and non-owners of the :.Qans of production, there
are anachronistic i."erinants of pi'ovious systei-.s. Such a rei-nant
is the group of landowners --.'ho rent the land for others to vork
(the tenant syster.), and tha ;^roup of crattsr.en who ovrn their ov/n
tools and who buy an:^ jell theii" own products. These, hov/ever,
are diappearinj classes,
larx'3 classic statorisnt on the class strug-jlo is j.n the
Lanifesto, ''The history of all hitherto existing society is the
history of class strug;^-los , " ^° "Every forr of society has been
based... on the antagonisr. of oppressing and oppressed classes," ^""^
Larx recognized that the proletariat has not always been conscious
of itself as a class so that in the beginning the clash was between
the bourgeoisie and an incoherent r-;ass. Later, hovever, the r.asses
becaue increas in[:ly aware of their class affiliation. It was the
interit of the first International and of the Corj.:unist Lanifesto
to sharpen the awareness of the r..assos as to the class nature of
the struggle,
Engels said that I'.ar::: was the first to discover this law of
history,
. arx did not originate the idea of class
39. l arz and Engels, CCL, 321; Lenin, TKl.
,
17,
40. iarx and Engels, CCL, 333,
41. 2ngels, Prsf. to EBE, 10,

conflict, lie rof srs to Augustin Thierry as the "fatlier of the
class struggla in French historical writing-," The traditional
economists under the inf luenoe of :licardo, Sr. ith and i althus obser-
ved what they felt was a natural harcionious class conflict, 'hey
contended that ina a cor.petitivo sociat:' the er-ployees and the
ej-.ploy'?rs would naturally arrive at a just balance. This lad thou
to advocate a laissez-faire policy. Since social haniony "/ill be
a natural result of frg:; co; petet ion, ;;,-ovarnL:ont ir-':nrf f^r?nco \"ill
confuse and obstruct rather -than aid iu tho process oi har:..ony,
Berthai* introduced the thesis, hov/ever, that social hariiiony would
'.:e created by le^:. si' ^-^-i.--^ coarcion. Konry George further^ ; '' is
thesis in his Proj^ress ana Poverty (1879), The recognition ui a
class conflict as hanxonious, however, Tras not the s^tlo as. the
recognition t'.at thio conflict •• 3 the root of the injustic
disharL;ony of society. Prior to i arx, class conflict 'vas considered
,to be a natural and neces^Rry pax-t of society. ' arx contended
that this class conflict jj rooted out if so,cie"fcy were jver
to becoue harnpnious. The r.eans of destroying classes and the conflict
between theii: was, according to L.arx, to be accoi-.plished first by tbe
42. Sel. Corres., 71, la^'x to Engels, July 27, 16^'4.

bsighter.in^' o2 class difforonces until tha r..ajority class had
displaced the r.irority clann, Ther. by legislation and education,
by the abolition of tha ecouoj ic Lases of claso differences,
there '7ould ulti^-ately coL.e a classless society.
Glass antagonist's, said liarx, are fostered by tne capitalist
systei.;. In this capitalisii is self-destructive, for it pro-
i-otes the unity and solidarity of the very group that will over-
thro" it. Tiiree classes are jiro; oted by the capitalist systeL.,
i„arx says, "wage labordrc, capitalists and lanulorcis, fort.ed the
:hr8e great classes of E^odern society resting upon the capitalist
i-.ode of production," The capitalists and the landowners ai'e
united by i.arx by what ho ca?L''.s the bourgsoisie class, '•i'hey are
the owners of the r-eans of social production and the ar ployers of
wage labor. The wage labo^-ers are the proletariat class "-vho, having
no teans of production of thei:' own, are reduced to sellinjT thoir
labor po~/er in order to live,"
Sir.cc "the essential conditior. for the ezistence anci for the
sway of the bourgeois class, is the f on: .at ion and augr-entation
of capital," the abolition of capital in the sense of sm-plus
value will result in the abolition of the bourgeoisie. This
43, See Lenin, TIC.;, 31.
44. Larx, CAP, III, 1031.
45, l.:arx and Sngels, CHI., 321, ft. by En^jels,
46. Ibid., 333-33-:,

is what Larx t eans vhoxi ho assorts that "the theory of the
u;.i3-;; i-ay uo sur:.: od up in a sin^^le sontanca; Abolition
'jf private -^i'oparby," -a is speaking of the private control
of the r.ears of produ-^t icr
.
In a society, cl-jiss anta^;o.:i s^.- aro :-.9 p^'ii..ary
fiictors, it is essantial that a class ivhich ai^is to be the
_ aster should "conquer for- itsolf political po'var," The
'.vorkers Kiust Oi'ganiza, for ''avery class struggle is a poli-
tical strug^-le." Lanr oontirues, "The iKi.ediate aw- of the
Co: u' ist is tha... fonation o"^ t'v? -^rol 3ta "iat i;.'-c n ol?.ss,
overthrov; of the L^ourgeois supra:-acy, coi. quasi; ox politic;.! power
by the proletariat," L.ar:?: reco^^nizes that this usurpation of
•oo'7,ir ^y n.'ol jtaria 3^1r. : s is r.ot cOi.pIct-! justice. It is
"aictatorship, " Still " j prolotai'ian uover-ont is the salf-
conscious independent i-ovet-ent of the iurense i.ajcrity." ^"
Thus, it is nearer justice than the dictatorship of the bour-
geoisie. To poii.t the issue Lars contends that the proletariat
47. L arx and Sng&ls, CCl., 3 3^.
48. l^arx, FBUR, in GI, 23.
49. Lenin, TH,., 33-34; Larx, YPP, 59.
50. Larx and iilngels, CGI., 330.
51. Ibid., 335.
52. Ibid., 333.

. ii3t S3G that the soat of nil th'^ chaos is in the boui'i^ooisie,
''xr order that one class jIiouIlI oe the class of ef.ancipation,
par excellence, anothor class must contrariwise be the class
of i.er.if3st sujujaticn." 1. arx cortnnds that the pi'oletariat
;..ust sjg :ho " concui^ ti'ati.ii of all chj ajfects cT oocioty in
another class,"
I. arx criticizes Utopian socialisi:. for failing, to soe that t
root of the i.atter is tho class stru gle. The general tonots of
reft wing ref orri.ist s are valuable in that they criticize tha
stJitus quo, bub thoy fail to soe that tho stru^-^le is es To'^t:' ?11'
a class struggle and thus their attacks do not touch the root
causes. Karx is confident that "with the abolition of class
dif :^r'?nGes ell thr? ."^cair.l nol^ticl i^^i^ir. --lity nr:'.?"or'' fror-.
thei.. would disappL>ar." ''^^ '.iddle class hi;;;to.'iai.s err, says
Larx, in presuEiing that the class strug^^le ended when the bour-
geoisie caue to po'.vcr. ^'^ The das'? strugjlo r/ill not end
until the class of the rr.ajority coii^es to por/er and finally when
':he proletariat as a class disa';pears,
53. karx, CHPR, in Slil, 33-34.
54. Ibid., 33. See also Larx, CVJF, 55.
55. Larx and liigels, C!C1 , 351-353.
56. Larx, CGP, 16.
57. Sel. Corres., 71; July 27, 1G54 (Larx to Engels).

L^n^ols has su:.: riz^d his and Marx's' vi-^w of th ^ class
o.-v.^.lo in his ''ovrcda znr drit": Auflage d9S Achtzqbnten
Erureire das Louis 3onap .-te «
Ss v;ar gerade Larx, der das {jrosse T^ewogungsges'^tz
der Goschichta zu-jrst entdockt hatts, das Getsetz,
wonach alle g^s chichtlichan KStpfe, ob sie auf poli-
tischen, r3ligiosen, philosophischen oder sonst irlgo-
logischen Geoiot vor sich gehan in der Tat nur doi-
Lehr oder waniger deiitliche Ausdruck von KSi.pfon
gasallschaftlichan Klassen sind, und dass die '^sistenz
d datdt auch die Kollisiorner dieser Klassen wieder bedin
gt sind durch der Sntwicklungsgrad ihrar Bkono: ischen
Lage, durch die A:i: und Weise ihrer Pi'oduktion und
ihros dadurch bodingten Austaschas,
5, Larx's Evaluation of the 'State,
I>-arx a;^rTed "'itY. H?7"!l'" tn-^-is ±^^r '- thi3 st^te aros? cv."
-
sequQ:.'.t to the appeara ca cf claa^ di--isions pror/.otad '-y the
growth of agriculture. Bv
,
,
-aas, Hegel evaluated the stvit-e
as : "^^-'s ^v -'^'^.1- ' ^".f -'^ :'. :~'"r
-c^. singly fT-^-i ":c:""S'! "'r'^-r^'^.s-
i-r.;:'ly rational, 1. ;:.i'X avaluct id the state as the exploitive tod
of the o^vning class. As long as the bourgaois ?.re in power the
state will be a repressive po^'er enforcing obedieiice to the
strtus quo. "The executive of tho r..odern State is but a co:.-ittee
no
for ; anaging the con. on affeirs of the ^lole bourgeoisie,"
""
Since the state st^.rtad r: .son of the conflict of classes, it
is nothing ^ut a class organization, and the "t. odern representa-
53, 3i':gels, "Voi'rode" of the Achtzennten .ru, o.iro u .'C ^.uuis
??onapart
e
vor. Karl l^arx, in KCD^J, 22.
59. 1 arx and Engels, CO!
,
323,

tivQ state is the tool of the capitalist exploiters of 'c.^e labor."
Larck has reiterated, "^j.- o.a-t .v:,-a zvi.. blocser: G jscnaf tsf lilu'or
dar in Klasson zerspalto"en Gf'Eellschaf t und als solcher Klassen-
staat,"'^"'' In his volu;:e on Larx Chang states l.arx's position.
The purpose of the Str.te is the protection of private
property, and the furction of the State is the o^rres<::inr
of the non-possessing by the possessing classes,
Thare j .ay be rare instances -^/here the ^.l?.ss ?5 :.n ?Gc:lot-' are ^^e-
latively equal. In such cases the state ray function 3 a i.ed-
iator, cut this does not occvr in rodern society where one or
the other class is air-; control of f^' rnr..Gnt
,
Larx, then, used tae teiv- state to u.ean the special i.ach-
inery for the suppression of one cla.'-s by another. Both the
capitalist society and t '.a fi. st phase of the con.unist society
care under this category, In his evaluation of the civil -ar in
France I^-arx observed,
The state po v^r as^uded i.ore and :-ore the charac;^er of
the national po'.ver of capital over labor, of a pu lie
force organized for social enslavecient , of an engine of
class despotisr.:. After ev >rj revolution raaking a
progressive phase in the class struggle, the purely
repressive character of t^^ state power stands out in
bolder and bolder relief.
60, 3:-.gels, OF, 203,
61, l.arck, KL, 30.
62, Chang, ITf?, 57,
63, I-a-x, CAP, L04.
64, Larx, C'.7F, 55,

"Hsre boui-joois jubl-^c si^nifios ths unl j.L.itad de^potisr- of ono
class over othar classos,' "Jn^Qls concurred with Larx in this
concliision in his introdii -^ti-n to Larx's The Civil r in France ,
In roalit/, uo . j" x-, the stcte is nothir.g but a ; achine
for the oppression of one cla."S by another, and indeed
in the democratic republic no less than in the i:;onarchy;
and at best ar ovil inherit od by the proletariat aftar
its victorious struggle for class suprei-.acy, whose Torst
sides the proletariat, just like the Coroimne, ca .iiot
avoid hax'ing to lop off at the earliest possible nor-ient,
until such tire as a ne^'' generation, reared in new and
free social conditions, will be able to throw the entire
lur.ber of he state on the scrap-heap.
: Tre the essentj.al elerents of larx's vie'7s are presented —
the cl a 3 r. f'us ?ospot5 o r - tr.re of Vte ctct itr> r 3c ry
iostructicn iij.'St oy a oour^'aois dospct j.sr.
,
and txien ^y tiie elim-
ination of even that d'.?spotisr. as the repressive eler.ents of the
state disappear cq-. pl^tel-^, \:: it stood in the days of the P- ris
GoL.iTrune the state -'as -.ely a — "parasite feeding upon, and
67
clogging the free r.over ent of society."
K-^-gel shovTed ho'v the state •.7as a logical developnent fror.
the atctdsn of individu.al self-consciousness, and the social
organizations of the far.ily and the co; r.xinity consciousness.
As such the stcte rep.' ;d a higher, L.ore univ 'sal d r-olop-
;-.ent of social li^^-ip;, i-arx agreed that "the subj !ct, society.
65. Larx, SEE, 22.
66. <-:;ngels introduction to Larx, CW , 22,
67. I arx, CVIF, 59.

..ust constantly te kopt in ind as the pren/'se froK rrhich -^e
68
start," but he did not follovir Hegel in oonsid^rin^ the state
as an advance over social organizations, Larck point 3d out Hegel's
position.
Sor:it ist die bilrjerliche G^esellscha^t als Antithesis
einar. systeuatisch?n Aufbau lingeordnet, als de'-sen
Thesis die Far ilia und dessen Synthesis dor -taat ?rscheint.
Thus while Hegel and ^'-arx agreed c.s to the thesis they disagreed
as to the synthesis, Ll-' -x's "/oaknoss or thi?? score 'vas his
failure to sho-v just '.vhat tlie synthesis should be-, though he was
certain that the synthesis should allov? rore freedor- than the
str.te "-?rr'ittod, I ar\- should have '^^v?lo-nod :"ore fvilly thar he
did in Oauitdl •:;ie nature of the lleich ijr .'reihjit which v/oii.ld
suprlant oth the bou.'geois and the proletarian despotic states,
T ^T-',-^ 0^ f'-^'^r -r.- vT-r'-tT -^^r'.lv-tions of t!' ? r-ir-te
hegel and Larx reached aif: jrent co .clusiciis in their ar alysos of
the main proble"/ s of the da3'' as well as of the constituent pa ts
of the st?te. Poverty acco"^:'"^ ^" - to H3g3l could be soi'.ved by col-
onization, while for ! :.rx it could be sol"ed only by a social-
ized oconoty established by revolution. Hegel o">-posed sl.wery
ecause of his idea of freodc.
,
, ut he excepted '-.-age sl^A'^ry,.
68, Larx, ir.tro. to :py, 295.
69, Larck, HI, 29. See page 138 f. for a further discussion of
.crx's theories of the R.oal::i of Freodoja,

to be rore exact he did :iot rocognizo it as slavery but as lan's
fraedor to sell his la ..oi- as ho will, Scci-il slavary v;ill dis-
appear as ^"^t is re". z ^'l , I arx on t^ i o;''^r ''•'.ri:^, 'I -i '^•"ed
th?t sla-'ory v/as a oonc tituo: t oT t'-iO bou.-^-aois .. t.. 03 aivi tiiat
•..hen slavery V7ent the state would also ~o. The roots of slavary
;:re econoi ic so t'- ':
-'- V ^ sk in abolishing sl "?"^' :< the
iestiTiction of tiie economic foundations of capitalisi-, "l-'o:- this
disr.erberiiient , this slavery of iv.iddle-cla -^s society, is the natural
foundation upon nhi-' > t:t ^.tnte rests, just a- +' civil
society of slavery "/as tna natural foundation upon which the anti-
que State rested, Tfi3 :::istence of the Stata is inseparable fror.
the. exist ance of slave-^,"*^^ 1:^q si '.^ory far fro;.: expressing ; 'an
'
freedor- to sell his labor at whatever pric3 he wishod, 'vs an
expression of the exploit at ii'^e aspect of the froe 3nt_3rprise
systen.
Hegel put an "ethical halo" around private property. It
•7as r^ssentirj. to the realization of individuality. The ineq^ial-
ity of abilities natur.air.y resulted in an inequality of oss'-s-
sions. This -.-/as as it ou^'ht to be, liarx, hcwever, said that
70.. l.arx, Si\ in 117,

private property -'-3 " " -1 "-.o ':ha bourgeois
.
-i,
"Security is the supre socD.al conception of oourgeois so ciety."
Private Dropoi'ty stresses the ri";hts of the irjdi'^idv.al as an
i-:ci.ic po-'-o! unity, T^ms bo'-' ' • '''.^
equality are for the bourgeoisie egoistic, Larx contirued that
.an "was !:ot fraod *"ror -roporty; ho rocei''?d f'-'-'idf -•.'o-n'?-rt.y,
lie was not frouc ' ^o<ji-' ::us';.7; ro^;i-'
72
io: ." "The exi3tir~ bourgeois property relations
':..r.:ntair ^^d ' by the St^t^-; pc -hich the boiv'-noisie h^.s or,'-an-
ized for the protection of its p-'operty ral iii^.s. The prcl-:!-
bariars i.ust» therefore, overthrow the political power r/here it
is aire dy in the han^c of t'^n '-ou --^oisie , " ' The in'^qii.alit ios
and e::plo it:.tion of st^ut-e stoL- 'id fro::i a false avaluaticr of
its significance and fror: an exaggerated extension of its appli-
cation.
One of the •ji:ajor cau.s ^3 of exploitation was the fact that
the rreans of production ' ro in large T':e3sure privately and un-
equally o-mod. P-o-;-:'':--, - id , .t-^^ - ; i p
,
not as individual privaoa po -sessions, but as social possessions
owned, by groups--not by individuals. This redistribution of owner-
ship rcul'' \n started V- - "t - of "'^ :n -.: : st
71, I. arx, j; in SS, 75.
72, Ibid., S2.
7 3.1 -ry., VC in Ss, 136

and wov.ld be consvj , at^d undal- the Second Phase, n -ov/inij- out of
his concept of the logitii.acy of orivata property -is n:-:tended even
to the 'control cf t'- productio", -~
-anctity snd validit;'' of ^c'-ti^act as an 3xpres'ion oi !r.an's freedor.:,
; arx had orly sarcssr. for tha so-call?d f^ee contract, because it
•vas OS ;onti'ally f. . ^ . s ' cllo'.vii.^- :..-o contractual adva^taje
vhich the bourgeoisie already poc-se?5sed,
Tliis sph-are that we are deserting, ':7ithin whose bound-
aries the s'sle and purchase of labour-povrer ;joes on,
is in fact a v yry Sder. of the innate rights of :i.an.
There alone ru-e Freedoi.., Equality, Property and Benthat;,
Freador- because both buyer and seller of a co: ;..odity,
say of labour-pc/er, are constrained 0""ly by their ov/n
free will. They contract as free agen-^s, and the
agreer-.ant they core to, is 'mt the fora: in which they
give legal expression to their corr on will, 'Hlquality,
because each enters into relation with the other, as
with a sir.-.ple ovner of co; i odities, and they exchange
equivalent for equivalent, Pi'op^rty, " ' ch
disposes only of -.vh.at is his ovvn. And' . ?c"v.se
each loo-ks only to himself. The only force that brings
thsK. together and puts ther into relation with erch
other, is the self i|hr-^3':^ , 'vrv- "^'"o -rri-'-tQ
interests of each, "
He;;;'ol'f^ tr^s.t? -^rt o''' c:'?- if; bcs^d c^"" -"is ?,s ::u.r"r)t i^n of
the sanctity of contract and cf pri'-ate property, so th .t u31
a-'ts against thei.-. are condemned, I>.arx*s attitude toward contrcct
and propert-' ' "'-o -'- -^-^-^ punish: ^'-t r" n • v-; 'p-^
7-:. 1 arx, CAP, I, 195.

against the.- - '^ ,:-.?:
-
rr
,
-epx-essivo -'- ^y,:—
^Qois i. Ox-ality. Sinca Larx oQlievod in r3x^olution against the
cc.pitalist syst 9;
, t logically cor.dorn sv.ch action as
Gri;-o but coi.. : r. .. - .-j stap tu •• ..'u f re >.-'i . ~--uish-
;
'^as for '-gjel tho logical ccipleirant to crir-s a^jainat pro-
party, although H^'^el did f!?.y that such punishi.ert sho^.^l.ci ^3 hr-:s-
ficial rather than u j:":^. ivoly punativg. Urdjr the capitalist st: te,
said J-arx, punishr^ent for property crir.;3S was a bourgoois tool for
presan/irg' the status qvo « Although l.'ar:: doss not -i -al -'- + 1- t^^r,
it cortainly v;ill be r.sco^^ary under a co, i^iuiist st..ta to uxex-
cisa punishi;;3nt evon for property criir^s, Jul^js and polic3,
V7hich for '''-T3I ars positirrs of
,
^ n,- l.-^x rn-t "Inf orLiOVvs
for capitalist ezcplo it?
,
'"--^'.'-^
.
-n. recognised the st-te to bo a unity. He^-^l *^7as con-
c----; -::! that tho state should o"^ "rrod by s ivom of
:-8 "checks and ,3la-.cos" t. ;o of govarnE.ent, since the unified
state 'vas the f.^j^st »tata. larx, however, sarcastically ohsen/ed
th^t tb- ^t-^- —1 f -r facially dist-,.,. ^3
and bal. nces ' thoory, A'^Vaally the st-te 'vas one big unifiod
systoK of exploit ation.

il-gel had assortan v&rs helped people to realize frG3doL:
the st./bj, isut also bacau.'^o tb^y wrought out the lest in L.an,
Hegel did rot condone '7ars " Gt\7?Gn cla'?se3 ov -vars again=:t the
rt ' t e - <=:+'.>t3. Th-? ''i- ]. -:tic p'-o- -o -•r.--r -'-p v o--- —
ur.ccr the i;
.p ?tus of battles betv/jon natiuns, L arx "-as or^posed
to '7.2rs ecauso they 'vore dynastic and economic. They ^'?:^3
fought for ecorp
-v^ts or coloni?-.
of this kind unified th3 ou.-goois stata, but brought only greater
suffering to the rass^s. 3 'TGre usGd -17 the bour;;:eois state
not only for the acquisitic; ' " r iUjry or tho preservat ion
of old, lut for a scapa-joat to take the ninds of the proletar-
ians away fror their dir^ prodi c'i.n:?rt
. Class wars, ho-7wer, and
^;.:rs against the state •-.)
-a l3-iti;.ate b •cause they were h-jne-
ficisl to the r^sses. Larx portrayed the dialectic as wo-'.ring
76
under ti^e ir.-nntus" of at il -3 '^t'TeGn classes,
hozh i..3r: u3-'alopGd orj^anicist ic theories of the state.
Tip cor-plete d 3V3lopr:ent
'
of the person -vas to be found in the-
75. Larx quoted syi
.p jt ically the resolution of a : .ans
meeting of •/orkingn en h-^ld at Brunswick, July 16, 1870; "lo are
ener-ios of all --'ars, bu': bove all of dynastic "/ara-," I arx, C\YF, 25,
•76. Larx and-^Jngals, CCL, ^^21.

service of the individuals or classes to tha larger organ-
77 ....
iza'tion. "'1 r. Led "'o p. nl 'p^"^r?^"?T. '".n p^-t^-.^ v--i- r-
the capricious solf vill and to co-opozT^o 3 in a lar^'ar '.vuolc--
the state, i^arx an e?.led to a olass loyalty to suppress the
capricious self -all - -n-n- -:.te in 1—---^' "7hole—
the 4)roletariat. "The -.vork: ngi-en have no country, " ^-arx
Thay have only their claso. Class loyalty as superior to stc.te
loyalty -as . cintaimd .7 the -i •• rs during - -r r'y-
France and Gorr^any, Tr -^n workers- "rrrote, "^Ve ai'e happy to
grasp the fraternal hand stretched out to us by the '.7orb..en of
Fr-^rcu... "'o 3.:all n^v :- '< ;t that thj v;ck.. all courtri )
are our friends and the ao:::pots of all countries our energies* "''^
The state '7as al'-ays repr"-" ive, thus t-arx ai:.?d to abolish it,
6, The x'evoliTti on^.ry Oi-orthrov; of- the State,
It nr.turally results fro! i-arx's evaluatif n of the 3t?te ^s
repressive thr.t the str.ta has to be dastroyed by revolution,
"In its stn.ii-glo rith th ^ roo-nle, tho ^a^'ty of order is cc--
pellod conntaiitly :o ir.c-'oase ti.e po^/er o:'' the executive,""
77. ^ulon, EHS, 2.
78. l.arx and Sngals, CC: , 340,
79. : r.rx, riV, 25,
CO, 1 ir::, CSF', , l-^S, Lut as •70 point out on pa^^e 131, i arx
qualified this thesis. Revolution -7as not an absolute.

T" is centralized po --^ ' iwf " " -.itarily !;ive up its anthority.
The t3ndency is for tho possesso.-s of pcver to i::intain their
position at all cost: . criticized the Las.'^allia^f ".'^'^ bour-
;3cis socialists fo'.' eposition thr.t the capit 1., 'uld
PI
ver be willinjj to r. ilinquish their authority.
If the vodern Ctate r/isbes to abolish the iripotence of
its administration^ it ^"ould have to abolish the present-
day node of living. If it 'vishes to abolish this .ode of
living, it would have to abolish itself, for it exists
only in o-^position to the sai-e. No living person,
hov!e er, •':'ould believe that defects in hi^ existence
are duo to the vital principle of his life, but -vculd
rather attribute their, to circux.stances outside his life.
Suicide is unnatural,^
A revolution is necessary to clear a-way the niaterial condi-*
"'hi ch . .5. ke for bou 'gco^ s 5 o and prol ^tei'i? t , T^^ 5." is -^ot
.rely a r>.att3r Ci juggling political parti.:-s but of abolishing
83
ecoroi. ic systeivs, ..'!Vol\itiors of the past have rely been the
84
shifting of po"' ''-o- - . --rr'^'r- group to another,
is uot adequate to insure .freedo:. for the ses. The dictator-
ship of the proletariat does change political po"7ers 'rot it
does not, _ . ....^ .' cogniz .a, ...olish e,ither 3.sic econoi ic
evils nor the state s s a corpulsive powbr. He highlighted this
ej-phasis upoji a th(;rou'^h going revolution in an address to the
Conjaur.ist' League in IC^O.
81, Ud^ard Bollaiiiy in L'., ix, sar; a point in econov ic d'-i'elop-
n.ent where capitalist rsight not be good enough even for the capitalist
0. possibility of which L'arx did not drear,:,
82, karx, SR in SE, 118,
83, Liarx, I'.C in S^:, 137; Larx, G?F, 119-120.
84,. Sngels, Intro, to 14,

7.-: ...ccrotsic c .. - itisfy tha p :^ ^
the prol3tai'i^t» Wcila tha dor.ocratic patty bourgeoisie
'.7ould liliG to brirrj the revolution to a close as soon as
thgir detands arn i. ore or lass cor.plied with, : - ' our
.
interest and our t'.sk to r..ake the revolution p t,
to k9Gp it goin^; until all the ruling and po3S3S3ing
are diprivod of po\7er, the joverniLontal r.achinery occu-
pied by the proletariat, and the or:;;;ani2at ion of the wor-
king; classes of all lands is so far advanced that all
I'ii'alry and cor potition ar::ong thcns^lv^s has ceased;
until the xiore iEportant forces of production ai'e concen-
trated in the hands of the piroletarians, "'ith us it is
not a i:.atter of roforp.5.ng pri'^ate property, but of aboli-
:?hing it, not of hushing up the class ar.tagonisn, but of
abolishing the classes, not of ar.eli orating the exictirg
society, but of establishing a nev one,
"arx beliiived th::t '•'•ly t]ie proletariat were revolutionary
enough to effect this cha:-j3, "Of all the classes that str.rd face
to face v/ith the bourg'jois io today the prolct?.ri::t alone is a
really revolutionary cla.-^s,"^^ Tlie Icv/er r.dddle clas^j is really
conservative— fighting to r.aintain status in th"e status quo.
The f?.rrio s are likev/ise a reactionary group. Their position as
l=!nd o".'ner's r.-akes ther-i feel a stake in the preservation of respect
for private property, "Th e hi -tor;,' of th-* thr-> - 7^-?" -'C h? s
ho-rever provided sufficient proof that this cla.3s of t;i3 population
is capable of absolutely no revolutionary initisitive," ' 7,/ien
asked rmether 1 id not f ear th::-^ i '-'esponsibl -'^•r. ; •''•' +
hang on the frj.ng.-s of the re\'olution would cast disrepute on the
proletariat, I. -rx said:
85. Lax^x, TS,
86. Larx and Sngels, CCI
,
332,
87. Larx, CSF, 134.

The 'dangerous class," the social scv.Cf that passively
rotting L.as3 thrown off by the lowest layers of old
society, Biay, h re and th':rs, be s-'ept into the rove-
Kient by a proletarian rovbltrtion; its conditions ox
life, however, prepare it far riore for the part of a
bri'- ^d tool of r^-cticnary intrijTi.o, ^
Ti: 3 ar:a a^-.in . j ., 3. c j a the tei..t;o.' ^.-y ^Ou--o;jois it o ji .ptJ
c>t roiedying the socisl and ^coror.io ;-alad justr.ents. The- weakness
of thR trade union i.over-.ont , 3 pointed out, V7as that "they fail
partially fror: an injudicious use of their po^'er. They fail gener-
ally fro!,: liii-iting the-..;selves to giiorrilla war against the effects
of the gristing rv'^t.^r
,
i '"to"d cf s I'.r ultcn'^^-'Sly try^--'^ to char.ge
89
it," Thus he Cj.-it icis :)d bho atter.pts of Socialists who 3xp'3ct
to rer.edy the systorn by legislative patch'fork, "Uni^'ersal suffrage,
direct legislation, p?o-l^'~ jv tice, a people's r.ilitia, etc« "ey
90
are a r.ere echo of the bour£:eois People's Party," Sngels raised
the sa!..e criticisr;. cf attempts to solve th.e housing question. The
bourgeoisie does not e::pl?''' t' -3 hoiising shortage as a r. /r,-..-al
result of an :'Cono, ic systei. of scarcity but as the result of
91 ^-
factors outside the sjster, Concerning British rule in India
l.arx said, "the question. zi.i- 1 ankind fulfil its destiny -^ith-
00
_
out a fundamental revolution in the social stite of Acia?""" in
a later article I.arx ansv^ers thiS' question.
88. larx and Engels, CCl:, 332,
39, Larx, VPP, 62, "Closer exar iii i oion o-" the sec3 sit^n : ove-
tent reveals that secession. Constitution (lent got ^ry)
,
Congress loc, cit,,
etc.y are all usurpations. In no place did they allow the p'eople to
vote an r.asse ." llarx to :3rr3ls, July 1, 1861, in C'TIJS, 227.
90. Karx, CGP, 18.

13J
Tha Indians will not rsap the fruits of the new Gler.ents
of society, scattsrod ai-ong ther.- by the Pritish bourjjeoisio
till in ^r3;'t Britain itself the nf^'v ruling classos shall
have been supplanted by the industrial proletariat, or
till the Hindoos theKSclves shall have gro /n "trong oroujh
to thro\7 off the English yoke altogether.
In a spGsch deliva.-ed to the Ha,9;ue Congress of the First
Int-^rnational in 1872 larx said, "It is to force that. in due tire
the workers will h..v9 to a_i j,...l if the dominion of labotar is at
long last to be established.""* So;.'.o years earlier in the fD.rst
volv.L-e of Capital (1867) 1 "-^x asserted that "fo 'ce is the rid-v/ife (ff
ii95
every old society pre^n.;.\; .i:.'; a i.e"> one. In his Poverty of
Philosophy he raintained that the class struggle "carried to its
highest expression., is a covplete rovolution,
. , 7ilould it, i .oreovor,
ce a raatter for aston^shrv'jnt if a society, jas 'd upon tha antagonisr.
of classes, should lead ultir.-.tely to a brut;'.l cor.flict, to a hand-
to hand struggle as its fi^'^l '"iftnour.nrt ?"^^ A~ quoting the t/ords
cf ''reorge Sand, i arx said th'.t "on th ; eve of evary general recon-
struction of society, the Ir.st -'ord of social science '.Till ever be:--
'T? CO; h-^t ou la ;ort; Ir. l^^V'-.o !^ar ~r^. " ? ire cv. le niant. Cost
91. Engels, "The Housing i^uostion," pub. 1872 in the forr. of a-rticl'^s
in the Leipzig Social DorocrTtic paper, "^''olksstaat
,
printed in Purns, HI.., 344,
92. Larx, "The .^ritish i^le in India," pub. in th- "t^ Yo-k '"-i^A^^"-,
January 25, 1853, printed in Burns, HM, 180.
93. i;arx, "The future Results of British .Rule in India," pu^..
in Me\7 York Tribune, Aug. 8, 1653, printed in burns, Hli, 192,
94. Larx, "Speech to Hague Congress of the First International,"
1872, printed in Stokloff, History of the First International
,
240.
95. Larx, CAP, I, 824.
96. Ivlarx, Poverty of Philoso^ohy, 190.

ainsi -iui la quostion :' "inciblenent pos4s."' Concerning
ths Paris Ccr.i.une i^-arx pi'oclaiK.ed —
The fruitless butcheries which have occurred since these
June and October days... ^^ill convince the people that
there is only one r-eans of shortening, sir.plif yir.g,
and concentrating tlie torturing death agonios of
society — only one r-.eans — revolutionary terrorisn,
Iv-arx v/as not advocating individual acts of ter -orisn; but a
united clas:: teri-crisi.., biiouch -e shall see that ; ^ade exceptions
to this need for violanco. The f onsier he believed to be atot:istic
ar.archisr. ; the la tter -vas organic denoc 'acy, Reco-rnizi^r;: that
class struggle Iiad beon tho source of tlie -vorld's .7o-:'S, ho still
had confidence that only a super class stin.iggle could end the chaos
of claso co-fic-b* ^ut hcv "/ill the dostructirn of t'-a bourgeoisie
elai^inate clacsas v/nen the destruction of feudal a.'is ocracy aid
not accomplish it? : arx and E g3ls point od out tv/o differences
of the pres-^i-t ^•'^t:)r ^/.vt rzlze succ""? : ore -^/'""^ li'iely. Fi":t,
oc
production is socializo' . '^his has prepc.rad the '-'ay foi- the
socialization of distribution. The high degree of organization
and control in capitalist procirctior --r-H-"' - '—^.-^r, -o.- a
r-ore equitable organization and control under coix..unic!t leader-
ship. Second, the i.ultiplo class dist i?:ctions of prior societies
97, karx. Poverty of Philosophy, 191,
98, Lax B^er, Life and Teaching of Karl Larx , 50.
99, Gf. Larx, L?, 10"; 3AP, I, 39S; ^rgels, AD, 309-310.

ha^'e bGCo: e merged into tr-o the bourgeoisie and the pro-
Istariat, "Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses,
horevor, this distinctive fe ture; it has sii plified the class
ar.tagonisr'S. Society as a v-holo is :.ore and vore splitting
up into two -reat hostile oorvs, into two gro-t classes dir-
ectly facing each othj,.-, ;oisie and Proletariat. "-'^^ -
This centralization of social classes into tv/o neans that the
elit-ination of on© -/ill leave .but one altem tive for society -
the Froletarij.t
.
larx did r.ake 3o: e exceptions to the necessity of violent
rovolutior. He f':^lt th^.t -n certain countrios such as ^rroat
ritain,
..
oi..and, and t..e Urdted States the proletariat i.- ight
achieve power through the ballot. In a 1 :;tter to Kugelr.ann he
suggested that the vi^l-^r.t
-'''^-trr
-t:' "n of th? stat^ -
i
i..ay be necessary only on tiie continent
. In his 1672 spvech
at the Hague Gongre"s of the First International 'U8.^y: o^'S-n^ed
that in certain countri-'T V'.- t ^ air; — ' :;he
worko
-s :..ay hope to secure tneir ends oy peaceful i^eans,"-'-^^
Engels also recognized that violence r ay not be ci^.tegn^^ical.
"It (his '-cry) has
-]so co. ... i , . _
100. Cf. Marx a J.s, dCL, 322; Larx, CAP, II, c.32.
101. Stekloff, h/I, 2-^.0.
102. Loc. cit.

under which the proletqriat had to fijht. "I:o jiOuQ of struggle
of 1C4& is today obsoleta from every point of vievr." ^'^^
In do; .ocr-::tic countries, r/hich aro t'-- i • > - s
of stato orge.xiizatior; of capitalist so.cioty, tlu attack . ay
be Eiade froL. the standpoint of legislative r3forr... ^^era thore
v?ill 03 instances '.vhero the petty bourgooisia are also oppressed
and where it T/ill bs wise for the proletariat to join forces
ith then, in the attack. Concerning this Larx said,
In case of an attack on a coJ-u.on adversary no
special union is necessary; in the fight with such
an eneiiiy the interests of both parties, the rdddle-
class deL.ocrats and the T7orking-clas s party, coincide
for the roBiont, and both parties will caryy on
by a te2;porary understanding,
In this cotiion attack the proletariat ".vill have to prod their
Ldddle class pai'tnors in c . ucu' that they uo no t cui..p^''0L:iss
too easily with the capitalist class.
The t.easures of the da ocrats T/hioh in any case are
not revolutionary but laerely reforrist, r.:ust be
pressed to the point of turning theti into direct
attacks on private property; thus, for instance,
if the petty bourgeoisie prepare to purchase the
rail'7ays and factories, tho Trorksrs i.ust derand
that such rail'^ays and factci-ies, being the pro-
perty of tho reactionaries shall sinply be confis-
103, Engels, Intro, to Larx, GSF, 13-14,
1C4, l arx, "Adire-c to the Co. .: .urist League, l^^O," jn
;.arx, TS, o-7.
1
cated by xha State without cox-'-pensation. If the
doi-ocra-ts propose proportional taxation, the
workers i.:ust der-and progressive taxation. If the
der.'iocrats themselves declare for a Lioderata pro-
gressive tax, the workers i..ust insist (in i tax
so steeply graded as to cause the collapso of lar^e
capital... The demands of the workers r/ill depend
on the proposals and measures of the derocrats,
Than, after the help of the proletariat has \7on the war against
the bourjeoicie, '^ith the help of the pett7 bourgeoisie, the
pi'oletariat ...ug o .urn on ti u ^-^'^ y^ uour^;^ j oisie
.
In short we ixust no longer direct our distrust
agad.nst the beaten reactionary onetiy, but agaii^st
our forr.-.sr allies, against the party ^Yho are no'.v
aboxilt to axTDlcit the coM.on victoi'y for theii' ends
only.
Thus, although Larx recognizes a placT for refon: bills,
he :loos not consider th?: co be a ^-eneral substitute for a
revolution ijy foroo, buo as additional ueans to uaka the
107final overtnrow of the bou--jeoisie t.ore easily acoov..plished,
Larx understood t' r e t^^ - n:.-oletariat could not usurp poli-
ticcl power until they i.ad becoii.e a political force. The
proletariat t.ust be organized as a political party. Ulti-
- tely this '.7ill bo an inten.ational fellcvship. '^^'^ Sinco
105. larx, TS, 8-9.
106. Ibid,, 6-7.
107. See Larx, CAP, I, b52; b-rker, PT3P, 209.
108. Larx and Engals, CCL, 355.

capitalists are organized irt ernationally, the class 3t.ru£;-l9
""'ill no\7h9r9 bo solvad '.7ithin the national walls," ^^'^ To
begin with, hovvever, ths fight is certainly a national one.
"It is altogether s elf-avi^lant that to be able to f ijht at
all, the working class r-xi-st bo a bio to oi'ganize itself at • o! c
as a class and that its O'vn coointry is the itirediate arena of
110its struggle. So far its class strug-lo is national."
; arx re-e^phasized this in his "Addres?," "The i-ass can only
bring their pressure to bear '7h.en an organization has gathered
the"-: together ai.u oiv^n thej. an intelligent lead."
'^^'^
7, The First Phase oi th e Cor:.i..unist Society; '- :o Dictatorship
of the Proletariat .
Tl'.e revolutior.ary ovj^- b-..o\7 of the -our^aoijia jy .^le
proletariat would not usher in the full-grown ideal society.
l arx's allegiance to the dialectical i..othod ,pracludod the
possibility pf his believing that there ever 'Tould be a final
and unchanging stage -of social organization. Although he
jid net believe that 'vas possible .to onvision the Ile'.r J?ru-
salen., I..arx did point "^he v/ay toward two of the probable steps
through which society would pass. The first of these was to
109. Larx, CSF, 134-135.
110. Larx, GGP, 12-13.
111. L.arx, TS, 15.
1I
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be tho dictatorship of to? proletariat. In his Gritiquo of
the Gotha Prograi.., Larx stated:
Between capitalist and coi.i..unist society lies a
period of revolutior.ary transf on.iation frori one
to the other. There corresponds also to this a
political transition period during T/hich the state
can be nothing else than the revolutionary dicta-
torship of the proletariat « 11'^
\
In this first transitional phase r any of the evils of
capitalist society still r r.ain. Problems of distribiiticn
still exist because soio'sy ..as "just cLierged after prolonged
birth pangs fror.. capitalist society." '1^ I.arx pointed out
that bhe econoric conditioning of society is such that a just
solution to the pi'obleu of j,iving Lien a share in the fiaiits
of their labors would not be solved as yet, "Right can never
be higher than the economic structure and the cultural devolo-
piaent conditioned by it," He agreed that there r/ould still
be inequality in a society in which r.an received in proportion
to his ability to produce, for the sii/.ple reason that the ability
to produce and need are not alvrays cor.xensurate. But this is -
only a temporary difficulty. In the second phase i. en will be
expected to produce on the basis of theii- ability but receive
112. Larx, CGP, 44-45,
113. Ibid., 10.
114. Ibi-a., 21.

on the basis of thoir njod,
. Since he considared the state to be an exploitive tool,
l.arx contended that the dictatorship of the proletariat was
likewise a repressive a^ent, but' with the virtue of being for
the Classes irather than for the fen, •'••^^ In this transitional
period the state is a tool in the hands of the proletariat to
crush the bour^-eoisie, ^"^^ The repression is justified because
it is in the interests of the L.ajority, Concerning this Yogel
said, "Das Proletariat hat oine heiligo Lission zu erfttllen."
The only hope of German er.ancipation, for exax-iple, i-^arx saw
to be in a class which can represent the uhole needs of hu-
i anity and can s;^; bolize the suffering and subjugation of i..an»
The proletai^iat is such a class, °
But this class is not an ultii-.ate with l:arx. There was
a proletariat because there was a systei:! of inequality that
produced it, "A new social order is possible," said Engels,
"in which the class differences of today will have dissappaared,
and in rhich, perhaps after a sl^ort transition period, which
though sor.ewhat deficient in other respects, •-•/ill in a:'y case
be very useful morally," ^'^ During this period icen are
115. Larx, CGP, 105.
115, See letter of Engels to Bebal in Larx, CGP, 96, This
principle was called by Charberlin a "conception of preferred
rights for the class of j..anual wage workers. "( "KL3T, " Ar:. Lerc,
Jan,, 1939, 64.)
117. Vogel, HG, 295.
118. Larx, CHPR, in SS, 37, "In h\y opinion, the biggest things
that are happening in the world today are on the one hand the r.ove-
...ent of the slaves in Af.erica started by the death of John Brown,
and on the other the r-^ovetent of the serfs in Russia," Corres. Larx'
to Engels, January 11, 1660, Ci7US, 221,
119. Engels, Intro, to Larx, '^LG, 13.

learning the econoi.ic l.abits that i:.a]:e freedorr. so that in ths
next phase when the state has withered away i.en can live
without authority of the state becsaue they are in the habit
of pursuing a fair 3Conoi..y,
Certain aspects of tho eld order wi],l be modified under
the first phase. The ^eneral cost of adr."inistration other
than production costs •..•ill be jreatly re luced, The au^e
expense of coL.petitive advertising '7ill be reduced to a fraction,
Th3 duplication of labor by hundreds of separate organizations
will be i..ade unnecessary in the new unified and co-opei-ative
soci'ety. On the other hand, the budget for such itor^s as
promote the public good T/ill be greatly increased. Distinctions
bet'ireen diminished and unair.inished proceeds of labor '"ill dis-
appear. In the co-operative society, the workers onn the y;.eans
of production so that their labor is no longer a i ere ooiJ"/,odity
to- be sold to others, As the cmers and producers the /.vorkers
share naturally in T7hatever is produced,
larx hastened to point out however, that too ruch should
not be expected fror. this first phase, "rJhat we have to deal
with here is a cocu-.unist society, not as it has developed on
its own foundations, but, on the contrary, as it orerges frOM
120, Larx, CGF, 7.

capitalist society; '.vhioh is thus in evary respect, economically,
uorally, and intellectually, still stai-.ped \7ith the birthnarks
of the old society f .-o;.. -/hose wor.b it onarges," '^^ It is
because of this that distribution is still esseiitially bour-
geois in principle. Sveir/ man receives back just what he
puts in, but with the difference that there is no surplus
value left over. The payi-^nt of wages on the basis of -.'ork
done fails to solve the inequality of distribution because of
unequal abilities. In order to solve the inequality of dis-
tribution one would need to have an unequal basis for distri-
buti- n, Tj3s is ^j/hat i arx introduces in his principle-*-
"froi. eacxi according to his ability to each according; to his
needs," This v/ill not be put into effect, however, until
the second phase is reached,
8, The Second Phase of the CoLX.unist Society t the Kingdoi. of
Freed on
.
Onj of the '.veakest aspects of I.^arx's philosophy of the
state is his failure to develop adequately his theories about
the second phase. In a significant passage in the third volutie
121. Larx, CGP, 8.
122. Ibid., 10.

of Capital 1 arx statoo—
In fact, tho raalr- of freedoo: does not coi-i ence
until tho point is passed where labor under the
coEpulsion of necessity and of external utility
is required.
Freedot; in the realiv. of ; aterial production consists in the
fact that,
Socialized i.an, the associated producers, regulate
their interchange v/ith nature rationally, bring it
under their cqi-: on control, instead of being i-uled
by it as by sone blind power; that they accor-plish ,
their task with the least expenditure of energy and
under conditions tiost adequate to their hur-an nature
and LLOst worthy of it. *
The idea of fr9::idcr-i as recognition of and obedience to
lav? was a -orinciple which ^e^el had developed and which L.arx
had ^ov.'u-.ou, i'ngels pointed out that,
Hegel was tho first i an fo iiake a proper explanation
of the relation of f reodor and necessity. In his
eyes freedom, is the recognition of necessity...
Freedom. do#»^not consist in an imaginary indepen-
dence of natural laws bvj^ in the knowledge of these
laws, and in the possibi^y thonee derived of applying
then-- to given ends,
In another work Sngels speaks of a higher phase of the cor.:.u-
ni^t society as "the asc3r.t of ;..an from the kingdor. of necessity
to the kinf^dor„ of freedor;.." 1^6
123. I.:arx, CAP, III, 954.
124. Loc. cit.
125. Engols, LSS, 147.
126. Sngels, SUS, 134-135.
1I
It was because of his recognition that capitalist econo-
r-ics was essentiall anarchic ani uncontrollsd that 1 arx spoke
of it as a kingdot. of nocessity. Tha contx-ol of econorics
by legislation in tha interests of the uasses vrould provide
for a kin-dor. of f reodo,.. This -ics essentially the principle
involved in Hegel s concept of freedoi... it "*as planned con-
trol as over against anarchic "^hiri, i.arx put his finger on
a fundar-.ental -veakness of the free enterprise syster, nar ely
that it is uncontrolled. The ca'"^italist syster assur.es that
uncontrolled and unlicensod coi-petition .7111 produce socially
favorable consequenc; . . pled for the control of econoi-.ic
processes by laws which .ill insure justixie to all, T'^? com-
petitive capitalist S3rsteE:: has produced an econony which puts
a prei iui- on the lo-vest possible "^age, and '7h.ich lures the ^ant-
pressed laborer by the bait of piece work pay or bonus pluris.
In the higher phase of the cor.i.u- ist society the i ethod of
distribution ~ill be, "frc:. ecch according to his ability,
to each according to his need,"
The dor.:inant trarsitional factor bet'.7eon the first and
second phases is u..v.;^a.. cedly the theory of the "'-'ithering a\7ay
127. l.arx, C!3P, 10.
I
of t^-'s st^.to," ow '} *:'-?r ; ".ro t^i-' ;;?r:. s of tbis ^''nor-^
ill his '.vritin^-s , 1 arx aid i.ob clearly ctate it.-^^^ I '^ •.'.-2
not just th3 capitalist ?5tata but the c or.:-,:unist state also
uhich --.'as to disapoear, lii ^^is os^zj on "The Poverty of Philo-
sopliy" l.arx said,
The working class v/ill substitute, in the course
of its develop:- on t, for the older order of civil
society an association which will exclude classes
and their antagonisms, and there \7ill no longer
be political power, properly speaking, since poli-
tical po\7Gr is 3ii;ply the official for: c;^ .'-ta-
gonisT: in civil societ/.
It '.7as L.arx's belief that there -vould be a tir,.e nhen no
stat 3 '7ould be needed. In the beginning-, the presence of class
r..ade the state as a pressure agency inevitable, '^e ?b olition
of classes should i.ake the stcte unnecessary. It '7ould be
unrealistic to expect that the capitalist state ^ould arbi-
trarily choose to destroy itself, if not because of the desire
for self-preservation, at l.'ast because the state finds the
cause of its defects in ualadr/.inistration. The capitalist
state said I.^r.rx, dees not drean that the trouble lies '7ith its
0';rn essential foundation, "^^^ I.arx said that "the state
12e. Cf. Chang, LTS, 127; H-gels, SUS, 127-129.
129. Larx, POP, 190.
130. Larx, SxR. in S3, 115-115.

coasos to crcist," and "it cecor-os possiblo to sno^k of f reader.,"
^yhen the rosistai'.co ol the capitalists has been brolien, the
capitalists have been eliininat od, and there are no economic
classes. "The abolition of tha state is only lojiccl -'ith
the Goi,u-U/;ists as the inevitable result of the a':olition of
classes, for onl^'- then 'rrill there be no need for an organized
ppcrer of one class to hoo;. dov/r. the other," ^-^^ "In place of
the old bourgeois sooioty, v/itli its classes anu class antagonisi.s
we shall have em association in vrhich the free devslopi.ont of
each is the conditio^" ^cr '':hc fr---? • o---^! opj.ent of all." '
The state is not o.s .le^el beliaveU the realization of
the ethical idea but sL'-.ply "a. product of society at a cer-
tain stage of - volution." ^'^^ Th.us,
As soon as there is .:o longer any class to be held
in subjection; as soon as class rule, and the in-
dividual struggle for existence based upon oyir pre-
sent anarchy in production, with the collisions and
e::cesses arising fror.. these are re' ovod, nothing i.iore
rer.ains to bo .repressed, and a special repressive
force, a State ic no lor.ger necessary, ^^•^
As Engols expressed it "The state is not 'abolished,' It dies
out," •'^^ The expr9S.?icr. 'dies out' ' been translated by
Lar in as 'withers away.' to suggest tha (gradual disappearance of
131. Larx, GGP, lO'l.
132. Lcr:: in review? of Sj^j^g de Girardin's Lo Socialise et
l'lr..port in Litorarische l.'chlass
.
Vol, III, 44-27~
133. Larx r.nd iSngels, J3I
,
3'^:3.
134. Ergels, OF, 206,
135. Angels, SUS, 127.
136. Loc, cit, Lenin, SAIx, 10o*The thesis that the state will
die out rests, houever, on a narro'.7 definition of the state. Certain
the disappearance of classes cf exploited or exploiters -Till not do
away with the need for governr:ient. I'-arx adr.its this in the first'
phase but' ignores the i.atter of grvernnent in the second phase;

the stata rathor than its sud'Ien ten iriatiori,
Cortair. fp''tur9S "^trxr^ out ir, tho second phase ir stDite
of the lack uT s;ste..;atic ..v:;ljp: jnt of its theory uj .....r;:.
It will be a sort of p}.an:"i'3d aiiarchy where people ^ill co-
oporate ar.'^ r;or]: fci' f'o ^v.blic jood fro'- ^''?bit. '^hn incr.l-
caticn oi this ;.?.bi « -.z." 'z'..q o-ncaticnai f ur.o «ior. of t ho first
phase. Political oi-ganization will be superceded by econonic
organization, for althou;;h does bolieve th?.t political or-
ganizations are :.o lonjer needed, ho is not sure that i.:an can
get alonjj without economic organization. There will be in
this second phase ''.n aVr^orc-*' of class aistinotiDns sir.cT ^.^''-rr-'-
one will be in the sai-.a class, Tliere v/ill thus be tho abolition
of the class division caused by ownership or non-ovmership of
the reans of producti-r.. Hr.t-^ and country will co-c " "'.to and
at-alganatD thoir interests. There "'ill be an abundance of
wealth, ihere vill have b^en inculcat'?d, through the first
phase, a habit 20 6r33.t as tai do a change in hvu lan nature,
Vogel has aptly stated '. ..rx's position:
Die ko:.u"'.unisti-sche Gesollschaft ist filr Larx und
Angels die Idealgosellschaf t , in der die vernttnftige
!!i/irklichkeit sich vollendet, in der die Freiheit
sich allseitig entfaltet, in der die vrahrhaf fcige
Sittlichkeit und das richtige Recht das Tun der
Lensohen regeln, in dor die Derckratisierung dos

'jaltblir-orlichGn Iiu::-anisr.us die braitesten Schichtan
e.'fasst. in dor sich alia GagansHtze hamonisch
IBs en. 137
137. Vogsl, EG, 293,
T
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lishod in liic prol j^o:--j::a 1,0 :.>o.cs . It :,u3t be reco[;idZ'3d
that tho untir..3ly d ath of Green prever.tad hin not only fror
cor pleting the book but - r^c-— -- zi-- ^/^n nr-t--t a-^ -"ll.
The criticisr of one of sha^-pest opj^onents- to the
effect th'.t tho Proles:or. uia lacks clax'ity and order is sore-
\;hat vitiatod when - v that hc.^ , t' -
book -.vov.ld ne\'9r have oaon published in its present state.
The vehor oncy se e of the critics ha's frequently arisen
as a ro^ult c; : d c J3\':'ity and lanifast incoi-pleteness of
the consideration of csrtr.in o^ the uajor premises,
Ilettleship has obser^r3d that the stro^'^Tst eler'.3nts in
the character of Gr.jen w^ro "the sonse 1 :-'i -lic duty and the
sense of religious dependence," This strong sense of duty
fovrd nxr.i-.or, '.ion in hi"^ concei'n for ethics ard in his
waru antipathy a^-ainst li iacnist-, J:-, Gv-o.-jia liarkaess has
added that Green had a nane for ir.aturity and accuracy ar\ong
3
:'"ilr-sn^'^'."S cf his 0"r '^.^y.
fce:'"ore we take up the ethical prir.cipl^s #iich. Green espoused,
1. Sidg'/7ick, "Groan's S^ohics," Lind, 34-, (1P^4) , 169-187.
2. Ilettleship, l.rr oirs , III, 29.
3. liarkness, POG, 9-10.

l-^t us noto the place of Green's ethics with rolation to" the
jeneral trend of 3n2:lish ethics,
1« A Revolt Ai:ainst Traditional Snglish Sn-piricisK ,
i^ot till Oi.piricists -.'or/u so far as liarbort SpericOx- 121
redxTcing ethics to a sociology or to ^hat Paulssn calls "ethog-
4
r?.r)''y." The •prir^ci-ni iu^a back of tl.e "irical roveT^ent in
at. lies '-.'as to s-:u'.; xiie dapender.ce of et-iio-.i pri:icipl3S upon
experience. Unfortunately the ten* exporience had co . 9 (through
J-
i-i ^ 1 '1 n^ f- '"cr E'"'""S9 r'.'^.t'^ c.''o""'^« '^^"'R ."r!;'?3ct
of consciousness -'as 3li*..in-it3d, Tne hedonist or tha utilitar-
ian folt in general that pest experiences supplied all the data
necessary for : oral 'mr- -d-3, Hune, ]^o--."- 'j --'5 superceded
by Lill and Bentha;., tno f 017. or espacially brii.t;ing valuos and
consciousness into the real:., of experiences to bo considered,
D:-\':'ey and Tufts poin-'^ ; ' ' '
,
•^o":' "- "^'lUS air. ost al?,'ays
allied 'vith eB.piricisrt, understar.ding by eK.piricisu tha theory
that particular p:?.st experiences furnish the niethod of all
5
idoas ?nd ':3lie:^s." " ' ' -"ard to any specific ;.odo of
behavior the utilitarian si piricist, Lill, s-.iid, "Social utility
'I. p:.^ilsen, ASJI, 1,
5. oy and Tufts, STJI, 231.

Ill
alone can decide the prof o rence,"° But relinquished a
ri^id hr^donisr. when he t^d to account for the choices
v.hjre :a\}pinec c :loaoV.iO .. x j not cor coBiit ants, ''-^It
oved to irtx'oduco i. "rt of duty or conscience.
Trie internal sanction of duty whatever our standard of
duty r.-ay be, is one and the sar e- a feeling in our
orn i-ind; a pain, r ore or loss intense, attendant on
violation of duty, -Yhich in properly cultivated
noral natures ri?- ,:j, in "'"--^ nore serious ca^is,
into shri^-' '."o: it as an ir pos^iV.ility,
When llill atte. pts^ to sho^r that so»8 pleasures are inhir-
e'^tly hi"^h5r tbsn o":^''''' , 5.^- unq.' o'^'tion^iMy abandonin,rj his
hedonistic positicn, Jx>.q o. ly lasis on which one pleasure can
be rated higher than another is to introduce sone criterion
oth'T V~^:. rlo'-Tiro,
The chief proponents of heaonist: or ut ilitarianis:;. -'ore
not, however, ii : oral uen teaching the pre-otdnerce of sensual
pleasures, -"^t- '': " " ^^-.^-'^-^i ' o.-lo'-'i^'-, '^li ^"-.s , t-u -"-t t^"-t
abiding pleasui-e ±z to bo ''oiuiu in disciplined thinking and
rich friendships, .'Jarlrjy corn and •vater v/ce al' he n?3io j to
o
"vie evj with, /^ws i" 5-- 3s. Hedonists, by and lar;;,-o,
have not tau[;iit sensual pleasure, since the Cyrenaics (who
certainly did) but their theory gave no criterion by which the
average ran coii.lfl ^" * rence of higher pleasures
6. I. ill, U7IL, ?4.
7. Ibid., 24,
8. Ibidj. , 8.,
9. Cal'^i-s, nyr-., 73-74,

over sonsual pleasuro'', 'c '-^ t'- ^ calibor of J . ..
Benthac's Pri.-ciplos of l o -als and Logislation
,
Chat), II;
Horbert Snencer's D^ta of Sthjcs
,
Chap, III; and Henry Sidgwick's
Tha i-9thods of ICthics c ' ; condQi.nod not as orc.l but
as inadequate.
Sar.UQl T, C!olerid;je and Thcras Ccrlrle had atte'-n+ad to
introduce Gj.: Ido'^list. into ji.glar.d out t-'-oi^' aGoui.pts
"ore crowned v/ith r^eager results. The pion^^or of this r ove-
r ont to establish idealisr.. in England and J, F. Stirling whose
cock Tho Secret of Ho^'cl (1S65) '.^-^s an atterpt to introduce
Hegelian ideology iiito "Crglish philosophy, Tha r. ost proL'.inent
l?-"d'?rs i'^ ""t inuat ? r t""!.:? '^ttn "^f, l:':"\r9 boen^^ Joii -
Jai-'ci, ijd'.vCi'a , jaird, 1''. . hr^im-id bosar.quot, J, lack-
j zio, A. Seth, and T. Green,
GrG'-^r c.': 'J -^^3 '-hzt -n] ^isure or hapr)in:^3n could
be the critorioii t.jrjt oi a i-.oral lifo '-acause of the vague-
ness 0^ the leaning of th>3 terras happiness or pleasure. He
readily r.dr.iittod that happiness or pleasure i-ay accoh-.pany the
pursuit of tho good, out that the good is soi.-ething other than
pleasure, and this something other ffirsen took to 'ce self-real-
ization,
10. Falckenberg, KI.P, Windelband, HOR, 630,
11. See discussion of this in Fullerton, HST, 236-238.

lindolband calls "jraon toe ;.ost cojent opponent of r.;.tural-
istic -ethics in spita of the fact that Greon and Spencer do have
ii'' c 0'" 1 CO' com for ". "'clo, D'T"G"^ '•.rf! 'T'-if+'' ,f."!,':;o v>cv':t
this out as tcioy u'^il 'Iraju as tlie ona "'ho fix-st poii.ted
out the fufidar ental fallacy of psychological hedonis] , nar oly,
th.'^.-!: dosire c?.:^ '^o ---n'T-'^i ' -r the anticipatic c/'' - ''z " •'r
12
i faction, Vhoy lihov/iso recognize him as tue fi -st opponent
of utilitarianisjv. to recognize the pi'actical valt\e which util-
13itarianisr- had in pror/.o^,-^ - "ocial and political ' ''-^rr . Of
the r7o?.'th of utilitarianism, in this reg^^rd Greon said,
"Jhatover the eri'ors arising fro;.. its hedonistic
psychology, no other theory has bean available for
the social or political rafor; er, combining so r.iuch
truth with so r..uch recidy applicability. Mo other
has o'^fered co coru anding a point of viav? fror -Thich
to criticize the precepts and institute ons pre-
sented as autrp"': t?."^ive,''"^
Again Green st-tTS, "Tjio .o^Jthfulness of utilitarianisiL. has
arisen frov.. its giving a vrider and r. ore impartial range to the
desire to do good, not fror: its st iJ'uletir.g th-'t '^osire,
-ut, for all this, Greer opposed the asic pri.ciple of utili-
tarianiSK that pleasure '.vas t^ie criterion of Lorality, Gr^en
t-aintained th.-^.t the social T^a^sion of utilitarianisv: was in
spite ox its theory, and that if hedonist: v/ere con sist er.tly
12. Dewey and Tufts, STH, 269; Green PTE, 168.
13, Dewey and Tufts, F,TH, 287-88; Ritchie, PSI, 143; Green
213-331.
l^x. Green, PTE, 3il,'112,
15. Ibid., 331.

f ollov/c2d, i: would iiindor i..oral progress, "Tbo ^veatsst
possible s\XT.. of pleastires" is a tieaningless critorion of
: oral ''nv-^^lorccr o , '-'^ ""roor roit iratos, "Tlio spiritual pro^-rg
of. uarJciiia is cus an uiii. earning phi'asj, unless it :^3o.'ns a
progress of personal character and to personal character," '^^
2. Letaphysics Is the .youndction of TCthics ,
Graon's attempt to bane othics on ;.:3ta-r.h'''s ic3 is bost
understood as a raaction a^jainst naturalistic ethics, Hia
assurance that no sound ethics could bo derived froiu the sense
data of experience r..ado hi), the r;:ore deten:;ined to jivo etMcs
a sound foundation. At the beginning of his Prolegomena he
says concerning anyone who anticipates establishing ar ethics,
It is better that he should i^ke it clear at the
outset why and in '7'iiat sense he holds that there
is a subject r^iatter of enquiry which does not con-
sist of uatters of fact, ascertainable by e::perirent
and observation, and what place he assigns to L.orals
in this subject j-.atter, .. he should begin with ex-
plaining why he holds a 'r'.ctaphysic of t.orals' to
be possible and necessary; the proper foundation,
though not the whole, of every system of ethics,
16, Green, Works, II, 5,
17. Rashdall, TG3,ir,2o^. .Lashdall sharply criticised Green
for his stateL.ent that " :hci greatest possible smi of pleasures
is a Leaningless statarient. Although Rashdall claii^'.s to be a
hedonist, he certainly defends the hedonist principle at this
point.
18, Green, P73, 220.
19. Ibid., 4.

TliG crude naturalis::. of Kur.o laft othj. cs in a :.:opc;J. ocj j
L.orass, "It is obvious," sv.id Groon, "that to a being who is
sirpl}' a rosult o'*' n-'tTral foi'cis an injunction to co-forn
21to their la'-;s is u..i.-3 .r.i;:g. " ..'he '±ol3 concept of duty and
obligation gro'vs out of sorvething that is not a co.nstituent
ele-.ent of natural fo.'cas.
GrodH coi 6 3 close to the over-pious conclusion which Bov/ne
22
reached. To sa;- that ethics nas a i-etaphysical basis is not
neces .:;arily the sai..a thir.g as to r.^.^ that ^thi ct? -Jn: ..?.--fls a
theistic prer-ise or leads to a theistic conclusion. Green did,
however, put considora le ei;.T:hasis on the place of the eternal
So f i- founding ethics o - '-vm prir.ciplcs, Jr. order th:.":. a
oasis be
-
ataphysical it i.-ust be other than the result of
phenor-.enal cause and effect. Logical principles are such
bases which -re univDr^^alby roal, not because there is a Qod,
but ecause of the very nature of logic« Green finds this
metaphysical prjixiple to bo self -corsciousnos 5, a f^ct "rhich
naturalists either i u.' e::plain on non-cor scions
-i..ciples
iiitchio has pointed out, "In this fact of self -consciousness,
discovered by exairlnatim' of rental
-ohenor'-ena, Green finds the
^taphysical basis of ethics,""'' oi.
-e all experience is con-
20. Hu/.e, Treating on liuL.an Nature, bk., Ill, pt. 1, il-2;
pt. 3, #1.
21. Green, PTE, 11,
22. "3vory theory of knor.'ledge rust reach the theistic con-
clusion or collapse," Borden P. Eomie, TTK, 316,
23., Ritchie, PSI, 142,
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stituted -rj intellici"'-'^ ."^ " tions, the only possibllit:; of
there being any knoT/ledga depends on th3 existence of c cor-
x^elatirg self conscious^ , This conRoiousiiess Green designates
as a spiritual prir.cipl j o :.g.. ,:.o u L".:ly ethics but ?-'3n
nature depends,
A, E, Tp.ylor, although id-^r.list, h-^s attacked this -re-
. iS3 of Gre.jn's on t/u -.isi'S th':;!: atl ios irj not a iion..a:ivc!
. ut an er. pirical science, Taylor puts ethics on an evolu-
tionai-7 basis Gi;:l.-.' ho th?'.t of lllf3S terra rck for all practical
coriclusions, Althov;-h it sggr'S probable that athics f^'r-ishes
i:^.ta for i otaphysics and r.ot vice varsa as Green claiv.ed, this
is not to r.'^.'- th'^t ^th^^.s ir. ?. n'^vsic"! rol-at ic''"^^ :^ , re
sociolo^'v oi uahavioi', Ivx uofonse of the e'^.pirical iiature of
ethics Taylor maintains that there is no difference s-^.^'s in
f-o^jr'^? '^t-v^'.--' 'O'.'- " "' •' ;'^ic3l scier ?3 . ''''ivlo^'
confused i:;.e psyc-iolOby of a^'ioins Tii± : the itetaphysics of dis-
tinction etween mind and natter,
De'"ov 'I ^ "'tici2 'd ''TG ir. • '"/'lic •' '• ^
false uetaphysics in the srrr.se that it is rei ote f ror- f-xper-
25ierce rather than a h3lpf\il guide to evaryday conduct.
24, Taylor, POC, 12, 59.
0 » U , I .
,

'caphysils prior to rather than an i; -plication frox..
25
ethics , Sv-^rot
,
at isch to' ^ thod. The disaijre.-.; e"t
ihinkers in thoir final intorprotation i
"'S il?. for tho su.cco^:-3 of othical i::-^..j.--y j.'2 j. u
: wait until this far uore difficult ta3h is
co'.plitad. It is a noteworthy fact that
i.or.t in sthic::! theory and prictice is fs.j.- jro '.ter
then that found in v etaphysical theories
HedonisjE and self-realization, the chief theories
of i-odarn ethical thou-]?t, ?.re never exclusive of
each other. The representatives of the one are
always found in the last resort to recognize an
important ele o-t of ruth in the other. Still
f.ore strikirj- is this afjreerent if one turns fro-
the theoretical questions of ethics to the field of
concrete r-oral end;s.vor. Here i-^-oalist and ;..ater-
ialist, agnostic and orthodox believer, Ror-.anist and
Protestant, Jew and Gentile, are
^-^fj^ found working
side by side ^or coriion roral ends.
3, Self -cor.sciQusnes s : t'.ie Spiritual Principle in Ilnowledje and
ink^ture. •
^
Green's pr9E;ise i' psychological hedonis; e -rs not
only in i..al:ing i^le-sure -'-.he sole object of i.an's desires but
in _ . ing t!: tially iL.r,l and nothing; : ere.
Green recognizes the possibility that, "in the growth of our
3XT)er? ev^co , in the oi'oc "s of cv.r I'^irr.inj to hnor? th*^ -'crld
an :ni..:l cr^-wiii'.
,
j :j ':o .-j in ti a, ;r'..iv.w.lJ y
becoiies the vehicle of eternally cor plete consciousness,"
26, livcrett,
,
1
27, Loc, cit.
28, Groan, PTE, £1,

uf
The 'problai,:,
3 basis of epistai..ol'
lo-'ically prior to
.3iMe?
•
'
-•ecG
. .rrartad,
'S it, i? ons 0^* firdin- the relation
pa. ij.j^; ; : .•ounds or. on
idsalisjfc the problor; is not ac-Tte,
lo^'io;.! dualist thi'?
-l-e ^piste:. oloi^ical question stands
1 quest if
. -.v is knowlodge
. ,u-"G jas ct.".j.j3. ;iri ueliovjs it po s i :.l <j to ii-'rive
at a thoory of athics ha rust find the relation h it-v
'
r.sture, Ti ic relr.t? i? " - -rr-ov^^'^cl '"o ^t •>•»_•-!-_
tir.^uishing conscio-asr. j,''^"
The ansirar to tho one and the Hany, the i...ultiplicity of
f3ot and the unity deuandod by lo-;ic, can be found uost co-
herently on the assumption of a unifying principle , The
self-conscious parson is such a principle of unity in diver-
sity, Ag Green perceives,
the spiritual principle in knowledge is that which
is not rec.ucible to phenoL.ena noi- conditioned by
phenor-ena, '.vhich is the source of connected experi-
ence and ikakes objects and our ideas of then related. ol
29. Green, PT3, 31,
30. Williaw Stern cal?.s the self an Unitas Lultiplex
,
a
unity in diversity, -.Tith the capacity of takinj the iulti-
plicity of facts and unifying the^ into a unity of knov/lod;;e
and experience,
31. Green, PTE, IG.

The spiritual principlu is noeded not only tounderstand how
knowledge is possible, but to cor^preherid naturr as iell» Green
continues;
FroLL the abovo considerations this ruch at any rate
uould seer to follo"/: that a ton.x of consciousness
which we cannot explain as of ):atiiral origin, is
necessary to our conceiving- an ordor of nature, an
objective world of fact #ror.- v/hich illusion r-ay be
distinguished,
It is not. necessary for one to becor e an opistoi .olo jicrJ
liionist in order to solve the relation of uind and tatte." or
to understand knowolc'go at all, Locke reco;jrizod an anti-
thesis between what is (nature) and what is the v;ork of
i-ind, Episteuological dualist: is the experience of 30; ; on
sense.
Green considers these possibilities in the way the relations
between r^ind and jaatter or i an and nature are to be considered,
1, We ciust deny the reality of relations altogether,
and treat the: as fictions of our coL.bining in-
telligence,
2, Or that the relations being the product of our
combining intelligence they are yet sr'pirically
real on the ground that our intelligence is a
factor in the real of experience.
3, Or if we suppose ther: to be real otherwise than
r-erely for us then we uust posit as the condition
of this reality the action of soi.;e unifying prin-
ciple analogous to that of our understanding.
32. Green, PTE, 25-26.
33. Locke, CHU, II, 12:1; 25:8.
34. Green, PTD, 35-37.

Ii ' anuol Kant 'ir'.s '••zia ir. linn "'ith this •i:2,tt9r of the
placo of a juind Ox- consciousness in explaining how l:no"'leijo
is possible, "l.acsht zwar dor Verstand die I'atxir, aber er
schafft sie nicht."
Green puts considerablo stress on tho trans-temporal
capacity of the self. It ) v.st be adJ. ittsd that all the ex*-
periences of the self an ': tire (thoujh not necessarily in
space), but this does no: ii-ply that the ndnd cannot transcend
the TDresent tiouient of ti)...3 to traverse either backward in
retrospect or forward in ir.agination. "^reen referring to t2:is
concludes, "There coudd be no such thing as tir/.e unless there
were a self -consciousness v/hich is not in tir.e," "^^ Hastings
Rashdall has averred that Green's "ti;.elass self" provides no
meaningful connection aith the self in tiii^e with 'srhich ethics
is concerned, ihis confusion has arisan through a iidsunder-
standing of the sense in \7hich the self is both unity and-uul-
tiplicity, both in tiiae and t ir.:e-transcending, A,3, Taylor also
confuses this point '.7hen he claims that tho actual self is not
tii-.eless but is relatively peri-anent in tir.e. Consequently a
tin;elass Sternal Sslf, if there be such, is co::pletoly alien
35, Green, PT3, 33-37* Sorley discovered that the quotation is
36, Ibid,, 62, not in Kant,
37, Rashdall, TG3, II, 204-205. Harkness, POG, 307, says that
Green's "repeated ref erence to the tir.eless solf is doubtless intended
+0 indicate t;jQ abiding nature of the finite self fully as iv.uch as to
. phasize its relation to the eternal consciousness." She recognises
that his use of the teri- is confusing, but she. states that Green F.eans
that the "self is not conditi'ned by tir-e, rather than not capable of
change'." 217. Green do3S not satisfactorily solve the probloi.'. of the
union of' the tii-ieless and the teciporal olaronts of tho finite self,
"hoTrevor froK a practical standpoint, he assuiLes in his ethical theory
a porsoralistic unitary self v/hose x.'oral ideal finds its true reality
the eternal consciousness, but 'hich is not atialg:.-

to "fchg circle of our conscious activity, and is only an
hypostatization of the aubject-objsct relationship a>3tracted
in the episteuological process, The tir..olGSs quality of
the self does not r.ean that the self is a v/raith r'.ovinr; air/ays
in a tiix.eless lii.:bo, but that the self can jo either oa.ck-
ward or forward in tire (in thought) fron the specious present, '
4, Fye.edoE as Ir.tellii^-ence ,
The point d'appui of the possibility of ethics is that
there actually be a fraoJo:- of choice, that persons be able
to choose between alternatives and thus be responsible for the
foreseeable consequences of their action. In one of his essays
Green states, "Since in all -.-.llling a i...an is his own object,
the \7ill is always free. Or, i-ore prorerly, a r.iar in "dlling
is necessarily free, since '.villin-; constitutes freedor.,,,"
But sheer free choice is not adequate in itself unless in
the process of freedoi" soL.e intelligence is involved, '..'hen, fpr
exar-.ple a i..an wills to do t'^-^t -hich does not pror.ote the true
good (self-realization), his freedot. is false, ileal freedox:
is :7hen a i..an chooses correctly with regard to the true good.
36. Taylor, POG, 75,
39, This is v/hat is called trans-tenzporal reference, i.e.,
the ability of the laind to think of events which existed in
previous titie, or to conterplate events which ray occur in future
tiii:e.
40. Green, Art. "DSF," in Xettleship, WOG, II, 303.

As we shall nota lator, the ideal end of the state for jreon
is to provide for freedor. in this particular sense (an end
which the state only tends to approxiriate)
.
Qiu' conclusion is that, while on the one hand
consciot'.sness is throughout er-.pirically o; nditioned,
in the sense that it v^ould not be what at any tiua
it is but for a series of events, sensible or re-
lated to sensibility,,. On the other hand his Ou n-
sciousness would not be v/hat it is, as knorin?^,
or as a subject of intelligent experience, but for
the self-realisation or reproduction in it, through
processes thus e;::pirically conditioned, of an exter-
nal consciousness, not existin;^ in titie, but the
condition of ther? being an order in tilde.,, ^-^
The place of motives in the fiaiction of freedom: ia a
significant one to Green,
The world of practice— t-ic -..o.'ld cor.posed of i: oral
or distinctively h\ii-.an acti-«ities, r/ith their result
is one in -iThich the deten ining causes are tiotives;
a uiotive again being an idea of an end, which a self
conscious subject presents to itself, and which
it strives and tends to realize, ^-^
li'Otives are not to be considered as natural events sir.ply
because physical wants aru necessary to then, vmless as Green
indicates, "the self-consciousness in and through wliicli a
rotive arises out of the.-r.nt, is itself n natviral ^v?r.t or
41. Green, PTE, 89,
42, Ibid,, 104.

seriss of events or of I'slations between events," fhe
frsedoL. of i.an depends upon the froedor. of his u^^tives.
Lotivcs are basic in all chpico. If it '.vere not for the fact
that a person sought to achieve or avoid certain objects as a
result of his actions, thera t7ould bo, properly s^oakirf, no
act of \7ill.
One sees the essential unity in personality in the iiw-
possibility for any of I'.s of living; t.eroly for the present
r-oi..ent« '^e are inextricably associated ^ith our past, our
hopes, oui- future, '-'^his self-continuity rakes us responsible
beings because v/e can ro. ei.ber what we have b^en and -'v^.t .-e
hope to be. As Green observes,
There is one subject or spirit, ^hich desires in all
a u.an s experiences of desire, understands in all
operations of his int ellig.enco, vrills in all his
acts of '-'illin;~; and that the essential character of
his desires depends upon their all being desires of
one and the s:u.3 subject "^hich also understands, the
essential character of his intelligence on its being
an activity of one and the saue subject which also
desires, the essential character o" his acts of 7dll
on their proceeding fror-i one and the sane subject
which also desires and understands, ^5
That which sets : an off fror. the ani^-als is his ability to
think of liis life as an ^n.,, end to conceivo other ends toward
43, Green, PTl^, 10
G
^'A, Ibid,, 120.
45. Ibid., 136,

which ho intends to strive. To proi.ote further this
tial idea of the unity of the salf Green qndeavors to si-.o'j
hcT desire, intGlloct, and will ara intggrst od in personality.
He points out t at|
The real ajent called Dasiro is the i.an oi' self or
subject as desiring}; the real ajent called Intellect
is the tan as understanding, as perceiving, and
conceiving; and the i-an that desires is identical
'Jith the r. an that undorstaniis
,
Again he speaks to the point when he says that "a thoughtless
4-7
r/ill would u3 no 'Jill." -
Green recognizes a dual nature in 3.an, a facto-' -iiich he
never aeant to be decisive but only explicative, but v/hich has
caused soi^o difiiculty ar-.onj critics, Groen seos )-:an both as
113 iii and as he ought tc ^j, "The will in actuality i.ust be
the self-conscious individual as so directing hin-self, wliile
the v/ill in possibility, oi- as a faculty, will bo the self-con-
sciou3 indiviaual as capable of so directing hi'u..solf." '^^
When Tve C01..3 to evaluate tho quality of the will Green puts
stress on "the specific dif "erjnce of tV'o object nilled," "'^
For a utilitarian a good o^.' . aa will ; .ay bj evaluated solely
46. Green, PTE, 1^1.
47. Ibid., 176,
48. Ibid., 181.
49. Log. cit.
( t
1
on the Lanis of tho intontion of the one 'vho is r'illiri-;
i.e., ivaat ho iiitends ':o do. Goodnass or badr.ass of in-
tention is solely decided on the basis of t'-"? pleasure or
''?.in pi-oduc?d or 1 5. -c,"': ?cl , Gni sods t'-^is .-'S-^oct of telao-
logical 'o'thics baci v/ajn io is contrasted r;ith the f orr.alisr:
of Kant TThere the good -rill is the hi^ihsst good irrespective
of the consequences endured or produced. For tho 'uodonist
nothing save pleasure is jood in itself. A dded is £Ood be-
cause of what it does. All 'villing; is the saiiioj only the
effects villec'' — diff-ar^^t, Houevor, since the hedonists
hold that ail v/illing is directed toward pleasure, there is
no such thing as a oOod v/ill oi' a bad will.
Green has been Cj."iticiZ3d fir his apparent g-enerality
in definin^; the status of :-otives and the nature of the good,
Ayers clair.s that Cr^en* is sho':7ing cyclical reasoning.
He holds that the reason for this cyclical raa.Tonin,:: is that
Green puts undue stress on i..otive to the exclusion of oo nse-
querces. Green roco2:ni2GS that ff-Otives (as he defin ir. t^^'^r.;
S3e abuve) uu not sho - a >,.an v/hat he shoulu do, '^'^ uUJ :-e7
do show a i,.an the geiieral direction in which he ought to go.
50. Ayei's, 7.
51. Green. PTE, 331.

This is not specific o'^ough for. Ayers rrho statos that Green
- failad to jive an;- jy -.Thi:;. an andeavo*" is to
'^3 guidod. Groan had adi.ittod this to 03 trv.e. But Ayer^
continues that Green has not dona even as littla as he clairs
to have done, >lyers disposas of Green's ethios as a tradi-'
ticnal acquiescence in convenient dogiia, '^^wai'd Caird criti-
cized Green for the we?.lcr-'^s?5 of his systei_ in its failure to
positive and oo..z :j\..z^x':9 state;-. -jnt of oho i.atur^ of
r o
'.ha self and of the noral ideal. Sidgu'ick also criticizes
Green's concept of freodor. as boin^, a thinly disguised deter-
i .ii.isr « The antipathy of Sidg-.vick for Ger^- an idaalisn and
his ardent suppoi't of Ledonisr: ax^a revealed in this criti-
cisL. of dopenderca upon principles aa' being det ;n:^inist is,
J, S. Lackenzie, an ardent supportiar of Groen, ^^'^ affirms
that Green avoids circular reasoning by introduci' 2 the elegant
of self-real izjtior . '^Jq-'--.; t^is concspt, •."hich has some-
thing in coi i on .vith wnat -i'igiitj .an calls "the Law of the Ideal
of Personality" adds content to the definition of the good
52. Green, PT3, 392-395,
53. Caird, "Professor Green's Last w'o.-k, " . , ISBG.
•P^-. Sidg-.7icl:, GSL, 17-20,
"
55, Rashdall, TG^, calls Lackenzie a disciple of Green ~/ho
.as carried his theories too far.
56. Brifjht-an, I..L, 242-255.

life, tut it riu.st be cor.fgsfjod at thg start that Gi'?Gn*s oon-
o^pt of s 3lf-i-o:;lizatic ^jd lach concretanost^ - .. ;Jiniton9ss
We SQo-this vagvier.ess in Gi'een's sf f ixT.at ion that at the basis
of rcniity, thoro is ar "v.i'^oorditional duty..* of rar.lising
which car..o . ..i -^u-tely defined till lo i-oalised.
5, S3lf--^^alization: tho Unconditioned good ,
Gr'^^n can sasil^- lay 'ilai:. to jeiiT^ in tha pgrsonalistic
tradition jecausa of the integral place ho ^ives to the self •
as a consciousness '-hie'/, unifies the co:::plexities of experi-
?rc'!. On? c''' I'i.:; rc^t i •.v cue "^ayir-r; ii: t^^i" r'^';'^.r.'i is "-.Is
af 1 ii'i-.ation thct ''all ot er valu^^s are r^lativa co values
for, of, or in a person," The ultimate standard is
y -:-! of person?.! ^ " Green ii.eets \7hat he considers
a deficiency of er.phaois on the pai't of Mcjel o. ncernins the
. atter of progress, He~ol 3 Spix-it tends to negate and rdni-
i-.i'zG thj sijj-.if icance of the individual in the spiritual pro-
gress , Green al-.s to i..aintain the Hegelian ideal of spii-itual
devlopx-ent or evolution of : ind, but in ad^^ition he enphasizes
that 1. ere "spiritual progress of : ankind is... an un. .eaning
phrase unless it lieans a progress of personal character and to
57, Green, F7^,
58, Ibid., 218.
59, Loo. cit.

personal character." . i. putting indi-^iduality into
.^Ggol'^ dialectical cpiri tualisr* T^ere is a tendency on
th3 "!a;''t of He^'^l to sriaal: as if f5'nirit vera scb-'c/ad in tT-,o
'-.isto*-y oj' i-an ' s dovolop... j;.t apart f c: . u,io ii.ai iuuais '—o
:;oEiprise that historic prooess, aroon eisphariaes the fact
that the evolution is om of parsons.
It is because Green finds the ultimate ^^ood to reside ir
consciius life and acre specifically, self-conscious life that
-3 is so a'-in to th^ porsoj^alistic )..o''/?t: 3rt , Irvolvo':^. in this
pi'ocess is ruason, so that li:;o Flato, the gooa and the x'-ational
bacoue i:":separablo bedfellorrs, iio-ar when Green seeks to es-
tablish the end or purpose of ethics, b'-i 3ivjr;T t -ood, he
finds it in the dovalopr-.ont and reali^aticn oi" the self.
This desire to bocor..e the best of v/hidi oiio is canablo is in
:-ar:. ony rA'-y^ "-^at S. ^-i -ht-.an c-li- i Ideal of p-.-iona-
iib'^," ana what r ;ii calls the ''iuijal of virtue, of ujr-
sonal goodness."
Self-roalizati'- : l.- self -satisf acticii see:. ~ to have so: ethin
in coLr on with hodonisr., but at further investigation \7e see
60, Green, Fr3], 220.
51, Rashdall, TGE, 69.
62, Green, PT3, 469.
63, 3i'dghtn.an, LX, 242,
64, G-een, PT3, 3G1.

that the differencQ resides in the place given to ploasura,
Plsasuro is no nocassary ar^poct of s 3lf -realization,
.ad yet according to thj vie\; of Greon "since thero is pleasure
in a] 1 realization of capacity, the life in -which hui.an capa-
cities s]:oul''' be full'/ reali^ioi^/oula nece^rsrrilv u:^ ?. pleasant
life." '''^ iut as Gr..en points out i.u^-o.ous tii en Jjleacure
is an ajKbiguous teru. EJverythin?j is pleasurable to sotie and
obnoxious to soi c cf <-'r; . T .'r
,
':op, as Gr :-n -"i:-- z, the
piu'suit of pleasure i^ a futile eiaterp'risa. The only achieved
:.nd satisfying pleasure is that which cores secondarily and not
r. 'Tult of calculr.t • i'^tert^ "r?"':e just so far as...
a lialculatinj pursuit of pleasure uecoi..es doi inant an - cuper-
cedes particular interests, the chances off pleasure are really
lost." ^'^ Pleasure ^-^i;-, -t^^ pursuit of s ol-^ lizat ion
but whether it does or not :-akos no difference to the validity
of self-realization.
Qne of the sources of uifficulty \7ith Green's conception
of the realized self is that it lacks the definitives of
direction xrhich the masses of Tusii need. 173 shall evaluate
65, Gj.een, PTE, 186.
66. Ibid., 457.
67. Ibid., 190.
I
66, Davtej criticizes Green s categorical imperative as a
i.r.eory that tells >..en that they oug:ht to do scrething, but that
it fails to tell then '.7hat they ought to do. Further, says,
Dewey, the postulate . that r/hatever v/e do we fall short of our
objective leads either to recklessness or possirdsir, "GTI.I," 603.

under the section on the stren.gth and 'Taalcnass of Greer's
othics, xn uof :r..3j oT iiic solf jG.liz2. ui0n p:.'inGipl3 'Jro '?''
Th9 via^ for -Thich '.to pi sad is that the quality
of the absolutely desireablo life, ohich renders
it such in ij.an's thoughts is that it shall be the
full realization of his capacities; that, although
pleasure wust be ircidental to such realization,
it is in no 'vay disitinctive 0^ it, bainj equally
incidental to any uniupeded aci;ivity, to the 3xer-
oise of merely arir. al fujictions no less thcji to
those that aro properly hu^.anj that although mq
]:no-".' not in detail what the final realization of
£.an's capacities would be, we kno\T well enough,
froi:. the ovidence they have so far given of thex..-
selves, \7hat a fuller developt-ent of theu '.tould be,
and that thus, in the injunction to iiiako lifs as
full a roalization as possible of hur.an capacities,
',7e have a def initenes'^ of direction, which the in-
junction to L.ake life as pleasant as possible does
not supply.
Granted that r.ore content is needed to i.ake self-realization
adequate, and yet -. '^.oes suggest the proper juoti""'e and ulti-
Tjate goal of ratici:al tiorcl behavior,
Gi*een unnecessarily complicated his theory by hi^ easy-
going '..nalysis of the rigors of i..oral practice. . ins
that in the last analysis thero is no svich thing as a conflic
of duties, '^hat appears to be a conflict of duties ic really
69. Green, PT3, 457,
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z conflict of "po-.vers invested by tho ir.;agination with the
character of ir:ponents of duty." ^uty is one, nanoly,
3slf-pi'?S3rvation and perfection, S'ron the strict vantage
point of lo;ric such a vis'.v is possible but practically duties
arj i-.ultiple in spito of the fact that solf-roalization does
coi^-pass all duties, T.ia ra- if ications and ir.-.plicat ior s of our
actions aro so far-raaching that we are frequently hard-pros f?9d
^0 find the ri^-lit choice av. ong i-ariy possibla dutias.
This sar..3 oversir.plif ication is found in his theory that
"the ^ood in tho effort of the r.overert -'ill roally corres-
pond to the degraj o: j^oua v/ill r.'hiGli 'las boar; axar':3a in
...inging it about," .-''-"-is -r/ould be true only under ideal
cii'cTi.r ct ancGS . Tifith all ':ho hindrances and influences i: -
pii-tjii-g on uvu' actio;'3, i- i-. virtually ir.poss^iblo that :':e
icipetus of our good 'vill can r^ake itself felt adequately in the
results willed. Too i:any additional factors tn.st bo considered
for "the good or evil in the t-otive of an action" to b« "exactly
7?
. aasurod by the good or evil in its consequences," I7e see
also, then, that sir.plo as Green i. akes it, the relation between
self-realization and self-sacrifice is coi.plex, Hobhouse
70, Green, PT3, 4-05,
71, Ibia., 363,
72, Log, cit.

pointsd out that Green gavo too optir.^istic a solution,
'.7e can obsorve tho hedonistic influence on Green in the
interest which he t^intains for the desireable or pleasurable,
"In this treatise the cotr-on characteristic of the ^-ood is
that it satisfies soi'.e iesire," But the lulf illr..Gnt of
this desire is in persons.
73. Green, PTl], 262.
74, Ibid., 201.
II
11
B
-.^TER VIII
T. H. Givj:^.. RuLuSOPHY OF THE STAT3
1, The Iivplications of Greon's j^thics for His Attitude toward
the State.
We have already considered the major elercents of Green's
ethical theory and we hiive discovered that although it is strongly
I
individualistic it is also social. In the sense that Green s
social interest coriplercenys his interest in individuals, he is
correcting Kant with Hegel. Certainly there are significant
Kantian ele^ients in Green's ethics. Green's enphasis upon the
autonomy of the v/ill is a case in point. As we shall note, this
conviction that the dei:iands of the individual will are prir.ary is
carried throughout Green's entire attitude twoard the relation of
the indivdual to the state. By reason of the stress on personal
willing Green puts responsibility primarily upon the individual
and not on the state.
While Hegel s ethics became subsuned in his statism, and
f'.arx's ethics in the class, Green attempted to explain the right
of the state to exist in teiT.is of personal responsibility and per-
sonal development. While Hegel stressed the state, and Llara the
class, Green emphasized persons, Self -conscious , s elf -willing,
rational wills were Green's aim for individuals. "So far as it

is thus in respect of his rational nature that he iT.a]:es hiiv.salf
ftn object to hinself, his will is autonor.ious , " ^ Green aimed
to get persons conscious of thenselvas as responsible individu-
als, ^ The sole function of the state vas to aid in this process
of self-realization. The whole concept of freedor. ',7as interpreted
in this light. Freedor. v/as not so r..uch a natter of the absence
of restraint as it ^'as a i;atter of "expressing the condition of
a man \ti o is inwardly 'raster of hiii:self,"' ^
If Green's emphasis on the good will as the freest v/ill ^
was Kantian, it v/as likewise Platonic, Pauline, and Hegelian,
These men v/anted persona to be reasonable, and being reasonable
to be free. If Plato was correcting the error of the Pythagoreans
in his assertion that only the good r.an is the tieasure of things.
Green was atto^ipting to correct the error of the hedonists by his
assertion thez only the good will is free. Green concluded that,
Thus to the grown i^an, bred to civil libei'ty in a society
which has learnt to nake nature its instrvmient, there is
no self -enjoyment in the tiere consciousness of froedora
as exemption from external control, no sense of an object
in which he can satisfy himself having bean obtained, ^
Unlike Hegel, but like Spinoza, Kant, and Llarx, Green
emphasized the non-competitive nature of the good. Green regarded
1. i;ettleship, .JOG, II, 313.
2. Ibid., 316-317.
3. Ibid,, 322,
4. Ibid., 321.
5. Ibid., 323.
I
fche good as both social ?.rA non-con'.petitive, Hegel had stressed
the elecient of conflict necessary to the davalopment of Spirit,
Life 7/as an endless struj;:^^lo. } arx certainly pointed up the
struggle, but he was convinced that in the Kingdom of Freedom the
cocpetitive aspect would disappear. In revolt against both V-sgel
and Larx, Green contended that the good life can be achieved for
all without the chaos of conflict. Although Green's result was
not different frori that of Hegel or I.iarx, his tiethod aimed to ovor-
coLie the discord of the dialectical opposition.
Green followed Kant in affirming that ii:an was Eiore than a
creature of nature, tiegel "concui'ved in this belief, I^an could
not be ad quately understood merely under the aspect of the pure
reason, said Kant. The ethical impulse of the practical reason was
needed to complete the picture. Green was criticized ° f or puzzle-
headedness and accused of i-".aking man so unique that he was not
subject to the uniform laws which govern nature. Green was doing'f
however, just what Kant and Kegel had done in stressing the im.por-
tance of m.an as a reasonable and ethicll creature.
Green was concerned also that ends were given proper signifi-
cance, ^e maintained that the traditional English psychologists
had claimed or denied freedom, for the will irrespective of the
6. Mettleship, WOG, I, 167, 242. Cf. also Ritchie, PSI, 132-133.

n
objects willed, ' ?. Qr 1^ s :3lf -raalization, and
this end is compatible • ? or al . "he good which a
i..ai: C" ''"^ for hv ^ ^'^ ^ -^C'-; '" - . of pleasures,
obj'jcts '.vhich, wher. reuliz pern.anent contribution to a
social good which thus satisfied the' pen^.ar.ent self,"^ Li'^erty
for 0r3an involves -u . tha individual will to .0 ..... i
9
it -vill as long as thg ri :.vi-.s of others are not hamiod. This
was essentially the reai^ing of Kant's categcical irr) 'rj.t^ve,
"in cas 'S of sir/.ple . o.'-.l iuties," said Gr-^en, "tha ri^'. L 1 o-io of
action L^ay best bij fo-.nd by asking is tho result pr-on;otivo of
a good character' ',^e c-v -ct yy.ov a r.an's inn:!r rotives, l?ss
our own; but '.ve can jU-jo buei- the result is .enef icont , "'•^
Gr.ier attenpted to correct the indef initeness and the social
expediency of penthar.'s hedonist by the further criterian of
self-realization.
Ir his analysis of the relation of rights to duties Groen
r aired sternly Kantian, yet -'jth -e-t.-i?- Kngelian tin ••"5,
Green recognized certain .ni r-b.ts ;viiich Lien had even before they
""•re in states, but rights v/hoso percianence the presence of a st te
insured, '^ These rights - obligations :'•-! r.<±. - -.-al duties;
they ?re not relative to st.'tes of ';7ill. They are rel.?.ted r.erely
to outwa 'd acts the perfom.anco or omission of which ought to
7. bettleship, '^OG, IJ, ?21,
8. Green, PTE, 234,
9. Barker, PTS2, 33-35
10. llettleship, WOG, II, 424-425.
11. luid., 461., These "rere 1) protecticin of body, 2) deterrin-
ation by one's oxm will.

be enforced, 1-Iatural ri^'i;ts, then, are dictiiiguishQci fror.
r.or-al duties in that the forter ai^ enforcible z'hile the latter
depend upon iiiotivas and disposition?. "Legal obligations," for
exai.ple, "can only be Ojlig^.ticns to do or abstain fror certain
acts, not duties of acting from certain notives, or "/ith a
1
3
certain disposition." Those natural rights or laws will then
be those lar/s necessary to provide the conditions in which a
disinterested or unselfish r.-.orality shall be possible, ilights
re rerely reans then to the perfornance of n.oral duties, "A
law is not good because it enforces natural rights," but because
14
it contributes to the realization of certain ends," This
certain end is the self -'oalization of noral duties. Thus the
criterian as to which rig.' its r re legit ir.is.te or which la"/s
justifiable is one which presu-orios = s an idea of the "Loral
vocation of r.^an,"''"^ This Greon conclud::s,
Th'.^re oug it to be rights, because the r.oral personality,
-
the capacity on the part of an individual for r.aking a
couon good his own, ought to be developed; and it is
developad' throiigh i-ights; i. e. through the recognition
of nerribers of a society of powers in each other contri-
buting to a co.i-or good, an^^the regulation of those
powers by that recognition.
12. i;ettleship, 1705, II, 3<0,
13. Ibid., 343,
14. .Ibid.
,
347,
,
.
,
15. Log, cit.
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Only those deeds, ther should le r.atters of l3~al r.'ohibit ion
or con'j.cr.d the doing o;' omission of which a'fects the developCiGnt
of I .oral persons, Gro3r. 's r^itrhts are talative to r.orality and
not CO la'v. I'l.ey are i:.j. i - ights and not lagal rijjhts. They
are related to Duorality in th;:t they are Leans to attaining the
rt:oi-al 3nd. Greer distin;~'aiPh3S t',7o concepts of pe '5o:ts. The
one is logal in which pj^'son j^eans "a subject of .-ij.'ts avid nothing
n.ore." The other is ethical and i.eans that "rigiits are derived
17
froF. the possession o r " -somlity as — a r-:tional v;ill,"
They natur;-.l .i^i-its are 'innate' or 'natural' in
the satie sense in ';v'hich according to Aristotle the
state -is natural; not in the sense that they actually
exist r;hen a man is born and that they have actually
ezistid as long ?-s the huaian race, but that thoy arise
out of and are necessary for the fulfillnent of, a
moral c^^pacity 'vithout '37hich a nan would not be a i..an,
Iv^oral duties, however are natters of the individual will, Un^er
coiipulsion they cease to ^' ^. tiie character of cioral acts,-'-^
In the light of the foregoing ouservations we sea that Green's
emphasis on the individual and on the right of the individual to
coral self -direction lo;^.ds hir. to a definite niinir.iziiig of the
place of the state as a positive force for good. As \-ie shall con-
sider in our next section the prir-iary task of the state is a negative
one.
17. Kettle ship, ^700, II, 347
le. Ibid., 353,
19. i'.itchie, PSI, 1^-7.

2, Tho i-3gative Function of the State
.
"Will not force," said Green, "is the oasis of the state,"
Kegel had stressed the idoa that reason was the basis of the state.
As an institution foun: 3d on reason the state had a rijht to exert
force to insiire its o';7n pornaanerce. The use of this, force did
not rdnir.-ize, for Hegel, the validity of the state, i'^rx consid-
3i'ed the stabo to je an institution of sheer oppression. The
state ••?s founded on force and as such v;as unjust. Certainly
Gr? !•" s not far fro;: I?. " j.^. '~i.z c^^'tent^-^n th"t ought to
uQ thaf -c-.sis of livi:;g xogetner. This insistence of Greer.' s that
will be a.ade paramount is the natural consequence of his funda-
li.ental interest in persons, '"r'-:n stated this concisely.
On the other hand, Tvhen the po^ver by which rights are guaran
teed is sovereign (vs it is desirable that it should be)
in the special sense of being ciaintained by a person; or
persons, and v/eilding coeraive, force not liable to con-
ti'ol by any other hujr.an force, it is not this coerci-'e
force that is the important thing about it, or that
detorn-ines the habitual o.edience essential to the real
L-.aintenance of rights. That which detanLines this habi-
tual obedience is a power residing in the corx'on will
and reason of Ken, i, e. in. the '7ill and reason of ir.en
as deterruined by social relations, as integ'jsted in each
other, as acting together for co: ron ends.
In his attitude on fre^don: Gre.3n like i.egol jelievid that the
state could and should provide it for everyone, Hegel had r-.ain*-
20. Ilettleship, ;70G,- II, 427,
21, Ibid., 409.

tained that the freedon vvhi^h oxen.plif ied the gro-3± of Spirit
could ba developed only in a state. Apart fron a state the indi-
vidual could not express all the potentialities that were in hir.i.
Green likev7isa asserted tnat the individual needs the state re-
lationship in order to develop adequately. The state helps the
individual to develop, not so raich by nhat it does for the indi-
vidual, as by what it r.akes possible for the individual to do,
Hegel saw this developiiisr-t of freedoL: lore in the light of the state
as a state than the individual as an individual. Green v/as con-
cerned al'f'ays that the Kantian autonoiay of the \7ill be achieved
by all. The state was valid only as it helped in this process.
In comparing his theory with that of Hegel Green reraarked,
So far the state, in that full sense in which Hegel
uses the teni^-- does contribute to the realization of
freedom, if by freedoti we understaispd the autonoir.y of
the '.vill as its detert:ination by rational objects,
objects which help to satisfy the deciand of reason,
the effort after self-perfection,
The inportant thing in civil society was that there be a power to
guarantee roan's rights, i, a,, that will nake it possible f oi* ii.en
to have freedon; of action provided they do not infringe on the
san.e freedom of others, ^
22. i:ettleship, "lOQ, II, 313-314.
23, Ibid., 408.

In a real sens 3 this fre don: was initially a negative froedom
of being left alone. State action T7as expedis-^t o-'",ly as it tended
"to proLiote freedm.: in the sense of self -deteruixiad action directed
to the objects of reason, inexpedient so far as it tends to inter-
fore Tvith this." The function of the state '^as prir.arily
negative. Its task was to rerrove the obstacles to hurcan develop-
i^ent. The state had no ii.o.al function of making uernbers better.
Green's idea 'vas Kantian, ::i3 o'oal was the free v;ill v/illing
itself and doing good, not because of external obligations, but
because of an inner sense of self -in-posed duty. The important
feature of the state was not what it 'iid for the individual, but
what it made possible for the individual.
As far as LOst of the citizens are concerned the state is
a repressive po'vei". l..oc;t people conforr. to institutions which
they had no part in making. It is not until iVien take an active
part in the affairs of the state that they cor«e to racogriza that
the state does exist for the coBor.on good, L.ost people err in
supposing that the state is to do things for then, rather than to
free theri to do things ther/.selves , In this Green --/as an ardent
supporter of laissez-f aird policy. It was the duty of the state
24, Kitchie, PSI, 147* There were ti2:os when Green believed that
a considerable amount of state interference was necassary( s eo above
176, 180), The interference was not a i.-atter of the state ioing 30L.e-
thing for the citizen, but of fi'eeing the citizen to do that sox^ething
hi^-self •
II
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to provide the opportunity for the self-realization of Torsons,
"The self-realization whose oonditiors a cor.xunity ought to secure
for its i..3Libers was in the i. ain Aristotle's idealization of Greek
citizenship but r/ith its aristocratic ii -ilicatioiis oi itt ?d."
Green stated thai,
The real function of governr.ent bein^- to r;;aintain
conditions of life in which uorality shall be possible,
and uorality consisting in the disinterested perfoiT.ance
of self imposed duties, 'paternal govornr.ent' does its
best to rake it ir.ipossibl3 by nar. -owing the room for
the solf-ixiposition of duties and for the play of dis-
interested motives, ^'^
Green v?as concerned pr^j arily with three froci'^.l :'eforr.3:
education, tetiperance, and property. It r ay oeei. contradictory
that I'.e favored considerable state intervention to bring these
reforr.s about, but he '-'as only intending that the obstacles to
the full developnient of persons be removed. If i. en are oppressed
by ignorance, poverty, oj injustice, it is the task of the state
op
to rst'ove these hindrances. Government has the right and dvity
of legislating changes in the economic syster or of regulating it
when it fails to produce or provide for abundant living. "The
value then of the institutions of civil life li^s in their
operation as giving reality to these ca-acities of will and reason,
and enabling them to be really exercised," Thus, "to ask why
25. Kettleship, IQG, II, 515.
26. Sabine, KPT, 67'!.
27. i:ef,leship, TlOG, II, 346.
28. Eaker, PTST, 50-51,
29. Nottlaship, 'HOG, II, 338.
„ 1
I an to subr.it to the po-.-'o:- of the stats, is to ask why I a:.
to allo.7 Lj life to ba regulated by that cor.plex of institutions
without which I literally should not have a life to call n.y own." '-'^
Green's conception of the place of tha state in the Dunish-
nent of crir.'.e "/as naturally related to his concern that persons
develop to their best. Green agreed with L.arx in spirit at least,
that the state had no divine right to execute punishrents. 'his
was especially true in t'le lij^-t of t.io ::'act that soiucj laws pro-
tected r.inority interests, or at least protected sonathing that
only the fe^ could possess. "It is not the business of the state,"
said Green, "to protect on? ordsr of rights specially, but all
rights equally, "^^
The right of the st'^.tj to execute punishment was based on its
right ai".d duty to reuovo obstacles to self-realization. If
punishr-ent can prevent such actions as interfere with the possibility
of free action which contributos to the social good, ther) the
state has a right to punish. Green concluded that "if punishment
then is to be just... it i-.ust be, so far as public safety allor/s,
ref orn.atox-y."
3, Self I-lealization: the- Positive 5nd of the State .
It should be clear no'7 that for Green the individual is the
basis of the state, and individual self -developr.ent is the end of
30. ITettleship, lOG, II, 428.
31. Ibid,, 499.
32. Ibid., 486.
33. Ibid., 510.
i
the state. As .ii^istobla cor plcted his at"-? cs by hi" i^o''. :'. ':i
,
because the good lifa.can bo i."ealized only by thj cil^izeii of the
good state, so Green cot pleted his ethics by his viev/ of politics,
"Only through society, in thu sense explained, is porsor.ality
actualized."
This actualization of personality is not a r^ore personal
r.atter. It n.ust involve a social good, Self -real izaticn included
what Green called "an ideal of n-utual service," A true good
must bo one in which all can participate and ^hich all can achieve,
i.o exclusive values can bo tlio good. On this basis Green criticized
the "stream of unrelenting competition, in which r;e adiLit that the
weaker has not a chance." ^' He continued, "the principle ^hich
it is here sought to i.aintain is that the perfection of huran
character— a perfection of individuals which is also that of
society, and of soci'^'ty "'hich is also that of individuals-- is for
i-an thu Oiily ouject of u-.:;olute or ii.'iri..oic valua, xn thiz
regard Green discerned the service done by ut ilitarianisv in insis-
ting that it is the hijhest good of the greatest nujvber that is to
be taken into account. '^^
34, Green, PTE, 2?G.
35. Ibid,, 279,
35, Ibid., 296.
37, Loc. cit,
38, Ibid., 301.
39, Ibid., 412,

It is the iiiterprataticn of self-roalization as ths realization
of a cor.j-.on good that unitos Green's ethics with his politics,
"A"' -i' terest in coi.iL:on ~oo'j i' o '.round of political society in
the oonse that without it no . cuy of people would rocognize any
authority as having a olajx. on their ccr.u"on obedience," The
solo jus tif ic?.tion for jovernr.Dnt is that it be for -* '.ood of the
people. Fror^. the point of vier; of the individual, it nmst be
said that, "it is only as .ieKibei's of a sociarty, ar. recognizing
coLT'.on interests and objects, that individuals cor e to have these
attributes and tights; and the power, 'vhich in political society
they have to obejr, i ; dei'ived fi^oi.. the development and syster.a-
tization of those institutions for the regulation of a com on
life without which they would have no rights at all,
Hegel er-phasized v.ore Tvhat the irdividual could do for the
ctate, although iu whiG process the in^liviaual found his true
freedom, llarx en;phasized what the state did to the class of
proletarians, and therefore to the individuals of that clsss.
It was because the state as he sari it degraded r.an that I.arz
concluded that if t.an 7/ere to be free, the state v7ould have to be
abolished.
40. Nettleship, r.OO, II, 415.
41. Ibid., 385,
42. Ibid., 428.

Greon agreed with Hogal that r.en needed the state for coi;.plote
developi-.Gnt , but he avoided ' ogel's tendency to slight individuals
in the interest of the organic v/hole. Green agreed v/ith I. arx that
states can bo repressive or paternal, but he avoided I arx's extrene
conclusion that all states r.ust be aboli?^hed. Gi'eeii contended that
state povzer r.ust be kept at a ciinimuTi., and that the n.iniii;uir. be of
a negative sort of rerioving the obstacles to individual developn-ent
.
In order that persons attain full developr.-ent , Greon believed
that personal property was needed. He insisted that every citizen
had a right to son.e propert-^. Ko- it would saeiu that Green is
Hegelian at this point, . u.- ..ogal placad great stress on . an's
need for property v/hich he could call his o\7n, I,arx believed that
r..an'c greatest need 'vas p'.^ivat? access to public iirovevty , ^ith
Larxian analysis Green obsei-ved that,
A man who possesses nothing but his po'vers of labour,
and who har, to sell these to a capitalist for bare
daily uiaintainance, r:ight as well, in r-jspect of the
ethical purposes -"hich the possession of property should
serve, be denied rights of property altogether,
The principle of private property is that everyone should be
protected in their pursuit of getting and keeping soi:.e property,
since propei'ty is a -^.aans to s elf -realization, , Since abilities
43, Kettleship, '.VOG, II, 525, It should be noted that Green's
affiliation vrith or antipathy to Larx was implicit and 'not explicit.
The word i-^rx does not even occur in PTE or the three voluKe 7/OG,

arc different, unequal possession is a natural result, Fo-' the
L.ost part GroGU saw no injustice in this, but hs did recognize
that land involvocl a difforer-t probler.'. f ror.: r.oney. The possession
of a lar^i'o sui.. of u-onay in the hands of one person does not neces-
sarily uean that soreone alee -rrould have to have less. '-Hth le.rA,
ho?.'ever, the tionopolization by one could not help but mean that
some v.ould have to take less or even go v7ithout. Improper use of
property, then, T7as certainly an evil. Property, like everything
else, should bo adrdnistered so that self -realization for all is
not obstructed. Green did not conclude with l.arx that the capitalistic
system ',vas to blame for the unjust property situation. Green believed
that a more adequate -state control of the ^^ay in '.vhich land rights
were acquired and used would 5olve the difficulty. In this legis-
lative control the state was exercising its negative function as a
rei. 0"\''er of obstacles,
4. The Rights of the Individual A^-ainst the State ,
Green shors a fin 3 ':il".::ce between Hegel and in his
attitvu.e ttj?.'ard the right of i. uividuals against the st:.t3.
Green begins by the very Hegelian statement that "there can be no
-h-^ "':o ^T-^n'-'^T- +v, ^ i of str.te ^-.'z-'-^t in "'1:.? i v,-f;-re:^+ of
tne o.t:te."~" Since individuals havo. non.e of th? general rights
^4. V + ! ^^--i-, lO'l, II, 453,
/\
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( save tho ri :ht to s alf -p-'oservatior and the right to elf-
willing) apart frorj the state, thoy havG no basis for their con-
plaint that their rights are being infringed upon. Green stated
that the citizen cannot ^ave any right against the state, "in the
sense of a right to act otherwise thah as a L.eLiber of soi.e society,
the state being for its ner.bers the society of societies, the society
in "/hich all their clair.s uoon each other are r.-utually adjusted."
This being true, how then, asked Green, can individuals lay claici
to rights against the. state? Individuals ought to obey even bad
laws as a genci'al rule.
Having said this, Green repeated the question: "Has the indi-
vidual no rights against enactr;.Qnts founded on ir.perfect viens of
social V7ell-beinv:?" His answer -as lass dogi..atic than his
previous ones. "Ha has no rights against ther:. fourded on any
right to do as he likes," This qualifies the issue by the ir plicit
as5U].>ption that there is sor e basis upon '^hich individuals L.ay
have the right to oppose the state. This basis. Green says, is
the self-realization of persons. In order to oppose the lar/s, the
individual s.ust be able to- shov/ that there is a public interest,
45. Tlettleship, '^OG, II, 452; also 370,
46. Ibid., 455.
47. Loc, cit.

generally recrgniaed, t'^r '- : abrogated, '''s anding that t^^^'
inf i'ingeaent unst ba tjOnai'aily -'ecognized as such, Green avoids
having to support a i-i::oi-ity or oven one i..an crusades against the
lav;, Lar/s should be obeyed— oven bad la'vs. ] a^- "should do all
he can by legal luethods to get the cor-:i and cancelled, but till it
is cancelled he should confoix. to it."
By der:anding that the i asses recognize a breach of right Green
avoids t' e anarchy to v/hich Ivarx's position leads, I'arx is certainly
core Kantian, or atoi istic, whe^ it cor..es to the right to revolt
than are either piegel or C-r-en. If, said Green, the v?.st r.ajority
of people see that a lav/ is bad, then the breaking of that la\7 vould
r.,ake no "breach in the la-.7-abiding habits of th ; people," On the
other hand, if the breaking of an evil law, such as the act of befrien-
ding a slave, leads to general anarchy, then the duty of the citizen
to law as such takes prece':lencc over the duty to insure rights for
slaves. Green's irtelleccual position on this i.at:er is cor.iparable
to that of Socrates in Plato's Apology and Crito. In €.y.j civil
question the in':^ividual ought to act so as to contribute to the
-'Gll-03ing oi- iio^te, "^^
48. i:ettleship, WOG, II, 417,
49. Ibid., 457.
50. Ibid., 421.
I
Having x:.ade this coti j- ii '^ ^ncy'- " 'i 5.+-^ ci V-.:it under con-
ditions where the governi,.or.t ic so i.a/^agjud that there are no
legal i..eans of obtaining the repeal of unjust la-;7S, there ir.ay
bo a "duty of i-esistanc? . " Any l^i- that trar sg:r'3S'5 3P t^^ n cor-j or
good, infringes on rights;. and it nay ue thus a duty uO resist
such a law. The test then, as to whether resistance is right if
not that tho majority wills it, but that the resistance is for the
cou.ron good. On this oasis even a r..inority r«ay be justified in
resisting if their resistance, does not proi-ote anarchy. But Green
goes even further in ad;:;ittinj- that there i.ay be tiros when the l«w
5is so perverted that ever, anarchy is not too great a price to pay.
Green's position nay then be as revolutionary as that of 1 arx,
but the qualif icatio: " " :^ - <?o exacting that act ial r3volt 'vould
rarely be justified. Yet, the possibility is provided for.
Green surx arizes this well in a statement in. .is "Principles of
Political Obligation."
On the other hand, it is under the worst governtients
that the public spirit is t.ost crushed; and thus in.
extreme cases there l ay be a duty of rasistance in tho
public interest, t'-iough there is no hope of the resistance
finding efficient popular su:^port. (An instance is the
Lazzinian outbreaks in Ital/y). Its repeated rene'val
and repeated failure may afford the only prospect of
ultirately arousing the publi-c spirit which is necessary
for the maintenance of a government in the public
interest.
51.1;ettleship, V/OG, II, 4-22.
52. Ibid., 424.
53, Ibid., 423.

As far as roforff jiiover. ents arc concernad, Green took an active
share. Although he did not enter ir.to the actual problei-.s of L.any
political refOiT'3 in his lectures, he did clarify the presuppositions
which were iviplicit in the life of the state. Ho did not say -rhat
kind of political organization was the best, but he did say thsat
\jhat3ver kind there ras should aiv/ays oxorplify the prer.'.isa that
"will, not force, is the basis of the State," It '•/as in his
"Principles of Political Oblijjation" that the speculative and prac-
tical i'-terests which i.j ..ad find a r. eeting place i^.ost clearly,
Ritchie has said of Green,
Ke went straiijht frou tho declaration of the poll, when
he was elected a toun councillor, to lecture on The Cri-
.tique of Pure ..oason, Ko -Tas rob. ed of his sleep by
thinldjig about the 3a stern Question and dreading lest
the country should be driven by L.otives 'of -vhich perhaps
a diffued desire for excitcr.ent has been the rost inno-
cent,' into what he regarded as an indefensible and un-
righteous war. Ilis strong opinions on the liquor traffic
-vore in his onn j_ind directly connected 'vith his con-
ception of the ethical end and the nature of rights,
5, The .dght of the State bo Carry on lar
.
Green's position Tith regard to the justifiability of "^ar is n
nearer to that of Lar:c than to thr.t of lljyel, Hejel had asstired
that tho state had an unquestioned rirrht to oxecute v/ar on it behalf
and to expect that the citizens -.Tould participate. Green consistently
54. Ritchie, PSI, 131-132.

strassad the fact th^.t the prii ary task of tho stata wa? the develop
r_ent of persona, and tmless the state aided in this process, it had
no valid excuse for existerce. Oraan said, "Hence there is no
ground for. holding that a state is Justified in doing whatever its
interests seen: to require, irz-espactivoly of the of facts on other
The i-^ternati'' nalisi;. of '"i-e-ar iz brouj^ht out at this t)oint.
It is not that Herel s t>eoi7 aiu not i' ply universalis:-, ;uit that
Hegel doubted that states could co-operate, Fegel expected that
on the international st?.ge 'var had to be a factor i.aking decisions.
In fact Ilegal sug-ested ohat a state illustrated strength and glory
in participating in a .var. Green dif:^ered sharply from Hegel on thi
":'ot onl-j did ''roen sstablish the idea of a universal brotherhood in
tha relation botv/oen states to aach other, bux no stated positively
that T/ar is not an es ential attribute of the state as such, in
its proper condition; it i^ ratber the a-ttribv.to of a parM^ular
state, in an i;..p9rfect cor.dition.
There is no such thing as an inevitable conflict
between states. There ir- nothing in the nature of
the state, given a i-ultiplicity of states, shovild
u&ke the gain of the one the loss of the other.
The TiOre perfectly each one of thani attains its
proper object of giving free scope to the capacities of
all persons living on a certain range of territory, the
easier it is for others to do so; and in proportion as
they all do so the danger of conflict disappears, ^°
55. IJettlaship, •70G, II, '479.
56, Ibid., 476-477.

Thus, there v7as no reason ^hj 7?ar could rot be abolishf?d. In
this he certainly disagrn- • -Hf' o-al.
In all three of these conceptions— his internationalisr;,
his idea that war was an avidence of an inperfect state, and his
idea that war could be abolished. Green was certainly in accord
with Larx, I arx's political philosophy airbed at internationalisr..
He looked at the wars between states as dynastic or econoric in
their cause and as ii:ckin^; no constructive conti'ibution to the needs
of the i:.assQS, Such wars would disappear -.'ith the state. 3ven
class wars would disa'opear as ;.ankind becare nore and i-.ore one
class, '.oth r en anticipatoa a warloss world. Green tjion considered
the right of persons co Idfo with the fact that war takes away life.
?I3 believed that wai* was not i.urdor althouTh he was equally cer-
tain xnat the loss o:.' i.^. "ar could ..oi uu explained as otlier
than an abrogation of i an's ri^ht to live. But in war two factors
are absent' that are present in rxirder. These factors are: 1) the
end of war is not personal ^ain, although it :..ay be national gain,
2) there is a general absence of personal nalice or hatred. ^'
This is r3co;yni2ed rener-^.lly in wars ton-ny, T^ius t'-e soldier r a;"
kill Gori-.an soldiers o^' civilians during fori al coi-bat, but during
57. :--ttleship, 466-4-67

the occupation aftar su-'.-endor, tha sai..3 soldier ray be tried for
i.urdor if ha kills even a soldier of the enercy vrithout cortain
jus tif ication.
The state r.>ay sho-/ that T/ar helps to prevent a ,..o. j serious
rvTonc;, but it cani.ot sho?7 thereby that there is no ".vron^ in the
death of participants, "];o state of war can r.ake the destruction
of I. an's life by i..an othei' xhan a wronr, tl.oujh the 'vronfj is not
always chargeable upon all the parties to a T^/ar," ° Green con-
c lude d
:
^u. conclusion then is that the destruction of life
in ^ar.,, is al-rays wrong-doing, with v/housoever the
guilt of the T/rong-doing r-.ay lie; that only those parties
to a war are exerpt froi:. a share in the guilt '.vho can
truly plead that to theru v/ar is the only j...Gans of :.uain-
taining the social conditions of the r.ioral davelop-
nent of r..an, and that there have baan vary fev; cases
in which this plea could La' truly i ade.
58. IJettleship, '.VOG, II, 4-76.
59. Ibid., 473.
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CHAPTER IX
THE DBPii. Dj..C!j; OF IvJlRX Ax^D Qu Hs3GSL FOR THSIR HilLOSOPHY
OF TliS STATE
Ths study of the influence of ^egel on Larx and T.H.Greon
in tho philosophy of the state has revealed Kore of an indirect
and negative influence than a positive one. Although both
I-arx and Green were Hegelian students, thoy neither followed
the letter of his law nor car-e to the sar o conclusions -lith
regard to the validity of his principles. Lar:s: and Green, in
r.any aspects, interpreted Hegel alike, but they .jvaluated hiii
differently.
The doidnant aspects o. 3„ol's philosophy of the state
i.ay be su:.^ arized as follows.
1, The state represents the r.eans through -cyhich ;:an vay
realize his capacity for fraedoi.. Only in the state relationship
can .- an achieve this freedo:;-. This rests in part on the thesis
that the true is the whole, and that the state represents whole-
ness,
2, As 2:an becot.es r.ore reasonable, i:ore rational, the state
becor.es x-.oro organized, tore concrete. In its pri:..itive beginnings
the state arises out of the conflict of classes.
3, Although in theory Hegel aiie^ed at freedor. for tho indi-
vidual, in practice he subr.ierged the individual in the over-n-helv- ing
pov/er of tho state

4, Tlie unity of the stato y.ii.st not be marred by any
checks and b^l3nc3S theoi'y of ';ovGrnr. ont . If nocc^Pary
this u.-ity ;. ust be forcaj. -j Griticiz jcl ds;. ocracy in tliis
respact as atomistic In order to gain this stato unity,
Hsgel appealed to r^ti'y-^-'l ^^.-VH ot is^r .
5, Classes ai'^ foii gu on Gi..8 oasis o2 the division of
labor, thus there are as A.any classes as there are kinds of
-.70 rk
.
6, Property is necessary to help r.an realize his individuality.
An inequality of distribution is natural on the basis of the
inequality of skill.
7, Slavery '^^s opposed because of his idea of freodosi.
This slavery was, however, rore intellectual than economic,
for Hegel excepted wage slavery,
8, In line with this, Hegel tended to undarestinate the
possibilities of the x-iasses and overost ixiate the disinterested
powers of the ruling classes,
9« War was not only a necessity, but a glorious opportunity,
"Jai" holped iken realise their true dignity. Long periods of peace
debilitated ken, 7iar was not advocated bet-.?een classes noi" r.-;?iiist
the state by the citizens of the state, but rrars betv^oen states
'.7ere inevitable and honorable, especially "vhen ••raged by a siore
spiritually advanced state against a less spii^itually ad-'anced one.

In certain rare instances vrhero the orancipation of spirit
dei.anded it, revolutions v/ere justified, ^^eg-el believed
that the French Revolution -^as such an instance. History
shows that progress is Kovinj under the impetus of battles
between the itore advanced and loss advancod states,
10. To these ideas t.ust be added the driving Ishesis
of tbe dialectic. Life L^oves in a thesis, antithesis, and
synthesis fashion, VJhen one atteupts to evaluate any single
fact of life, the pi'inciple of negativity as part of the
dialectic dEmands that one consider also "hat has he^M oi.itted.
This contir.UGS ondlessly c until all facts have ij^on oonsidered.
Thus r:an faces an "unendliche Aufg-abe." Hot until i an considers
the vrhole "/ill he h?ve the r.ost adequate vie^r of things.
The history d pnilosophy since I-ejel's deatn reveals that
his influence was rost co'^-ple::. Up to the tiro of his death no
clear or searching criticises had been r-.ada of bis syster.i. But
when the great vaster died there was no one to take the lead in the
battle of wits, and as a result the cofc^plexity of his systo*: pro-
'iuced a i ultir?] ioitr of schcc^'.s. '"oth I.-arx aiT^ ^ro'on -'^re :;ar. jht
in the .'.ogeliari reaction, _.otli of theu were intarosted otu.d3nt3
of his philosophy though they ^ere not ardent follo\7ers of the
^ri". ".ipl,.-' of hj.s philoco-'^- c" ?, state, Ir. cort?.i-^ -^.spects
i..arx and Grjau were influjnced positively out x-Ox-e often nega-

tively by Kegel in their uhilosophi js of the state.
The jcost fundamental positive influence of Hegel on
both larx and Green was in the j.atter of the dialeotical
principle, I. arx testified to his dependence upon Hegel for
this significant thesis of his own philosophy of the state.
Eo\7ever, Hegel interpreted this dialectic as involving the
growth and developicent of spirit, ".'hile l.arx interpreted
the dialectic as involving prii/arily the developtient of
cono; i:; conditions. It is trv3, ho-9Ver, that Hegel did
consider o'j..av i,l:aii opix'ivu.al xao^u.-s, .yj.'^^- as ^,-00 ^i'aphy
,
cultural environr.er.t , and econoi ic conditions, but his over-.
heli-.ing et'phasis was on spirit. Larx, in his tui^n, did e:..-
phasize other than econoric facte.-s, such as art, education,
and general cultural conditions, but his over'.7heL*ing emphasis
as u-oo"- yconc' i iaoto-'n . Tl- 0 ".-.•ry root of the stru -lo
-.'licl:! was iniiQro:.;t i.i i..ai':;'G systoi:. cai 0 froi* Kegel's pxUiisiple
of the dialectic, '^'.10 dialectic presupposed a constant battle.
In P^egel s philosophy of t'-^o s 'sate tnis "T'?^ G-^r.to: i" -^d in '.^ars
between states. In l arx' 3 philosophy of tlie state ti:is was
jpitorized in the class struggle.
Green, like-rise, was influenced by Kegel's dialectic.
He agreed explicitly with Hegel that the purpose of the evolu-
tionary tiover.ent of life -vas to yrotote the freador.. of ran.
( I c
I
Greer. ..isa^jraaci L;^ax-^pl;,- -/it'i .-jgal, howevar, on tha matter
of the \7arlikeuo3s of the dialectie. Green contended that
the ^'ocd v,as non-oo^ petitive, and that war was not rsVi^^al
or nucessary olos^ent in pro^jress,
A further ir.stance in which I.arx and Graan rare positivoly
influenced by Hojsl is in r/f j j.a+lier of iraTdoi , Hegel's priz-ary
theoretical concern -.-ras that j^an develop spirit oi" freadoi.. In
this process Kegel believed that the state -.Tas basic. It expressed
a fui:'^?: "rtal reasons blaness , In his POH and his FOR Hegel
traced, the developr^snt of states and showed hov* their advance
should be i easured in terr.s of the freedoEi vrhich they provided
for the citizens. Ancient state, such as China and India, r/ere
severely criticized becauf^e they held the jf-asses in a bondage of
ignorance and oppression. Later states, such as Germany, France,
the United States of Ar.erica, and England were pi-aised because they
developed free and rational citizens, Witliout the state the people
could not attain this frecdoi. of spirit,
ban: '.ras also concerned that peapxj i acu. j ; c.'e ir:-'-;, but
freedor. for hir.: r,'as priy.arily a r^atter of econoi ic liberty,
;;r:: testified to t^e feet that Hegel's theoi'ies wore sytipathotic
to :.-3 p^'o ...uoticii 01 ore; li'oouot., but he contended that Hegel'
s
practical application of his theories frustrated freedor. To

^egin 7/ith tho stat'i v n '-.
.^ovido foi* 9conoi.:ic
.
..•3 j„c.
.
As far as Larx could sq9, scatas ware repressive DOT^'ors
forcing the 'Till of rinori-tios on y.ajorities. If the stats,
as Iiegel claii-ad, 'vas th3 u.'.^:.:.i2ation that oould rako L-on
frea, why were so r.any in scono:' ic bondage? That uqv. had
-acoi.-e jr^oi'e free in the Ger:'ani':; states an'"! in the Unito':";
States of Aj-.-rica than tho;
, i:i J.,i.,a, ;.,-rx aax..ittGd.
jjut ho added that while the sinds of sojv.e ten have been
liberated froju i^^nox^aroe an.; iha bodies of so;:e froi . c'is-3r,S'3,
and ',7hile the Ref oi'...aticn ...auo all uen theoretically citi::o;-:s
of rorth; still the fact roiBined that the vast t.ajorities of
T7ere still in such econoi-io
-aiit t'-^r.t tho freodor"- to pursue
aducational and cultiu-al interests, the freedor to have healthy
bodies and elevated j-.inds, th:3 freedor. to be \7ell-f 3d, voll-
clothed, and \7ell-hous3d ^-^rt'.lly denied the^\.
Lars's solution -./as still a state, at 1 ^ast in the First
Phase of tho cor:- ur.ist society. Although the Second Phase is
not clearly described, I.arx's i: plication is that hovevor .v..
function by the free choice of citizens, it uill still be a state
in the sense of an organization.
Green spoke with favor concerninj Hegel's concern for freedot.
He agreed with Hegel that the state played a vital part in the
achieving of freedor... The state protects i.an and provides a way

for his self -realization. It ic interesting to note f.^.at
Green f-^akes no x ention of l.arx. 'Lvon the nar.e door; rot
occur in the three volujio '.VorRs of Green by ^ett leship..
Green criticized Hegel, however, for his statist-.. He
aintained th?.t Kegel actually uoi.iou ^r^ejiOi to t en by
his overwhelMing stress on the state. In Hegel's state
x..an becare K.erely a r.eans to the glorif ic::tion of the state.
The influence of Hegel on : s.rx and Green is further
seen ir the jaatter of the function of the state. Hegel
favored a free political lifo ir. principle; yet he insisted
in practice that in the last an-lysis the state should take
precedence over the individual. He '-as so concerned that the unity
cf the st^^t-^ raintained that enforcenent of a unified opinion
'.as jv^stified. Although- Hegel recognized that souo states r..ay be
so evil that they ought to bo destroyed, still state unity ought to
be preserved virtually at all costs. One of Kegel's criticises
of the dei-ocratic state -as' that it 'ip.s so ator.istic that it
v'eakened state unity.
'Ihile Hegel elevated the authority of the state to a
position of dominance over the citizens, Larx reacted v/ith
the elevation of a planned e6onor y to a sir-ilar dor.drance.
As far as the First Phase v/as oonoorm^c i.,:.rx'j planx.ed econory

-:i?.s cortainly as regir-ientiva as Ke-cl's state, but the
difference, ^"arx affirmed, 'vas that -^'i - latter provides for
the welfare of all, while the forKer pi^ovides for the welfare
of the -few, Larx evaluated Ke^'el s laissez-faire attitude
the field of econorijs as^a syi-bol of bourgeois exploita-
tion. This econorlc anarchy left the masses at the wercy of
the barons of ownership, Hegel appealed to a national patriotisM,
v;hilG i arx appealed to a olasc loyalty. Although Hegel decried
revolutions, L.arx considered ther.; essential to state iripr overrent,
Gr^en agreed with Hegel in spirit that the l aissez-faire
3zcno'L.-j l.aa i-.aritorious aspects, but he agreed in principle
with Larx that actual events show that great xiasses fail to get
oven the necessities of lif -3 u.nder such a syster-., Groen bolie-"'Td,
ov;ever, that this iiiequ'^lity coul-.l l.3 solvijvi jy legislation ^overninj
property ownership and use, and that the capitalist syster. as su.ch
;7a3 not at fault. •'he state, said Green, ought to function as
the ret,:over of obstacles to self-realization. Both laissez-f sire
and planned econoi-y entered into his solution. The state /ac not
an agent that did things for -people, T]-:g st'^to nrr^ideu for the
opportunity for individuals bo do things for thei-^salves, Eut when
individuals prevented others froL. self-realization, and when
obstacles v/ere put in the way of self-developi-.ent , then the

state ou^ht to abandon a laissos-f aira a':titud9 and adopt an
interventionist position. This intervention would involve,
ho-vrever, onlv ths re: oval of barriers, and -'ould be in spirit
like L.arx's Reich aar -^^'oi oit, Orcjn Ljnli3vou thG,t the state
oujht to be preserved frowi anarehy. To this end, even bad la\7S
cu-ht to be obeyed rather than run the risk of throwing a
state into a coi^aitioii of anarchy. If, horever, a i-ajority
believed the la'r to bo evil, then no harii -.Tould be done to the
general belief in lawfulness if this particular one ^^ere
i(-nored or disobeyed, '^s a last resort Green conceded that
even a revolution < ay be necessary. The qualification for the
need for such a revolt is that obstacles to self-realization
'sculd be reroved, that they could be ree^ovod in no peaceful
v/ay, and that the result of the obstacles •.ras so evil that the
risk of anarchy v;'ould not bo tec great a price to pay.
Green agrees in spirit v;ith Hegel's attitude toward crir e
against the state. Both Hegel and Green were persuaded that
the state was essential to personal dovelopy.ient , an:! therefore
should be protected froBt the anarchy of indifference to property
or contract rights. Acts ag^iinst property and contract underrine
the unity of the st^rto, so it is essential that they be consi-
dered ci'iras anri punished accordingly. Both uan agreed that the

punish/r.en-t ought to ba ref o.'t.atovy, Punishr-.ent
,
they agraod,
was not intended to ..ate out 3yo for gyo and toctli toi" tooth
retaliation uut to sat up aoti^.'i'^ir.ts to tha rene'^^'al of crii:-.e
and to re.:.ov3 obstacles to S3lf-develop/:ent.
Since I'.ary "-cs no concer- -^il '-''i-t t^^a precent stat? con-
tinue, he was not concoiT.Gd over 3o-cailed crii..-G, Si^jce i.:ost
criiuos -Tere ag inst property, it r^as natural, said l.arx, that
the courgeois state be conccrn?d, "^he ' ourgeois state, ho''H\''er,
ought not exist, •'•he revolt of the jc.asses against the present
property conditions was essential to the procuretisnt of freedou
for all. The result was that ! arx did not consider crire in its
reference 'to the state, although he did think of it as perpetrated
by the bourgeoisie against the p.'olotariat
.
All three en recognized the fact of classes. They disagreed,
hovrever, as to their definition and function. Hegel had said
that classes were forced on the basis of the division of labor,
a fact \7ith vzhich Larx agreed, liegel had continued that the
division \Tas on the basis of occupation and product. Thus thare
vera as i any different classes as there -ere occupations, Larx
said that this analysis ?ras sxiperf icial. Occupational distinc-
tions wore a ifeinor natter, -'•he significant fact r'as that thare
tv7o i-ajor groups: those ".vro ovnna the r'.Gans of prodxiction and
those who did not. ''^his distinction, said Larx pointed out that

^hile one to-i'oup had free access -to the ) oans of production
and of gaining \7Galth, the other group (which was by far
the larger) had to depend upon the chatity of the fori'.or
if it were to have the }.iiean3 of subsistence. It is illogical
to suppose that the owners of the x-.eans of production will
play Santa Glaus to the have-nots, '•here are great profits
at stake for the owners and we ought not expect ther to
give thai,, up voluntarily so that the i:.asses I'ight live da-
CTrtly, A usurpation by violanr^o, if necessary, is needed to
disenthrone the few and put the i^any in ixntrol of the iiieai.s of
production*
Green leaned in the direction of Hegel in his feeling
that classes are not necessarily antagonists; but ho agreed in
spirit with l^-arx that the question of O'.-znership was one that needed
ans\Tering. Green, however, believed that even as the individual
was of r ore significance th/^-- ':'! 5 st-^te, so he was also i ore sig-
nificant than the class, as ...ai'x's class transcended individual
states. Green's individual transcended classes,
Hegel and Green agreed in principle that private property
-.as essential to the realization of the individual. Property,
said Hegel, was oa T-.eans wherby persons Kay develop their potenti-
lities of Spirit. Green said that private property -as necessary to

self-realization. Both r gn recognized that in a sycter; 'ihero
persons could freely on barp.'is a , oho ^-ora capable '"oulcl ^-et
. ore than the Isss capable, ^reen, however, Tras concerned
that the free-cnterpriso systeii broke doT7n V7hen all the available
property had been taken, i.e-.vcoi»iers found that there v/as no
property for then.. Gr:3on believed that this could h-j solved
n ''Bvis-jd 3vst9:- of p^.-o^orty O'.Tnership, In soi .0 casos
this v/ould i,..ean the broakup of large estates; in ouhers it
^/ould Kaan that where property embraced -'ital tieans of production,
the st ite v/ould take a hr.i- in r,-;i.ovin^' obstacles to the use
of these ):-eans for the sail" -aevolopi-^ent 0:^ all,
Larx recognized th.at in the first phase private p^-oporty
.. ould bo continued since people r;ere too aceuctor.od to it
to give it up so easily, and also because lie observed that
people- who had property oi' '7ho had the hope of gettin^^ it, had
i ore incentive to labo.-, l.arx said that what was needed. ras
not a r..0i-e universal disti'ibution of private property, but a
t.ore universal access to vital property. Lore public property
v/^s T.'hat v/as needed. The econov-ic ".'ant of the r.as'ses r ay be
interpreted as due to a lack of .personal property, but this
is a superficial observation, "^he underlying; cause is that
vital x-.eans of production are already in private nauds, and

the result is that the trasses have no froo access to ther.
The rolution is ^Toup ownership of the i.eans of production.
Under the First Phase this jr-oup would be the proletariat.
Under the Second Phase it would be the vrhole body of \7orking people
On the subject of -ar the :,ost diverse opinions arc re-
presented, Hegel's dialectic v/as syr-'pathetic to the Dan7inian
idea of struggle and battle. Hegol believed that ^ar helped
^.ar. realrze hia ui^-nity, an-i no c only this, but that a long
peace debilitated society. '-'Jar was as natural and glorious
to Hegol as political actiy^':-^ T/as to the cultured Greek
of Plato's day. Unlike r.a_.\., ;iegel af.'irrod that v/ar between
nation states nas inevitable. It -Tas part of the dialectical
dQvelopx.'.Gnt , In general, hcvever, clarr -'.-irs -.r '' rs a';"iiist
the nature of the state were prohibited. In rare instances,
however, Hegel justified soixe x'evoluljion if it aided in ar an-
cipating spirit, ^ho French I'-evolution was such an exaz-^plo.
In general Larx accepted Hegel's dialectical it.plicaticn that
struggle was basic. Both he and Sngels congratulate Hegel on
this ocoi'e, I.arx reacted against Hegel's attitude to',7ard .var,
hor/ever. This vias not because I alirx ^ras opposed to violence, but
because nars between states -rore inimical to the best interests
of the masses. Inter-state -/arfare '.vas dynastic or econor.ic in
purpose. Such v/ar -as intended to strengthen the pov;or of the

state. It was intended to p--oc\:r? r.or/ colonies Oj.- rarkets,
or to pi'otect the colonios ai.d . ^rkeos already obtained.
After -varE v/ere ovej; bho lot of the i.assGS -.^as usually
still tho sar3. They v/ara still the wage-sl-vos of coi^-io..^at9
. onopolias. Class ;7ars, ho-avor, '-arc nocacsary oo rei.ova
ha obstacla of the private o-^n'^rs of the Koans of production.
Such Tarfare right indeed bo bloody, but it ha'^- virtue
of i-'.proving the rf-elfara of tha xiasses of axploited peoplas.
It is coi-i only supposed that I aras ) ade no axcaption to ohe
n^ed for violent revolution. This is not tha case. 1 arx
specifically stated that in th^ case of advanced countries
like the Unitad States of Ar-erica and England the cow»unist
victory could coi.e vrithout violence bein;;; necessary. vVhather
it v/ould or not '^as another question. Thus L.arx and Hegel
differed not or the i^.atter of the lagitiz-acy of violence,
but in their ideas as to v/hat tha purpose of violanca -.vas.
7il£rs to strengthen tbe state \7orQ praised by Hegel and con-
demned by IJarx, Wars to strangthan tho p .olatariat 7/ere praised
by i:ars '.nd conacii.iiaa llajol.
Grean explicitly criticized Hegel and iviplicitly Larx for
sli:-htin'f tho indivir^ual in tha : atter of -var. "Jhathar the ^ars
...rj for the state o.' Jux' .::a claas, tha ii;diviaual still suffered.
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.'.<= ca. ._ot justify, said Gr3on, tho takinr of lifo, 'i^vo?'-' thov. -h
•3 can sho:.' that the 'var - ay avoid a groatei' ovil.
justify the ^ar as such if it could ba shovrn to rer.-Ove
^rGat9r' obstacles to self-r :3':.lization, Graer. f'iOLilt-
,
3i\ch situations voulJ jvgr arise.
The conclusion of the luattGr is that the influence of
.^"1 cr I. r:: t^.r'"" Gr-vjr --^r^ : cat significant in t'^'j '-^s? -
idea of the dialectic aiu in ^uq or.phasis upon xreaaoi..
Further than this the influence is jtore negative than positivo.
Hegel pointed is simp, ^r- 5- '^'^-c ; •
:
the:.... Thus Kegel' 6 iii^'lujii^o oi.- . z.r'ji ana Green is in i^ae field
of basic principle of dialectic progress, while in the field of
practical lication bot'a \ i^rx .".nd Green 'verc objectors rather
than follo-.rers.
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ABSTRACT
Uha-^tar I
It is the purpose of this study to investigate the
irfluGnco of Kegel on I. arx and T, H, Gr-^n in tho philosophy
ci „;.e state, Sinoc ohe probleids of political philosophy
revolve around the Major is-ua of the relation of the individual
to the ^tats, it i: - —tr m^i^ .-v.
-to understand how each
of these isn iuterp.'ot eu t.iij relation anu then to see ho't Hegel'
interpretation affected those of Larx and Green. Both Larx and
""r-.-.T: att!-?st to th3 fact of Hegel's influenco upon thei*«.
Jh.aptor 11
The literature dealing with the philosophies of the st?'.t3
cf Kegel, l.arx, and Green supports the tliesis that the lat i;er
two '.rere influenced by Hegel.
Chapter III
Although Kegel placos oonsiderablj ;jt.'«c3 o;. jho imivi-
point of view of the
dual will and on freedo. of choice, tho^individual is but a
prelii;:inary stage to a ?.-or^ adequr.te viorr. i-oralitat( indivi-
dual ethics) has .0 ojuo.. j Ju;.c--.oiu zrA universal as Sittlich-
k9it ( social ethics).
Chapter 17
The following facts energo concerning- ^.ogel'n philosophy
of the State,

1. He sal considered the state to bo tho i.-oar. s by "'hich
the ethical ideal nf trBouo:. is reali^ju.
. ;lio: is
based on his conviction that the fundamental" principle of the
state is reason, and that reason'is the pre-reqiiisit o to
fr
.
2. Keli;3-ioii is a i^eans of preserving stat'? unity, but
because it emphasizes the •.vholo, 1.3., Goa, religion is also
an esprfissicn 01 the state at : x.i^:;9St dGvelopi.ent
, Since
reli£-ion represents wholeness, i.e., rationality, Hegel's
stat'?:ent that t'-e st'^.to nsts on relijicn is tantar-nunt to
-'-.yi.ig that tht; o^./be rcatc on reason.
3. The jroyth of the state is understood in the light of
certain facts.
1) -^-isto.y portrays the progressive struggle of »ajn
for freedoT in universality,
2) iwoason rules t'-o nrl-l.
3) L.an's gro\7th is . ected by his geographical
environi.ent
,
'1) 1. -^.n neo^ip sr. ^
-janized political life if ho is
to jcoi-.o I'u-.ly froo.
5) The state represents for i^an the concretion of his
perpetual strug-le '---•-•.d a miivorsal spirit.

4-, In his disciTSsioii cf
-^ho relation of t ^ /ili-'-' -lu?].
to the state, Hogol conoluuju chat:
1) Individuals find their meaning in the state, r.nd
apart fro:, it, V^'-- "v-vg ro spiritual developr ont.
2) The st'::te is, ihuo, .li^h.or than the individual.
In any issuj b3t;Te9n individuals- and the state,
the naed oT state unit^r takes proced over .w.y
noeci of ohe individuals,
3) Since the state provided for the rer.lization of i,nn's
right'-, 5.': i-a-i - '
-er right to dei and duties fror^
tho inaiviuual,
4) Revolution against the state is, for the r-ost ^art,
wrong; although I does nako . _ o. .or -.i.j ^o:,oi-
bility of ravol. Lion in rare inst^.nces ',7here the
leaders of the state are utterly unscrupulous and
where the „over ^.....o. -..or., i.j^lf. In his
criticisi of von Haller Hegel asserts that force is
not the uasis of ':he state.
5) The state has gIisj i-ight to aci and the services of
its citizens in ti: o of '-'ar. Since the "true is the
•'holo," the preservation of the state as a •vhol-i in
i orj ii-.por ta;..;, o-:an the preservation of the in.^ividual
as a part. Wars unify the state. Peace is stagnation.
War is glory and progress.
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5, TLo constitution of a stato reprasants the prosont
concretion of the principlos and lo.rs conceivod by tho ^lor.lo
to be necessary to pi-ovide for that troe dovelopient v/liioi:
leads to Spii'it,
.
6, The prince as an individual gives to tho other-Tise
abstract will of tho stato a pu-i-conal v/ill r/hich executes a
unified decision. Although the prince i'^ essentially a fipn-o-
head, the governnent is in tho hands of a 3ol3ct "-^I r.^-.sonable
fo'T. In this thesis Hegel illustrates hi^ lack of confidfjnce
in the >j.ass3S and his over-anthusiastic assut.ption that the few
officers of the stato rrill n-.-o- -t- t^o real n-i-ods of the nation.
7, Although the i. plications of riegel's dialectic are
clearly in favor of a unfied -jorld, he believed that no authority
existed to .docide disputes t .-ir— - nations. The anarchy of inter-
national relations led He^el to conclude hat where ; ore advanced
nations were endangered by lass advanced nations, the forxier were
justified in destroying or subduing the latter. Poth Hitlsr
kussolini justified their recent aggressions on this basis.
Chapter V
Larx considered previcuo and present traditional ethical
systems to be exploitive tool? in the hands of a bourgeois few,-
used against the proletarian r ass^s. Although f'arx's attit^ide
toward ethics was prir-:arily r.ogati-. i.iu ouuc^ri. I'cr the needs
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of the oppressed and his conf i-^.or.co in r.:an's capacity for
dovelcpront are certainly othical.
Chapter 71
Larx's philosophy of the state r..ay be sui;. ariZ'^-1
f ollov/s
.
1. Although Iv-arx accepted Hegel's dialectical method,
he believed that its abstractnass re'ld'jd to "ci r,o -^octed
by a practical prograi:. of acti( n. '^'he revolutionary impli-
cations of the dialectic in its dei-and for change and grovrth
'vere concoalod by "An-^l in th? r cr'',"':hical statisr. -hich he
proposed for his day.
2. i.arx recognized in theory other factors than the
econor..ic as cond5 1: l ; rVr
.
-ducaticn, i-usic,
environr.nnt
,
but in pw.-actico .13 stressed an econor;.ic deter-
:-inisK alt.ost to the exclusion of these other factors.
2, '?-'s first and pri- grou; ci_.^i..:.Gj ^3 co Ids
class and not as Hegel said to his state. Progress will cote
through a- terporary intensif t of class consciousness
to '
: 'cllovTed by th^ - classas alto^o.iior.
4, The state is the exploitive tool of the ruling or
bourgeois class. This "•ill - l^.ntod by the rule of tho
proletariat. The f?: ' .;c.. liguotioi fr33doi.,
in *i8h there will bo no state because there are no classes
to oppress.

5. In ovdefr to- bring; this about violent revolution itr
^9C9ssarT, but in cartain states,
-^h^ change ; ?- - j^.q- :
-'j p3ace:'ul i.3ars.
The aost positive influence of He-9l on both Karx and
".recn Tas in the r^atter of th dialectical principlo. this
-•ir.cipls I. arx fcundsd his revolutionary raover.ent, A second
influence of fle-el on Larx v7?.s in the concairjP for froedor.,
l.;arx differed, hov/cvor, in hiz idoe. as tr ' o- freedom. r;ould
be trou5;ht. H3:-;el uepund^id on the state for this. Larx depended
on the class. In spite of l.arx's aversion to th? irt^ite, his
soluti :n F^.i'st Phase
-.-as still a sta.y, a..^ rltrou-h
thu Sacoud Phase is not clearly described, his ir.plicati-.n is th
it will still be an or^-anization» ''/hilo l^vr. accepted the
f£ct nf ^ strife ir. :.aloctio,
. ^ .derated only class
wars ai.d con^deL-ned inter-stato v/arc as dynastic and iaperial.
Chapter VII
The ethical theory of i.. Groon io jased on the legitii.ac;
of the principle of self-realization. Green gives an integral
piece to the individual.
Chapter VIlI
In Green's philosophy of the state the follov^ing facts
ai-.er-e.
1. Kis Kai.tiw.i. ir. jo.pr j ;c.-..iGn o^ the significance of the
individual person causes hii.. to pv.t erphr.sis prir'.arily on the
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irj dividual o-rpr ri'-Tinst ths statn.
.
lias cv. essQntiall - uG-ative function as tho
rei over at obstacles to individual realisation.
3, Onl^r in so far ?. s th3 stftc! provides Tor :
roulisatici; of its citizens ao^o
-it fulfill its function.
i: uividual is ths basis of the state, an: the r .alization
cf the irrlividu?.! is the st?.te's crly excuse for existence.
-.
.
..^-..ou^.; the inaividual could in extretie instances
'e justified in revolting ag-aa.rst the state, in general, the
indiAn.dual curht to o'vi-^ -^-./n t,...,, -.ol-^-., •-v,,..
ri^.rovin^ the state which L.akes sei.f
-x-ealization possible
into anarchy,
•
The )f..sir. conclv.'?i---
~ issertatic;. u.. j ii^f lu^xvce
oi -e^-el on ^arx and Cr.e
.,3 philesophy of the state ajce
a? follows,
1. Althou-h both":.' ,-, .
^
^
' jj -1. J. ^ ^ J Ll .1 J 1 u o
in their use of the dialectic, they neither followed the letter
oi llGSsl r.or agreed
-^ith re-j.rrl +0 tho
-^rlidity of his r^rir—'-t--.
2. ;3l's insist: :. : ..i-bc ' ..al vas a frour
i ar w.:.s accepted by' both Larrr and Green,
3. ?Jhilo Hegel considered tho st^.to to be the rean.::
• can bQcoi..e free, La —
. agaii'.st '-hat he saw to be iho
practical though not theoretical justification which Hegel t^ade
1

for the status ::iio
,
and concludod that the state had to be
cli
.
inat3:'!
.
Gr'-'-.n a reed rith ^'p-^l, birh arife-T
-^^-at o-.
ei.phasis cu^vrt put on -bliG inuiviclual.
4., Hegel favored a centralized political life under a
laissez-faire economy, L.arx^antsd a free poll b-^ '-f -^
under a ri^id planned econo: y. In spirit Green .ollo vad
: arx in the Eiattcr of the free politic:il life, while he
follo'Jed Kegel in the la'-tor o:."" the laissgz-f ai: -j oconoLic
lif '3.
5. Hojel believed that dialectical progress: leads to
-ar, but -rar only in t'^- ...u preserving the state,
larx, follo\7ing the aialectic, a reed that violence r-.ay be
necessary, but only in the interests of establishinp- the
dictatorship of the proletariat,
-/hich would in turn -.rither
away, i.arx" said that in certain nations "iolent revolution
r^ight be unnecessary. Green robeller" r-.'^ninst the corpetitivr,
:-ature o' dialectic as
. i...?r-.j^;,
.... The destruction
of individuals could not bo justified either in the interests
cf the 'state cr of a class, hence, he denied theoretica-lly the
right of war,
6. The influence of Hegel on Larx and Green is r.ore
theoretical than practi"?!. In ratters of general theory
HG;;el's influ3U03
.
as pocitiva; in i: atters cf practipe Ids
influence v/as prirarily negative.
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chusetts. In the fall of 1944 he ^as awarded the Kent Fello-'ship of
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he was appointed the Borden Parker Eowne teaching fellorr in the depart-
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